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Buyer-Seller Relations, Prices and Development: A Structural Approach
Exploring the Garment Sector in Bangladesh
by Julia Cajal Grossi
This thesis aims at understanding how manufacturers’ heterogeneity affects the configuration of trading relations and prices in a
dynamic environment. The institutional context I study is that of the Ready Made Garment sector in Bangladesh over the 2005
- 2012 period. The research here represents a contribution to that goal in four dimensions. First, accessing customs records we
constructed a dataset containing buyer - seller trade interactions at a disaggregated level, including volumes and unit prices of the
traded goods and, for a subsample, prices and quantities of the inputs required for manufacturing them. This feature allows us to
go a step further than most studies based on matched importer - exporter data and opens a fruitful research agenda. Second, using
this dataset I offer a first characterisation of the dynamics of the relations between manufacturers and large international buyers
in matters of (i) duration of the relations, (ii) evolution of volumes, prices, orders and profitability over time, (iii) heterogeneity
of the manufacturers and (iv) the probability of trading links arising. I find that relations with large buyers tend to be exclusive,
that higher prices are associated with longer lasting relations, which tend to grow over time and fail whenever the manufacturer
starts dealing with another large player. Importantly, I present a characterisation of suppliers heterogeneity novel in the literature
and show evidence on two salient facts: the higher the heterogeneity across suppliers faced by a buyer, the more persistent its
relations are and the higher the markup the buyer is willing to pay .Third, I develop a dynamic discrete choice game of linking
and bargaining that realises those patterns in the data. I implement an algorithm that computes Markov Perfect Equilibria to
discuss aspects of computation, convergence and multiple equilibria in the game and I scan a large parameter space to characterise
the mechanisms that drive the dynamics in the industry. Fourth, I present the structural approach developed by Lee and Fong
(2013) for estimating network formation games with endogenous bargaining and discuss three aspects in which its application
is not immediate in my setting. These are related to (i) the availability of prices in our data, (ii) the difficulties in recovering
conditional choice probabilities from the data, and (iii) the construction of the distance score. These difficulties lead to a pseudo
Monte Carlo exercise that compares (sixteen) alternative estimation procedures. This preliminary study suggests that restricting
the objective function to the observed states, using an auxiliary parametric assumption on the conditional choice probabilities in
unobserved states and exploiting the data on prices could be fertile paths to explore towards adapting Lee and Fong’s approach
to estimate structurally the parameters of my game with the data we constructed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about understanding the mechanisms that drive inter-firm relations in
developing countries and, as such, falls between the fields of Industrial Organisation and
Development Economics. This ambition constitutes a long run research agenda towards
which the studies presented here are my first contributions.
There are three general questions I deal with in this thesis. First, how are export-
oriented manufacturers in developing countries selected into sustained trade with large
international buyers?. Second, what is the role of manufacturers’ heterogeneity and other
frictions in the selection process?. Third, how are the gains from trade appropriated
at each end of these relationships?. These being empirical questions, two operational
goals were in order: to construct a dataset detailed enough to shed light over relatively
undocumented features of buyer - seller relations and to adapt or construct a suitable
econometric approach to answer those questions.
Of this research plan, the thesis covers the construction of such a dataset, the description
of the most salient dynamic aspects of buyer - seller relations, the development of a game-
theoretic model in the tradition of the structural Industrial Organisation (IO) literature
that realises those dynamics and a first evaluation of structural techniques to estimate
this game with our data.
All the empirical work in this thesis looks at the Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector
in Bangladesh. I will exploit a unique dataset recording all the trade interactions be-
tween exporters in Bangladesh and international buyers, between 2005 and 2012, with
a considerable degree of disaggregation1. The setting, with regards to the industry and
country, is well suited for the purpose of addressing the research questions described
above for at least three reasons.
1Access to this data is framed in a larger Project under the direction of Prof. Woodruff and Prof.
Macchiavello. I gratefully acknowledge their permission to use this data as part of my doctoral research.
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First, the dimension of the sector relative to the country’s economy and its potential
as a driving force for development makes the RMG sector in Bangladesh worthwhile
studying in its own right. Bangladesh is possibly one of the leading examples of export-
led takeoffs of Low Income Countries in the last couple of decades. Each country with
its specificities, these experiences have either one or multiple industrial sectors as the
backbone of growth processes tied to an expansion in international trade. The demand
from the major consumers of RMG, Europe and US, has grown sharply in the last ten
years (see graphs C.1 and C.6 in Appendix C) pulling from the exports of the world’s
largest suppliers. This process has pushed Bangladesh into the status of second largest
exporter of RMG in the world, after China. This, in turn, has translated into an increase
in the number of garment factories, which has grown from 830 in 1990 to 5, 600 in 2013,
and a sharp expansion of employment in garment plants, from 0.4 million workers to
4 million workers over the same period (BGMEA). This figure represents more than
45% of the employment in the industrial sector and exported values in garment account
for approximately 82% of all the exports in the country. Together with the increase in
the international demand, relatively low wages and fiscal incentives driving the costs of
imported inputs down have aided this expansion. A policy review included in Appendix
E offers a racconto of the governmental and non-governmental policy efforts in this
direction.
Second, most of the empirical analysis in this thesis will focus in woven garments. For
this category of products, technologies are known to be relatively homogeneous, across
products and across firms, which will contribute to interpreting some of our results.
Similarly, the majority of the fabric required for producing woven garments is imported.
This will allow us to exploit data we have available on imports from garment manufac-
turers to infer input costs.
Third, when focussing in woven products, we can identify a small number of large buyers
that every year account for 40 to 50% of the demand for the main woven products in
Bangladesh. The size of these players, relative to that of their 5, 000+ smaller coun-
terparts, allows us to work at the level of inter-firm relations in depth in a framework
of imperfect competition. Statistics at the firm level for large and non-large buyers are
presented in tables C.14 to C.42 in Appendix C and a qualitative description of each of
these large players is included in Appendix J.
In this context, the first output of the research work contained in this thesis was
the construction of a dataset with features that, to the best of my knowledge, make it
unique. The primary source of our data is the compilation of mandatory export and
import records in the main Custom Stations in Bangladesh, between 2005 and 2012.
Each record constitutes a product (Harmonised Codes disaggregated to the sixth digit)
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within a shipment from a supplier to a buyer, taking place on a given date. These are
real-time records and include details on the statistical values, quantities, destinations
and specifics of the terms of trade. Importantly, they include identifiers for all buyers
and sellers. The format and conditions in which this data was obtained required a
large investment in cross-checking the data with other official sources of information,
unification of the records identifying firms uniquely and further robustness and quality
controls. The work done on this is documented in Appendices A and B. Although
other studies have exploited custom-based data with similar levels of disaggregation,
our dataset allows us to go one step further than previous empirical studies on interfirm
relations: for a subsample of the data, we can trace back the imported material inputs
required for manufacturing the garments fulfilling specific export orders. For each record
in this subsample of the exports data, we can identify who the buyer and the seller are,
link all the shipments that correspond to the same export order and characterise these
flows in terms of volumes and prices of output and inputs (mainly fabric). The details
on the matching procedure, assumptions and coverage are included in Appendix D.
We have not found so far precedents of a dataset containing information on input-output
matches, with the level of disaggregation of our data and with its extensive coverage. We
believe that the scope of questions that can be re-visited using this newly available data
is extensive. In this thesis I only explore a small set of aspects relevant to the questions
described above. By the time of this submission, there are two streams of ongoing work
in which I am involved, closely related to the research reported in this thesis. The first
one corresponds to joint research with Christopher Woodruff, Guillermo Noguera and
Rocco Macchiavello, on heterogeneity, value addition and upgrading2. The second one
focusses on heterogeneity and network changes after mergers and acquisitions. These
two topics are then excluded from what I report here and constitute examples of what
we believe is the potential of this dataset for advancing fruitfully in a research agenda.
The second contribution in this thesis is mainly contained in Chapter 2. Here I
characterise the relations between large buyers and RMG manufacturers. This part of
the thesis is related to recent contributions, mainly in the Trade literature, that use
exporter - importer matched data to study different aspects of inter - firm relations:
survival and search (Eaton et al., 2014), switching costs (Monarch, 2013), reputation on
quality (Macchiavello, 2010), trade intermediation (Blum et al., 2010) buyer and seller
heterogeneity (Bernard et al., 2014; Carballo et al., 2013) and (geographic) neighbour
externalities (Kamal and Sundaram, 2013), among others.
2Institutional affiliations and contact details can be found in
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/.
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I am able to use the data at the level of the orders to offer a reduced form characteri-
sation of (large) buyer - seller relations on (i) the patterns of survival and duration of
relations, (ii) the general time trends in volumes, prices, order allocation, inputs and
profitability over the duration of relations, (iii) aspects of firm-level heterogeneity and
(iv) network or link formation. The empirical regularities that are found in this analysis
show that both the intensity of trade and prices are positively related to the duration of
the relation. Opposite to the papers documenting that switches of suppliers are induced
by the search for lower prices (for example, Monarch (2013)), I find that manufacturers
that are paid higher prices during the first year of the relation are more likely to sustain
the relation onto a second year. The evidence I present also shows a picture of highly
persistent relations of almost exclusive dealing, where links with large buyers break with
a high probability whenever the supplier starts trading with another large player. For
established relations, I observe that traded volumes grow over time, induced by the
allocation of a higher number of orders from the buyer to the supplier.
The analysis in Chapter 2 offers three contributions. First, exploiting an econometric
approach imported from the literature in Labour Economics, I offer a simple way of
characterising exporters’ heterogeneity moving away from the paths that related papers
have chosen: estimating firm-level productivity, eventually, via a structural model or
assuming that the relevant dimension of heterogeneity is monotonically related to an
observable characteristic that can proxy it, in general, exported volumes. The approach
here recovers exporters’ types under relatively mild assumptions with a simple procedure.
Second, constructing a measure of heterogeneity, I document a novel fact on buyer - seller
relations: in the presence of high heterogeneity across potential unknown sellers, a buyer
allocates orders more frequently to his existing suppliers, relative to market conditions
in which the heterogeneity of the alternatives is lower. While this is compatible with
a number of existing theoretical models, the results presented here constitute, to my
knowledge, the first empirical collection of evidence of this type. Third, exploiting a
unique feature of our dataset, I find evidence of the existence of a ‘premimum’ for
heterogeneity in the price - cost margins buyers afford. Again, without imposing the
restrictions of a specific bargaining protocol, I show evidence indicating that markups
in garment orders go up when the heterogeneity the buyer is facing in its outside option
is high.
The stylised facts in Chapter 2 lead to the construction of a model that constitutes the
third contribution of the thesis. In Chapter 3 I develop a dynamic discrete choice
game of linking and price setting. The game follows the general structure proposed
in Lee and Fong (2013) for studying Markov Perfect Equilibria in network formation
games with endogenous bargaining. The model I present has three features compatible
with the reduced form evidence found in Chapter 2: first, buyers choose manufacturers
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competing with each other for suppliers of heterogeneous types; second, buyers pay a
sunk cost for forming a relation; third, surplus sharing rules vary with different large
buyers.
In simple terms, the game ‘starts’ with all buyers simultaneously choosing one supplier
from a list of available manufacturers by comparing partner-specific inter-temporal prof-
its. The profits derived under each possible choice depend on the cost of forming links,
a match-specific component, the future realisations of the network and the prices that
the buyer would pay under each configuration of the network. These prices depend
non-trivially on the choices of other buyers: the seller’s outside option is determined by
the offers it can obtain from other buyers that have chosen it as potential supplier. The
seller, capacity constrained, will only be able to produce for one of the buyers at most.
The interaction between (i) heterogeneity at the matching level, (ii) sunk costs of forming
a link and (iii) competition between buyers determine the architecture of the network of
trade and its prices. The more formal aspects of the game build directly on the work by
Lee and Fong (2013) and are therefore related to Ericson and Pakes’s framework to study
industry dynamics (1995). Most of the assumptions in the construction of the model are
based on well established contributions in structural industrial organisation and present,
notably but not exclusively, in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007); Doraszelski and
Pakes (2007); Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010); Hotz and Miller (1993); Pakes and
McGuire (1994); Rust (1994).
Among the various papers that propose dynamic oligopoly models, the specifics of my
setting make the game similar to those in structural papers that need to nest the com-
putation of the stage profits inside of the dynamic programming problem defined by the
corresponding value functions (Benkard, 2004; Markovich and Moenius, 2008). In par-
ticular, analysing industry dynamics in the light of networked strategic interactions, my
framework is related to the work by Aguirregabiria and Ho on the US airline industry
(2010; 2012).
The bargaining aspect of the game is related to the work by Dranove et al. (2011),
whose theoretical construction follows Stole and Zweibel (1996). The distinctive feature
of my game is that the evaluation of disagreement points accounts for the effects of
disagreement in current negotiations and the future realisations of the network. Lee and
Fong’s setting accommodates this possibility and a small game with a static example is
presented in Appendix H.
The final sections of Chapter 3 implement for the first time Lee and Fong’s algorithm to
compute Markov Perfect Equilibria of the proposed game, repeatedly over a fine grid of
parameters. This allows me to discuss issues around convergence, computation costs and
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multiplicity. The final remarks in this chapter emphasise the mechanisms that induce
the empirical observations in the institutional environment I study3.
The fourth outcome of my research is reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The
game theoretic model presented in Chapter 3 offers the structure needed for ‘recovering’
the parameters that characterise the salient facts documented in Chapter 2 on inter-
firm relations in the RMG sector in Bangladesh. The dataset available to us contains
information on the two relevant market outcomes: who trades with whom at each point
in time, and what the price in each of these interactions is. Observing input costs helps
construct measures for the value of each relation free from generalising assumptions on
the cost side.
The formalisation in Chapter 3 suggests three sets of parameters in the model: a scalar
containing the sunk cost of linking, a vector of bargaining parameters (one entry for
each buyer) and a matrix containing a match-specific quality (one entry per poten-
tial pair). Chapter 4, in this preliminary version of my structural work, treats the
matching-qualities as observed and reduces the parameter set to the cost of linking and
the bargaining powers. This restriction simplifies the analysis in this chapter and is left
to be relaxed at a later stage, when a more systematic discussion on identification is
presented and the challenges described below are sorted.
This final chapter, therefore, studies the two-step procedure proposed in Lee and Fong
(2013), building on the work by Bajari et al. (2007), to recover the parameters that
realise the equilibrium observed in our data, expressed in active trade and observed
prices. I first present a number of operational assumptions required for estimating the
game in Chapter 3 using our data. I then discuss three aspects in which my setting
imposes challenges to the applicability of the structural approach developed by Lee and
Fong. The first of these is the availability of prices in our data. Second, the difficulties
in the non-parametric estimation of conditional choice probabilities from the data when
the state space is large and choices are highly persistent. Third, and related to the
previous point, the construction of the distance score adding over states that have no
instances observed in the data. This discussion leads to a pseudo Monte Carlo exercise
that compares (sixteen) alternative estimation procedures.
The overall estimation procedure uses forward simulation as in Bajari et al. (2007) to
obtain value functions. Following Lee and Fong, a prices-to-values fixed point routine
is performed to generate prices consistent with those values. I explore the possibilities
of (i) generating all prices in the system and (ii) excluding from the fixed-point routine
3All the Matlab code producing the results for this section are available upon request for the exam-
iners’ evaluation.
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the prices observed in the data, that would then act as ‘constraints’ in the iterative pro-
cedure that solves the simultaneous Nash problems. The second stage of the estimation
finds the optimal policies for each player and computes the conditional choice probabil-
ities that would arise under alternative candidate parameters in the equilibrium play.
These probabilities are compared with those estimated directly from the data. I explore
different alternatives for this step, using the ‘true’ underlying probabilities in the sim-
ulated data as a baseline. These alternatives are: (i) using a standard non-parametric
frequency estimator with a kernel to approximate probabilities in the unobserved bins
of the conditional transitions, (ii) assuming that the choice probabilities in unobserved
states coincide with the observed unconditional probabilities and (iii) attaching equal
probability to all actions being chosen by the players in unobserved states. Finally, I
look at constructing the distance score (which in this setting is the objective function
in the minimisation problem that searches for the estimates of the parameters) using all
the states of the world and only adding up over observed states.
The small exercise performed in this chapter shows some evidence implying that re-
stricting the objective function to the observed states, using an auxiliary parametric
assumption on the conditional choice probabilities in unobserved states and exploiting
the data on prices could be fertile paths to explore towards constructing a more suitable
econometric approach. The validity of these ideas needs to be corroborated with a more
extensive Monte Carlo procedure, which is the matter of my current research.
Chapter 2
Buyer-Seller Relations in the
Ready Made Garment Sector in
Bangladesh
2.1 Introduction
It is a well documented fact that contracts between buyers and sellers in export markets
are often incomplete and ensuring the quality and timely delivery of orders tends to be
a major concern for international buyers (see Monarch (2013), Macchiavello (2010) , for
example). Depending on the market, the underlying uncertainty is usually connected to
the quality of the goods, the reliability of the seller (in terms of lead times, for example)
and / or her productivity in a broader sense. While some of these can successfully be
tested and assessed within the course of a trading relationship, ex-ante, there is some
incompleteness in what buyers know about their suppliers. In particular, the garment
sector in Bangladesh is unfortunately famous for its lack of compliance with minimum
health and safety requirements and human rights, even when firms hold all the necessary
credentials. Governmental and official controls for these are known to be very weak, and
episodes of extensive coverage in the media have proved the difficulties buyers face, even
after engaging in costly screening processes, to identify out suppliers that might secretly
break their compliance agreements. 1
1The tragedy in Savar in April 2013 had 1,100 people killed, after they were locked inside a collaps-
ing building. The facilities involved factories that were producing orders for large buyers like Primark,
Benetton and Walmart. The media has reported several (smaller) cases in which manufacturers serving
large buyers experienced explosions, fires, sexual harassment accusations, forced overwork, illegal sub-
contracting, etc.. Only in 2006, large buyers like Inditex-Zara, Carrefour, Kmart, H&M and PVH were
involved in 14 episodes of these kinds. These episodes have proven costly for the buyers in that, first,
they needed to put in place compensation schemes in occasions and, second, (and most importantly),
they needed to deal with media scandals potentially damaging to their reputation.
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Data (un)availability and the elusiveness of the object have made the collection of em-
pirical evidence on the relation between such uncertainty and micro - level decisions in
trade almost impossible. The recent (and growing) availability of disaggregated matched
exporter - importer datasets has opened the possibility of revising a number of relevant
questions related to the one addressed here. Relevant contributions to this growing lit-
erature include Eaton et al. (2014), who show evidence on survival patterns in a panel
of exports between US buyers and Colombian firms, supporting a model of trade with
search on the sellers’ side. Monarch (2013) exploits a matched dataset of trade between
Chinese manufacturers and US buyers to describe a setting in which buyers switch sup-
pliers in search of lower prices. Macchiavello (2010) studies the process of building a
reputation on quality in relations between wine makers in Chile and their distributors.
Within the trade modelling literature, a number of papers have also exploited matched
exporter-importer data to study trade intermediation, notably Blum et al. (2010) and
subsequent papers by the same authors (Blum et al., 2009). With specific attention to
buyer and seller heterogeneity, Bernard et al. (2014) augment a trade model with buyer-
seller matching costs and Carballo et al. (2013) focus on heterogeneity and selection into
markets. Looking at the apparel sector in Bangladesh, Kamal and Sundaram (2013) find
a significant effect of geographical proximity of suppliers in the likelihood of forming a
link with a buyer, understanding proximity as a channel for information flows between
sellers or to the buyer. Outside the trade literature also exploiting matched buyer - seller
data, Andrabi et al. (2006), propose a model of pricing and asset specificity in relations
between a tractor assembler and its suppliers in Pakistan and Vignes and Etienne (2011)
look at the effects of connectedness on prices in the fish market in Marseille.
This chapter offers an exploration on the relation between heterogeneity across players
and market outcomes in the context of relations between Ready Made Garment man-
ufacturers in Bangladesh and their foreign buyers. The work presented here exploits
a unique dataset that allows us to go one step further than previous empirical studies
on interfirm relations: for the subsample of the data we are interested in, we can trace
back the imported material inputs required for manufacturing the garments fulfilling
specific export orders. For each shipment in our exports data, we can identify who the
buyer and the seller are, link together shipments in the same order but spread in time
and characterise the flows in terms of volumes and prices of output and inputs (mainly
fabric). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first dataset containing information on
input-output matches, at the level of disaggregation in our data and with its extensive
coverage.
The contributions of this chapter are three. First, exploiting an econometric approach
imported from the literature in Labour Economics, I offer a simple way of characterising
exporters’ heterogeneity moving away from the paths that related papers have chosen:
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estimating firm-level productivity, eventually, via a structural model or assuming that
the relevant dimension of heterogeneity is monotonically related to an observable char-
acteristic that can proxy it, in general, exported volumes. The approach here recovers
exporters’ types under relatively mild assumptions with a simple procedure. Second, con-
structing a measure of heterogeneity, I document a novel fact on buyer - seller relations:
in the presence of high heterogeneity across potential unknown sellers, a buyer allocates
orders more frequently to his existing suppliers, relative to market conditions in which
the heterogeneity of the alternatives is lower. While this is compatible with a number
of existing theoretical models, the results presented here constitute, to my knowledge,
the first empirical collection of evidence of this type. Third, exploiting a unique feature
of our dataset, I find evidence of the existence of a ‘premimum’ for heterogeneity in the
price - cost margins buyers afford. Again, without imposing the restrictions of a specific
bargaining protocol, I show evidence indicating that markups in garment orders go up
when the heterogeneity the buyer is facing in its outside option is high.
Section 2.2 presents the data briefly and describes the units of analysis. Then, a general,
highly simplified model is presented to derive the main hypothesis. Section 2.4 is devoted
to constructing the measures of sellers’ heterogeneity. The subsections in 2.5 present
the main analysis, exploring the two main market outcomes of interest: who trades with
whom and what are the markups paid in the transactions. I close this chapter discussing
the starting points for the modelling strategy in Chapter 3.
2.2 The Data
The empirical analysis in this chapter exploits a comprehensive dataset recording all
export transactions between Ready Made Garment manufacturers in Bangladesh and
buyers in the rest of the world. The original source of this dataset is the compilation
of mandatory export and import records in the main Custom Stations in Bangladesh,
between 2005 and 2012. Each record constitutes a product (Harmonised Codes disag-
gregated to the sixth digit) within a shipment from a supplier to a buyer, taking place
on a given date. These are real-time records and include details on the statistical values,
quantities, destinations and specifics of the terms of trade. Importantly, they include
identifiers for all buyers and sellers. Full details on the construction of the dataset,
its coverage, robustness checks against other official sources of data and cleaning and
control of the players identifications are presented in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Although we observe trade in all the product categories within Ready Made Garment,
we focus on this chapter in woven garments, unless otherwise stated for the purpose of
specific references to knitwear. The exports of garment in Bangladesh are split almost
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half-and-half between knitted and woven products, in which I focus here. Details on
this are presented in Appendix D. The main advantages of concentrating the analysis
on this subcategory are: (i) that manufacturing technologies are known to be relatively
homogeneous, across products and across firms, within the set of woven products; (ii)
that the demand for garment from large buyers is concentrated in woven products (tables
?? and ??);(iii) that most of the fabric required for producing woven garment is imported,
a condition that we will exploit to produce input-output matches.
As well as the exports, our source of primary data includes all the imports by RMG
manufacturers into Bangladesh, with records as detailed as those in the exports side
of the data. Exploiting an administrative procedure necessary for claiming for duty
exceptions when importing inputs for fulfilling garment export orders, we can match
specific orders to the material inputs used for producing them (see Appendix D for a
comprehensive explanation on this). Moreover, the RMG sector in Bangladesh being
almost exclusively export oriented, means exported volumes coincide with virtually the
whole of the manufacturers’ supply. Therefore, we can claim we observe the firms’
output entirely and, for the sample I will be working with, the relevant material inputs
as well.
In the main woven categories, we observe approximately 5,000 buyers operating in the
panel. Of all these, we can identify a small pool of large players that purchase woven
garment in Bangladesh with Europe and the United States as the main destinations:
every year, 0.2% of the buyers account for 40 to 50 percent of the demand for woven
products and, while the demand from other non-large buyers seems to have reached a
plateau, the demand coming from large buyers has expanded rapidly in the last years,
pulling from the overall growth of the sector. The trade patterns of these large buyers
are significantly different from that of the smaller counterparts. I will omit here a full
description of these firm-level statistics, which the reader can find in tables C.14 to C.42
in Appendix C, to direct the attention to buyer-seller metrics.
Relations here, in its broadest definition, refer to pairs of buyers and sellers that are
observed trading at least once in the panel 2. Appropriate refinements will be introduced
later. While buyer-seller pairs are the main focus of this chapter, some of the analysis
is performed at a finer level of disaggregation.
We can group the transactions between buyers and sellers in two types: buyers can place
orders to manufacturers or they can trade via isolated shipments. We can distinguish
these two modes of trade, using information on the Export Procedures in our dataset (see
Appendix B and Appendix D for details). The difference between the two modes is not
2The reader is again referred to Appendix B for various robustness checks performed on the identities
of the players, among others, controlling for changes in identities over time.
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merely administrative. Orders span over time, can entail multiple shipments, can involve
multiple products, imply an ex-ante specification of quantities, input requirements and
quality of materials and, notably, allow for import duty exemptions if fabric is imported
for the purpose of fulfilling the order 3. One-off shipments, on the other hand, do not
entitle manufacturers to claim for import tax reimbursements and, obviously, stand alone
as isolated shipments.
Large buyers mostly operate using orders, with almost 99% of the value of their exports in
our panel falling under this system (see C.13 in C). For robustness, an exploration of the
one-off shipments was carried out to conclude that there was no significant specialization
pattern of sellers over the two modes of trade. Of all the sellers that trade at least once
with large buyers in our sub-sample, only 25% of them have less than 99% of their trade
channeled via orders. There are only a handful of manufacturers with large proportions
of one-off shipments (up to 80% over their overall traded value) and these are mainly
manufacturers that are not specialised in woven products and that feature negligible
participation in our panel in terms of exported volumes 4.
Given this evidence, when we turn to more disaggregated descriptive regressions, we
focus only on the trade between buyers and sellers that is done through orders, dis-
regarding the isolated shipments, except otherwise stated. The dataset that we are
exploring, then, contains information on every product in every shipment of all orders
placed by buyers over the period January/2005 to September/2010 in any of the four
major woven categories. This adds to a total of 100, 382 orders. Less than 20% of these
belong to a dozen of large buyers and account for 40% of the traded values in our panel.
Appendix J contains a brief fact-sheet for each of these large buyers, describing them
qualitatively.
2.3 A Simplified Framework
Consider a highly simplified setting in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet to
trade a given product.
3See Appendix D for the conditions for duty exemptions on imports for inputs for garment manufac-
turing.
4To rule out the possibility of overlooking strategic allocation decisions from the buyers over modes of
trade, we corroborated that the probability of a shipment being channeled as a stand-alone transaction
(as opposite to it being part of an order) is not significantly related to: i. the size of the shipment; ii.
the woven product category; iii. whether the quarter in which the shipment is received corresponds to
the first quarter of the buyer operating in the corresponding product category; iv. the age, measured in
quarters of activity, of the buyer in the market; v. whether the demand from the buyer in the quarter-
product is above its median demand; vi. observable characteristics of the manufacturer (a proxi for
capacity and a proxi for quality, using import prices); vii. different forms of time effects.
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Buyers and Sellers. There are J ∈ N manufacturers indexed by j, each of a different
type θj , drawn from G
S , an Extreme Value distribution over [0,∞], with scale parameter
σ > 0 and shape parameter α.5 This is private information to each seller. There are also
I ∈ N buyers indexed by i, that are either large or non-large, collected in disjoint sets
with IL
⋃
INL = I . Buyers willing to trade draw costlessly and randomly a seller from
the set of all available manufacturers. For simplicity, all sellers are drawn out with equal
probability. Upon matching, the buyer privately learns the type of its potential supplier.
Production of value. When buyer i and manufacturer j trade, the net unit value gen-
erated in the relation is vj = θjF (Xij). Xij collects buyer-seller specific variables, in
particular, the inputs used in the production of the item. Note that the technology is the
same for all buyers and sellers, up to a multiplicative idiosyncratic seller effect. Sellers
of low type only deliver successfully a small fraction of value they produce, while sellers
of high type shift the per unit value up.
Surplus division. If trade is not consummated between buyer i and seller j, the man-
ufacturer pays no cost and renders no profit from the relation. This is the case also
for non-large buyers. Large buyers, on the contrary, can take control of all Xij mate-
rial inputs and attempt production with an alternative supplier k, whose θk is ex-ante
unknown. When trade is consummated between buyer i and a manufacturer, the value
generated in the match is split between the seller and the buyer, with shares βi and
(1 − βi), respectively, for βi ∈ (0, 1). The bargaining parameter is buyer specific and
exogenous.
Prices. The unit surplus from the transaction between large buyer i and seller j, relative
to an alternative k, can then be written as sij = (θj − E[θk])F (Xij). With the sharing
rule described above, prices are pij = βiF (Xij)[θj − (σ(Γ(1 − α) − 1)/α)], where the
second term in the square brackets comes from the shape of GS and Γ(.) denotes the
gamma function. For ease of exposition, we can define θ˜j = θj/σ to be the scale-adjusted
type of seller j. Prices can then be rewritten as:
pij = βiσF (Xij)[θ˜j − (Γ(1− α)− 1
α
)] (2.1)
Note from here that there are gains from trade and prices are positive whenever θ˜j >
((Γ(1−α)− 1)/α), which is the condition for trade with large buyers, in the absence of
5The location parameter is adjusted for a distribution with positive support.
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switching costs. Note also that increases in the spread of the distribution of types, α,
bring prices up. 6
The basic setup above induces a number of hypothesis that can potentially be tested
in the data. First, other things equal, higher types of suppliers obtain higher prices.
Second, higher heterogeneity in the types of suppliers in the market, results in higher
prices. Third, conditional on the type of the incumbent supplier, the higher the hetero-
geneity in the market, the more likely the buyer is to stay with its supplier. Fourth, low
type suppliers only trade with ‘non-large’ buyers.
2.4 Measuring Heterogeneity
Testing the hypotheses described above requires the econometrician to know (or esti-
mate) players’ types, unobservable in our setting.
The recent studies exploiting matched exporter – importer data have conceptualised
firm heterogeneity either focussing on productivity and efficiency or on quality. As rich
as newly available custom datasets are, direct measures of either of these have proved
difficult to construct. Most papers have used traded volumes (size) as a proxy for
the unobserved dimension differentiating manufacturers. Others have used volumes or
values to recover parameters of the distribution of such unobservables, as a factor in
a parametrised technology. An alternative to this has been to use unit prices, when
available, as a proxy for a latent variable in which prices or values are assumed or shown
to be increasing.
Our data allows us to go one step further than previous studies. We will exploit the
fact that we observe both volumes and prices at a disaggregated level to obtain (scalar)
measures of heterogeneity of manufacturers, using relatively light assumptions.
The operational definition for heterogeneity will be that sellers that, conditional on
the product, at a given price can sell higher volumes are recognised by the demand as
better suppliers. Prices of inputs are used as a proxy for the overall product (and seller)
quality. This is an innocuous assumption in the context of garment production, where
high quality pieces are produced with better fabric, which in turn constitutes not only
the bulk of the weight of the garment but also the largest component in the per-unit
cost.
6Recall α is the shape parameter. Therefore, for fixed scale, for example at σ = 1, increases in α
move the distribution from being right skewed (towards zero) and high peaked to being left skewed.
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For an order of certain quality and price, placed by a buyer i, in a given product
category m at a point in time, the manufacturer’s average deviation of the expected
quantity reveals its type.
qgojimt = α
g + αgt + α
g
m + ρ
g
i + θ
g
j + δ
gpfojimt + γ
gpgojimt +X
′
ojimtβ
g + ηojimt (2.2)
From the equation above, the θgj intercepts are extracted as a measure for sellers’ types.
The αgt terms collect fixed effects for the time period in which the order is placed (in
quarters), the product category and an overall intercept. ρgi constitutes a buyer fixed
effect, such that the θgj are shifters with respect to the average sized order by the corre-
sponding buyer. The price of the fabric, pfojimt, is included as a control for the quality of
the product and the price of the output, pgojimt, is also conditioned upon. Other controls
include the material of the fabric used (cotton, synthetics, etc.), other – non-fabric –
imported inputs, the mode of transport, the Customs Port and the terms of trade.
In terms of the econometrics involved in this exercise, the procedure mimics the type of
estimation that has been used in the Labour literature in the tradition started by Abowd
et al. (1999) (and subsequent papers of the same authors), exploiting employee-employer
matched data to recover firm and individual fixed effects from wage equations as a
measure of unobserved productivity, ability or the types of the players (some applications
are those in Becker (2005)) on returns to seniority, Woodcock (2003) on heterogeneity
and worker-firm learning and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) on annotativeness). The
underlying assumption in all these applications is that after including the appropriate
controls, fixed effects recover the relevant dimension of the unobserved heterogeneity.7
Like in the relevant literature, the successful recovery of players types in the context of
our assumptions depends on the number of ’movers’ each player is connected to. This
implies that not all fixed effects are identifiable. In particular, those buyers and sellers
that have few interactions within the panel and, even more so, restricted to one trade
partner only have no fixed effect estimated, which tends to select against small players.
7Estimating these many fixed effects with standard techniques introduces the typical problems in
the computation of a generalized inverse of the estimation matrix in the normal equation, involving
very sparse matrices. I follow the approach presented in Abowd et al. (2002), who develop a method
to solve exactly the least squares problem in this setting, grouping the data in the ”components” of
the network, which is proved necessary and sufficient for the estimation of both fixed effects for most
of the buyer-seller pairs. The procedure consists of dividing the data in the fully connected subgraphs
that are not inter-connected with each other (the ”components”), sweeping out one of the fixed effects
using a within transformation and calculating the fixed effect of the other set of players by introducing
individual dummy variables. Those components in which a buyer has only sellers that don’t trade with
other buyers, the buyer fixed effect cannot be estimated. Full details on the estimation procedure can
be found in Appendix I.
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The specification above recovers fixed effects for sellers that account jointly for 83% of
the trade in woven garments in the panel.
A parametrisation of the distribution of types of suppliers present in every product cate-
gory was obtained by fitting, via maximum likelihood, three parameters of a Generalised
Extreme Value distribution. A first observation of the resulting distributions shows two
features.
First, aggregating HS6 codes by broad product categories that identify the gender and
general class of garment, we can see that products that are typically more fashion sen-
sitive exhibit higher dispersion of seller types.
Table 2.1: Variance of Types of Suppliers per Broad Product Category
Borad Product Category Variance
Female Dresses 2.3681
Female Trousers 1.7288
Male Suits 1.4781
Female Jacket 1.4219
Female Skirts 1.4104
Female Ensamble 1.2129
Male Jacket 1.1539
Male Ensamble 1.0670
Female Shirts 1.0438
Male Trousers 0.9362
Male Shirts 0.8746
The 48 HS codes disaggregated to the 6th digit were grouped in 11 broad cat-
egories. Note that women’s ensambles are pooled together with women’s suits.
The variance is computed using the shape and scale parameters in the fitted gen-
eralised Extreme Value distributions and are highly correlated (0.92) with the
empirical variances computed directly from the data, when data is de-meaned
to be centred around zero.
Fashion sensitive products are usually supplied through shorter orders, with quicker
lead times and where a higher proportion of the order is delivered in the first shipment.
Looking at the median duration of the orders in each product category as a proxy for
fashion sensitivity, we can see that the raw correlation of this proxy and the standard
deviation in seller types lies between −0.69 and −0.76 (depending on how the duration
variable is constructed). This means that the shorter the duration of the median order
(or, the more fashion sensitive the product), the higher the dispersion in types.
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Figure 2.1: Probability Density Functions Based on Estimated Parameters per Broad
Product Category.
Graphs show generated probability density functions based on the parameters (location, scale and shape) fitted via
maximum likelihood. The right panel correspond to female product categories and the left panel, to male categories.
The location was adjusted for each curve so all overlapped curves would share the same mean. All graphs are generated
in Matlab.
Second, grouping the buyers in large and non-large, we can see that the distribution of
types of suppliers that trades with one and another group are of similar shape, with a
shift to the right in the case of manufacturers that supply to large buyers.
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Approximation of Distribution of Types of Suppliers - Large and
Non Large Buyers.
Kernel approximations are generated in STATA, using Epanechnikov. The types are de-meaned to center around zero.
The blue line corresponds to non-large buyers and the red line corresponds to large buyers.
2.5 Heterogeneity and Market Outcomes
2.5.1 Persistency in Buyer - Seller Relations
The first market outcome to investigate is the network of relations that support trade
in each market. At every point in time, we observe specific pairs of buyers and sellers
trading. This market outcome can be conceptualised as the result of multiple buyer-
level decisions of allocating every order it demands to a supplier, out of a choice set of
available manufacturers.
I simplify this decision into a binary choice, made by the buyer, of allocating the order to
an existing supplier or to a new supplier. A strictly positive outcome in this binary choice
signals persistency in the choice of suppliers, favouring already known manufacturers.
The main interest lies on the effect, on this outcome, of the heterogeneity the buyer is
facing across its potential suppliers.
This requires specifying two operational definitions. The first one is that of an existing
supplier from the perspective of a buyer and I will assume that an existing supplier is a
manufacturer the buyer has traded with in the last year in any product category. The
second one involves defining the set of available suppliers to the buyer, this is, the set
of manufacturers the buyer considers as its potential supply when facing the decision to
allocate an order.
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As in many discrete choice problems, our data collects consummated trade, this is, ex-
post decisions. In this context, the set of suppliers available to the buyer constitutes
a hypothetical choice set for the relevant decision. Actual choice sets are unobserved
and presumably exhibit large variations across decision makers. The baseline definition
will be that all buyers face the same set of available suppliers in a product-quarter
combination, and therefore, are exposed to the same ‘amount’ of heterogeneity.
Numerous alternative definitions can be presented and, in particular, I will use the
information we have on the actual allocation to weight the types of the suppliers when
constructing the variance as a proxy for the heterogeneity the buyer is facing. Of all
the suppliers that in the year of allocation of the order are active in the corresponding
product category, I give higher weight to the subset of manufacturers that are ‘closer’ to
the manufacturer that is selected ex-post by minimizing a score based on three observable
characteristics. For each pair of observations, formed by the actual supplier of the order
and another manufacturer available in the market, the measure is constructed as the
weighted product of distances between observations in the three variables, where weights
are given by the corresponding covariance matrix 8. The selected variables collect the
quality of the input used by the seller -measured as the average price of the fabric used by
the manufacturer up to the corresponding date-, the experience of the supplier -measured
in the number of quarters it has been producing the item-, and an approximation of the
segment of the market in which the seller operates -measured as the median buyer he
is used to serve, ranked by its location in the normalised distribution of prices. This
alternative is presented in the Appendix.
The baseline specification of interest describes the probability of an order o for product
m being allocated at time t by buyer i to any existing supplier. Note that in our panel,
an order identifies m, i and t uniquely, so part of the subindexing below is redundant,
but hopefully clarifying.
Pr(aKoimt = 1|X, θˆ) = Φ(α+ β0 ¯ˆθkoimt + β1 ¯ˆθuoimt + β2StDev(θˆuoimt) +X ′oimtβ) (2.3)
The outcome variable aKoimt takes value one if order o, in product category m at time t,
is allocated to a supplier that is known by buyer i. Recall θj constituted the the seller
fixed effect obtained in the previous section, as a proxy for the type of the supplier.
¯ˆ
θkoimt is the average type of the known or existing suppliers to buyer i, relevant to the
current order. Similarly,
¯ˆ
θuoimt denotes the average type of all available suppliers that are
8For pair (i, j), for instance, ∆′ijW∆ij , where ∆ij is a vector whose k
th entry is defined as xki − xkj
and W is the covariance matrix over all k’s. Note this is the square of Mahalanobis score.
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unknown to the buyer. StDev(θˆuoimt) is the standard deviation across these unknown
suppliers. Xoimt contains other covariates, including buyer, product and quarter fixed
effects, counts of known and unknown players on each side of the market, the size of
the order and the size of the overall demand in the product - quarter combination. The
table below presents the results from a Maximum Likelihood Probit estimation following
the equation above.
Table 2.2: Probability of allocating an order to a known seller - Probit Marginal
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Av. θ known suppliers 0.050∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Med. θ unknown suppliers 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.026
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
St.Dev. θ unknown suppliers 0.041∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.023
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Av. θ unknown suppliers 0.013
(0.02)
Volume order, logs 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volume demand (prod-quart), logs 0.003 0.025∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.004
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Number of buyers, logs -0.055∗∗∗
(0.01)
Number of available suppliers, logs -0.029∗∗
(0.01)
Ratio known to all suppliers, logs 0.064∗∗∗
(0.00)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79892 78809 79892 78809 78809 78809 78211
An observation in these estimations is an order. The outcome takes value one if the order is placed with an existing supplier of the
buyer, according to the definitions in the main text. Standard errors are bootstrapped in all cases, clustering the re-sampling by broad
product categories. Products are organised in HS6 categories.
Across all specifications above, we corroborate that the probability of re-allocating an
order to the pool of known manufacturers is increasing in the average type in the pool.
However, this effect is not dramatically large. A unit increase of the corresponding
covariate would imply shifting that average, from the median to the 95th percentile,
jump that would induce an increase in the probability of allocating orders to the known
suppliers of around 1%. While the median (and average) type of the unknown suppliers
does not have a significant effect on the outcome, increases in the deviation of types of
the unknown suppliers increase (3 to 4%) the probability of allocating orders to existing
suppliers. Note that the only specification in which the standard deviation of unknown
types does not affect significantly the outcome is that that accounts for the proportion
of known suppliers over all available suppliers, in Column (7). Other things equal, an
increase in this ratio would reduce the number of unknown suppliers, which in turn
decreases the denominator of the standard deviation of unknown types. An effect of
magnitude similar to that of the heterogeneity across available suppliers is induced by
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larger orders. In terms of volumes, orders 1% larger have a higher probability (0.03) of
being sourced from known manufacturers.
2.5.2 Profitability and Price-Cost Margins
I now turn to exploring the evolution over time of price-cost margins in the orders
placed by a buyer to its supplier. The regressions below have as cross-sectional units
all the orders between large buyers and suppliers. As explained above, orders span over
time and for the purpose of these regressions we consider them to be dated by the date
(aggregated in quarters) of the first shipment in the order. Orders in a trading pair are
then arranged by date and numbered subsequently. This numbering constitutes what I
call the Linear Trend in the regressions below, and a unit increase is an additional order
placed by the buyer to its supplier. I exclude below all the relations that last for less
than a year, as the focus here is on the evolution of surviving relations.
The outcome variable is the price-cost margin in each of these orders and is denoted
µijoks, varying at the level of the order o, placed by a buyer i to a seller j, in product
m in sequencing time s. Note that m is specific to o and the triplet ijs fully defines o
so notation here, is again technically redundant.
µijoms = α+ αij + δm + ιt(o) + γ1s+Xijomsβ + ijoms (2.4)
Note that ιt(o) introduces seasonal corrections based on calendar times t of order o.
Dummies for the buyer-seller pair, products and seasons are kept in all regressions. The
outcome variable is defined by the difference between revenues and costs, as a proportion
of the costs (i.e., (PQ-C)/C).
Across all specifications, we observe a small positive effect of every additional order in
the relation. Across all pairs in the data, the average number of orders in the relationship
is 3.6, although a large share of the trade takes place in the top tail of the distribution
of number of orders in the relation, which, on the 95th percentile is 12. The average
price of the fabric used for producing the garment and the size of the order are both
negatively related to the margin over costs. The number of buyers allocating orders in
the relevant product - quarter combination seems shows a positive effect in the price -
cost margins. An expansion of the demand of 1% - again, measured via the count of
buyers - is associated with margins 0.085 higher.
Of substantive effect is the role of the type of the supplier, proxied by the fixed effects
in the volumes equation. A shift of a supplier from a score that would place it at the
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median of the distribution of types to the 90% percentile induces increases in the price
- cost margins of 0.23, other things equal. Conditional on the type of the supplier, we
also observe, despite the large standard errors, a strong positive effect in markups with
increases in the dispersion of types the buyer is facing. Now, the standard deviation is
measured over all alternative the buyers could have allocated the order to. This then,
represents the heterogeneity across the buyer’s outside option to the incumbent relation.
Table 2.3: Price Cost Margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
markup all markup all markup all markup all markup all markup all
Linear Trend 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Av. Price Fabric, logs -1.085∗∗∗ -1.086∗∗∗ -1.085∗∗∗ -1.095∗∗∗ -1.096∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Volume order, logs -0.131∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number buyers, logs 0.084∗ 0.087∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Volume demand (prod-quart), logs 0.039
(0.03)
θ supplier 0.238∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Av. θ alternative suppliers 0.083 0.100
(0.08) (0.09)
St.Dev. θ alternative suppliers 0.110∗ 0.102∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Constant 4.722∗∗∗ 4.348∗∗∗ 4.201∗∗∗ 4.656∗∗∗ 4.506∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.29) (0.43) (0.17) (0.22) (0.38)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-Seller FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53848 53848 53848 53848 53762 53762
R2 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.612 0.613 0.613
An observation in these estimations is an order. The outcome variable is measured as (revenue - cost)/cost, which in the data, across
all product categories and time periods, has a median of 0.87 and a Standard Deviation of 1.3. Standard errors are bootstrapped in
all cases and clustered by HS6 categories. Time fixed effects are taken according to the quarter in which the order starts, irrespective
of its span over time. Product fixed effects correspond to HS6 codes.
2.6 Discussion towards a Model of Network Formation
The analysis above presented a selection of reduced-form explorations that aimed at
understanding aspects of the evolution of relations between buyers and RMG manufac-
turers in Bangladesh. In Chapter 3 I present a dynamic game of network formation that
accommodates this evidence. The formulation I present has four key ingredients. Every
period, each buyer decides which seller, out of the available suppliers, to allocate her
order to, paying a sunk cost of linking whenever choosing a new supplier. These unco-
ordinated decisions set a bargaining network, where the linked pairs Nash bargain over
prices. The inside and outside values of a relation include both the current and future
flow of profits and take into account the effects of linking choices on future transitions
over states. Importantly, the outside options of the parties are determined by the links
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in the negotiation network. Finally, I allow for matching-specific qualities that are payoff
relevant for the buyer.
Persistency in the model I propose is induced both by the cost of linking and by the
presence of heterogeneity at the matching level. In a somehow similar setting, Monarch
(2013) finds evidence supporting strong recurrence in relations between international
buyers and suppliers in China, even when a large number of alternative suppliers are
available. To conceptualise this, he proposes a (single-agent) dynamic discrete choice
model in which buyers choose a supplier, evaluating the trade off between the gains
from switching to manufacturers with lower prices (or higher quality) and the cost from
switching. At the agent level, the formulation I propose coincides with the discrete
choice structure, in that the buyer evaluates in a dynamic framework the potential gains
of trade with the suppliers available to fulfil her order.
Bernard et al. (2014) propose a trade model with heterogeneous parties, featuring a
fixed cost of forming a relationship. In their formulation, the seller bears the whole of
this fixed cost, which is conceptually associated to tailoring the output to the buyer’s
need or to bureaucratic procedures starting a new export contract. In a search-and-
matching setting, Eaton et al. (2014) model the decision to either continue the relation
with the current trade partner or to search for a new partner on the seller’s side entirely.
Unlike these two approaches, the model I propose is compatible with an interpretation
of the cost of linking as a sunk cost the buyer needs to incur. This follows the anecdotal
evidence gathered in conversations with large buyers, who describe a costly process
of screening, visiting production plants, testing, adjusting designs and running quality
checks, before they can place an order to a new supplier.
Unlike the empirical observations in Monarch (2013), in our setting higher prices are
associated with relations that are more likely to survive. This, together with evidence
showing that sellers capture higher profit margins when competing large buyers are
present in the market, implies a switch-or-stay rule slightly different to the one in
Monarch (2013). The game I propose captures this new evidence via its networked
structure: as sellers are capacity-constrained, having an additional large buyer willing
to trade with her increases (potentially) the outside option of the seller when bargaining
with its current partner. If the value of the relation with the seller is high enough the
price is higher than in the state without a competing buyer and the link remains active.
The formulation I present in the following chapter accommodates a dynamic aspect to
the bargaining stage, after the cost of linking is sunk. The optimal price in a relation
and, consequently, the current and future value of that link, depends on the transition
probabilities over states, which are an indirect function of the costs of breaking and
forming new links. This aspect of the proposed model, resembles Kleshchelski and
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Vincent (2009), who, in a macro framework, find that when switching costs are low,
buyers are more likely to break the current relationship, and therefore the (future) value
of that buyer to the supplier decreases. In their setting, this has an impact on the price
the seller sets for its product, where a larger fraction of marginal costs is passed-through
to the buyer via prices. In the opposite case, when the cost of dropping the current
seller and buying from an alternative one increase, the value of the buyer increases and
pass-through goes down.
Chapter 3 is then devoted to the formal presentation of a dynamic game of network
formation, with endogenous bargaining. I also present a computer realisation of the
game, using simulations to show the relation of the key parameters of the model with
the evidence presented in this chapter.
Chapter 3
A Dynamic Game of Linking and
Bargaining
3.1 Introduction
The production of Ready Made Garment in Bangladesh is mainly export-oriented. Man-
ufacturers supply knitted and woven garments to buyers from all over the world, with
Europe and United Stated as the main destinations for their exports. Large buyers
account for the best part of the expansion of the exports in the sector in the last decade.
Then, uncovering the mechanisms driving their choice of suppliers and the determina-
tion of prices are key for understanding the evolution of the industry and, with it, the
development path of the country.
The results presented in the previous chapter show at least three relevant features of
the relationships these buyers establish with garment suppliers in Bangladesh. First,
relationships exhibit persistence and buyers tend to re-trade with their existing suppliers
over time. Second, the unit price the buyer pays for the garment is affected by the
presence of other large buyers in the market, potentially willing to allocate orders to
the same suppliers. Third, heterogeneity at the seller level plays a significant role in the
linking decisions.
This chapter proposes a model that realises those patterns in the data, governed by
the interactions between players’ heterogeneity and buyers’ competition for suppliers.
Using data on buyer - seller matches and prices, I am able to estimate structurally the
parameters underpinning large buyers linking behaviour. To do this, I use a model of
dynamic network formation with bargaining, first proposed in Lee and Fong (2013).
The game I present describes the dynamics inducing two observable outcomes in this
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market: the trading partnerships (or who links with whom) and the contracts or prices
between the linked parties. In Chapter 4, using records from every transaction I observe
between manufacturers in Bangladesh and large buyers in the rest of the world, over
a real-time panel, I discuss alternative procedures to recover the relevant underlying
parameters. The modelling strategy here serves then two purposes. The first one is to
offer a semi-formal framework that can help understand the evidence we collect from the
markets we are interested in, in terms of the forces driving the industry dynamics and
its institutional environment. The second one is to build a structure that can aid the
recovery of the underlying parameters that govern those dynamics, using techniques that
circumvent the problems that arise when estimating high-dimensional dynamic problems
like the one at hand. While this chapter will introduce references to literature on the
estimation of dynamic oligopoly games, the main discussions concerning this literature
and the econometric approach are left for the following chapter.
The players in the game are either buyers or sellers of RMG. In each time period, players
have two decisions to make: (i) buyers need to choose a supplier for their orders and
sellers need to accept supplying the garment if invited to do so and (ii) for the partners
that agree on trading, a bargaining process will determine the price for the garment. The
formulation presented here will show four key features. It represents a dynamic game,
featuring a sunk cost - to the buyer - of forming a relationship. It is networked, in the
sense that prices, and ultimately the probability of observing a given trade partnership,
depend on the linking choices of other players. It allows for matching heterogeneity,
as a cost-reducing component in the profit function for buyers and it accommodates
non-symmetric bargaining in the pricing problem.
The main idea that drives this chapter is that the observed trade network and
prices are the result of a dynamic process in which buyers, heterogeneous in
the surplus they can extract from the seller, compete for suppliers, hetero-
geneous in the value they can produce in partnership with each buyer.
In its general structure, the game presented here is that of a multiple-agent dynamic
game with incomplete information. This paper, then, is closely related to the literature in
Industrial Organisation that builds on Ericson and Pakes’s framework to study industry
dynamics, adding incomplete information to their general setting (1995). A number of
applied papers have exploited this set up to describe various institutional environments.
Applications have been focussed on different versions of entry / exit problems, with
choices on capacity, quantities, integration or mergers, of which some interesting but
in no way exclusive examples can be found in Ryan (2012), Aguirregabiria and Ho
(2012), and Gowrisankaran (1999). Within this tradition, the applications that are more
closely related to the one at hand are those that, like in our setting, propose quantity
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or pricing sub-games whose resolution affects future periods’ choices, therefore affecting
the conditional probability of future states being observed. This involves nesting the
computation of the stage profits inside of the dynamic programming problem defined
by the corresponding value functions. Examples of games with these features can be
found in Benkard (2004) on learning-and-forgetting and Markovich and Moenius (2008)
on hardware platforms and software choices, among others.
To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies that analyse industry dynamics
in the light of networked strategic interactions. Notably, the work by Aguirregabiria and
Ho on the US airline industry, study the relations between hub-spoke networks with entry
costs and entry deterrence effects (2010; 2012). An ’aggregation’ assumption suitable to
their setting circumvents some of the complications the networked structure imposes in
the formulation I present here.
The “outer” layer of the game is a dynamic discrete choice linking problem, in which
buyers simultaneously choose a supplier from a list of available heterogeneous manufac-
turers, in order to maximise inter-temporally the profits made in trade. In the “inner”
layer, linked pairs bargain over prices with outside options in a Nash bargaining setting
determined by the network of links. The specifics of the bargaining stage in the game
I propose resemble the exercise in Dranove et al. (2011), whose theoretical construc-
tion follows Stole and Zweibel (1996). The distinctive feature of my game is that the
evaluation of disagreement points accounts for the effects of disagreement in current
negotiations and the future realisations of the network. In my setting of simultaneous
bargaining, a seller negotiating prices with two buyers will consider as disagreement pay-
offs for each of these buyers no longer the price she would obtain from a second buyer
under the current setting, but the one she would obtain if the link with the first buyer
was dissolved after disagreement. This lowers the outside options relative to a simpler
and potentially more naive view of renegotiations12 .
In terms of the computation of the game I propose, as in Lee and Fong (2013), I exploit
a number of well established results in structural industrial organisation and numerical
methods. These help deal with dynamic programming problems, its specificities when
applied to multi-agent environments and to incomplete information settings, the asso-
ciated computation algorithms and the issues around existence and multiplicity. The
developments that are most relevant to what is presented here are those in Aguirre-
gabiria and Mira (2002); Doraszelski and Pakes (2007); Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010); Hotz and Miller (1993); Pakes and McGuire (1994); Rust (1994).
1Lee and Fong’s setting accommodates this alternative.
2Subject to parameters, but in the majority of the cases.
Chapter 3. A Dynamic Game 28
The following section presents an intuitive description of the game and describes its
timing, while Section 3.3 deals with the presentation of its formal aspects, and addresses
briefly issues around existence and uniqueness. These are further discussed in relation
to computational matters in Section 3.4, which offers evidence on a computer exercise
that finds equilibria of a simple version of the proposed game over a grid of candidate
parameters. In Section 3.5 the key interactions between the parameters of the game
and the observable market outcomes are presented.
3.2 Intuition and timing
The model described below constitutes an application of the general framework de-
veloped in Lee and Fong (2013). Lee and Fong’s structure follows Myerson’s network
formation game in that players announce links so that the bilateral intersection of the
choices of players gives a negotiation network (Myerson, 1991) 3. In the game below,
I will consider that buyers announce the links they want to form and sellers make no
choice around who they negotiate with at this stage, so the negotiation network is fully
determined by the decisions on the buyers’ side. Moreover, I focus on the main order
the buyer needs to place and I consider buyers’ action space is such that they can only
choose one seller to negotiate with at a time. These restrictions, accommodate the em-
pirical application at hand and make the outer problem of the game resemble those in
standard entry / exit dynamic settings.
Once the negotiation network is set, all the linked pairs simultaneously engage in Nash
bargaining to determine the equilibrium contracts. Prices are solved for, whenever
possible, splitting the surplus of the relationship given the bargaining power at each
end of the negotiation. Disagreement points in this stage incorporate two main features:
first, they account for future changes in the network, allowing for the exploration of
dynamic aspects of strategic linking and, second, they depend on other links the seller
might have, generating competition between buyers. In this process, for some sets of
parameters and continuation values, pairs linked in the negotiation network might fail to
reach a viable agreement. The final trading network is then a subgraph of the negotiation
network.
Attention here will be restricted to (pure strategies) Markov Perfect Equilibria (Maskin
and Tirole, 1988), as it is most common in the associated literature. I am going to omit
the discussions on the potentially (non) testable implications of this equilibrium concept
and its relation with alternative concepts, such as oblivious equilibria (Weintraub et al.,
3There is a vast literature elaborating on strategic network formation processes alternative to Myer-
son’s simultaneous link announcement protocol. See Jackson (2004) for a survey.
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2008) or self-confirming equilibria (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993). The reader is referred
to these papers and Maskin and Tirole (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (1988) for a more
systematic presentation of the applicability of the Markov concept to games of the type
we are interested in.
There are four exogenous primitives of this game. First, before the start of the game,
each buyer solves a demand problem in their own end market to determine a (fixed)
retail price for the garment. This remains unchanged throughout the game, it is buyer-
specific and it is taken as exogenously given. At the same time, buyers decide the size and
quality, determined by the price of the main material input (fabric), of a single order to
be placed and these also remain constant throughout the game. Within a given product
category, this can be viewed as the buyer’s main order of the product in a time period
4. Together with the choice of the size of the order, buyers decide the quality (price)
of the fabric they will require. Second, at the beginning of the game, each buyer-seller
pair is endowed with an observable quality for their match, fixed throughout the game
and payoff relevant for the buyer5. The matching quality enters additively in the profit
function of the buyer: trading with a worse supplier imposes an additional per-unit cost
for the buyer. One way of interpreting this is that a lower match will force the buyer
to incur in extra costs for quality control purposes, monitoring, failures in the product
development stage or simply that a fraction of the value of the garment gets destroyed.
Third, forming links is costly. There exists a publicly known sunk cost for starting a new
(relative to the immediate previous network) relation and a cost for maintaining an old
relation, both of which are fully afforded by the buyer. This sunk cost is a parameter of
the model and it induces the dynamic aspect in the linking decision. Fourth, sellers are
capacity constrained so each period they can only produce for one buyer.
Under those primitives, the game develops in two stages.
Network Formation: Buyers observe the network of relations that is standing and a
shock to each possible action they can choose in the linking stage. Actions in this context
involve the choice of (at most) one seller from the set of possible suppliers of garment.
Upon (privately) observing choice-specific shocks, buyers simultaneously announce the
seller they are willing to start negotiations with and pay the corresponding linking cost,
if applicable.
4The single-order assumption can be easily relaxed in the empirical application. At this stage, focusing
on one order per buyer simplifies the notation and will significantly reduce the state space, which will
allow for an easier estimation of an equilibrium of the example game. In addition, for narrowly defined
markets, it can be seen that large buyers allocate one main order and, eventually, a second small one,
negligible in terms of size, relative to the first one.
5The observability of the match-specific quality will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. For
the rest of this chapter, this is going to be treated as a know constant scalar for each buyer-seller pair.
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Bargaining on Prices: Given those announcements, a negotiation network is formed
and the pairs linked in the network bargain to reach a contract that maximises the Nash
product of their inter-temporal gains from trade. These are determined by the structure
of the standing network and the anticipated changes to the network in the future, upon
a potential failure in contracting. Prices are solved for and a stable network is found,
such that each seller has at most one buyer. Profits are realised and a new period starts.
The following section formalizes the game described above.
3.3 The Game
Let B constitute a set of buyers indexed with i = {1, . . . , B} and S a set of sellers
individually denoted with j = {1, . . . , S}. At any point in time, the -fully observed-
bipartite network of links between buyers and sellers defines the state of the system. A
link between players i and j under a given network g is labeled ij, denoted gij = 1 and
represents potential trade between those players. Similarly, gij = 0 implies that buyer i
and seller j are not trading under network g, so networks are formed as g ⊂ {0, 1}B×S .
Let G be the set of all possible networks. I will use g−ij to denote the network resulting
from deleting the link between i and j from graph g. Finally, gi designates the subgraph
for player i. When ambiguity is possible, gk· or g·k will be used to distinguish buyers
from sellers, with the first index corresponding always to buyers. Time evolves discretely
over periods τ = 1, 2 . . .∞.
3.3.1 Per-Period Profits
At a given point in time, per-period payoffs for each player ι, piι(.), are a function of the
standing network and its associated negotiated transfers between linked pairs. piι(g, tg)
is assumed to be continuous in tg = {tij;g}ij∈g, containing the per-period prices agreed
upon bargaining between all the agents that are trading under network g. t is defined
in space T = R.
I will restrict attention to the networks in which each buyer can buy from at most one
seller at a given point in time,
∑
j gij ≤ 1∀i ∈ B. At the same time, each seller will only
be able to supply the good to one buyer, at most, so
∑
i gij ≤ 1∀j ∈ S.
Consider a buyer indexed with i and a seller indexed with j and assume they are linked
under network g, so gij = 1 in period τ . Assuming away action shocks, which will be
introduced later on, the per-period profit function for i is given by:
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pibi (g
τ , t) =
S∑
k
gτik× [(ri−tik+ρik)qi]−ci(gτ |gτ−1) = (ri−tij+ρij)qi−ci(gτ |gτ−1) (3.1)
Note that qi, the quantities demanded by buyer i, are independent of j and so is ri,
the price the buyer charges in its end market for the garment. Both qi and ri are
exogenously determined. In our context, tij , the equilibrium price for the garment in
the buyer-seller transaction, is an intermediate price in the sense that it is the price the
garment manufacturer charges the retailer, who in turn sells the garment to consumers at
a price ri. In addition, ρij represents the match-specific component and it is exogenously
given and known (for now). Finally, ci represents the cost that buyer i pays for moving
from network gτ−1 to network gτ .
Similarly, the period profits for seller j in the network g are:
pisj (g
τ , t) =
B∑
k
gτkj × (tkj −mkj)qk = (tij −mij)qi (3.2)
Let mij be the per-unit cost of inputs if j is producing to supply i. Assume that mij = mi
for all the sellers that could be trading with buyer i. Note that the seller pays no costs
for linking and, everything else equal, its period payoffs are not directly affected by the
quality of the match with its buyer.
3.3.2 The Network Formation Stage
In the first stage of the game, given gτ−1, last period’s state, a set of links is opened for
negotiation, generating g˜, the negotiation network. This is reached through all buyers
choosing in a decentralized fashion at most one of the sellers available for supplying
garment in that period.
More formally, each buyer i simultaneously announces at most one link to (re)negotiate.
Let ai denote actions available to buyer i and ai ∈ Ai, which is the set of all the potential
individual links to buyer i. i’s announcement can involve linking to a player he is not
linked to under the current state (proposing a new link), re-linking with its existing
supplier or not trading at all: {1, . . . , S, ∅} so |Ai| = S + 1. Then, in a given period,
each buyer negotiates with at most one seller6.
6This restriction can easily be relaxed in the empirical application and has its theoretical generalisa-
tion in Lee and Fong (2013).
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Before announcements are made, each i privately observes a period payoff shock to
each action, ai,i so i = 1,i, . . . , |Ai|,i independently drawn from a continuous f

i (i).
For simplicity, f i (i) = f
(i) and while individual shocks are privately observed, f
 is
common knowledge. These are shocks to the payoffs i would make under each of the
possible configurations ai ∈ Ai. After privately observing her vector of shocks, i chooses
ai and announces it publicly.
In this context, the choice set for the buyers is the set of sellers (plus the no-link option).
Each entry in the i vector then constitutes a component that enters the per-period
payoffs of i additively when linking with each seller and this is a) unobservable to
the researcher, and b) unobservable to other buyers. Therefore, this captures all the
aspects of the linking choice that are not present in the data (unobservable to the
researcher) and that prevents other buyers from making a certain conjecture on rivals’
choices (unobservable to other buyers). Note that this shock is drawn every period, so,
coming from the same distribution, its value is time - buyer - seller (or action) specific.
While g collects the common knowledge state variable,  is the state variable collecting
the private information component. Assuming additive separability of the action shocks,
building on 3.1, the period payoffs including shocks are pibi (g
τ (ai), t) + ai,i
7.
A negotiation network g˜(a) is formed through all the links ij such that ij ∈ ai for all i.
In other words, the negotiation network is formed only as a result of the non-coordinated
announcements of the buyers. At this stage, sellers play no active role in the linking game
and negotiations will take place in every pair nominated by the buyers, which describes
more realistically the setting we are interested in. After all public announcements, all
the players observe the negotiation network, g˜(a).
While linking is costless for the sellers, each buyer i incurs a cost ci(g˜(a)|gτ−1) for the
renegotiation. We assume that all buyers incur the same fixed cost of linking with an
existing supplier, c, which is lower than the cost c of linking with a new seller. We
assume away any cost of breaking existing links. Then, ci(g(a)|gτ−1) = cI{ij ∈ ai , ij /∈
gτ−1}+ c(1− I{ij ∈ ai , ij ∈ gτ−1} , and I{·} is an indicator function that takes value
one if the statement in the curly brackets holds true and takes value zero otherwise.
Therefore, a pair that is already active in the network bears a low cost for linking, while
starting a relation with a new supplier imposes a high cost in 3.1.
7This assumption is equivalent to Assumption AS, equation 3.5, in Rust (1994) and plays a role in
the estimation approach in Chapter 4.
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3.3.3 The Pricing Problem
Given g˜, the negotiation network, players bargain on prices under a standard Nash
protocol8. Linking announcements being uncoordinated can lead to g˜’s for which some
of the linked pairs exhibit no individual gains from trade, in which case no trade takes
place and the corresponding link dissolves. In addition, the network formation protocol
described above is compatible with negotiation networks in which sellers are linked to
more than one buyer. However, the capacity constraints of the sellers restrict the possible
networks to those that exhibit one-to-one links only. Call O(g˜) = g′ an operator mapping
from the states space to itself, with g′ being the network arising from g˜ after deleting
all the links that exhibit no gains from trade for at least one of the players, within the
constrains imposed on the network.
The gains from trade in this dynamic game include both the period profits, pi, and
the future discounted value of being in a given network, V . Per-period contracts tij;g′ ,
between any linked pair under g′ then satisfy the following generic condition:
tij;g′ ∈ argmaxt˜
[
[pibi (g
′, t˜g′) + βV bi (g
′)]− [pibi (g′′, tσg′′) + βV bi (g′′)]
]bij
× [[pisj (g′, t˜g′) + βV sj (g′)]− [pisj (g′′, tσg′′) + βV sj (g′′)]]bji (3.3)
The surplus for the buyer is defined as the difference in current and future payoffs
between trading with the seller she is linked to or not doing so and bij and bji are the
corresponding bargaining parameters, which naturally add up to one. In this context,
Nash bargaining parameters equal to 0.5, for instance, give an equal division of the
surplus. Setting bij = 0 gives the Nash-Bertrand pricing solution in the competition
upstream.
The first term of the downstream player’s surplus, [pibi (g
′, t˜g′) + βV bi (g
′)], contains the
relationship payoffs, with g′ being the stable network arising after g˜ is formed and
t˜g′ = {t˜, tσ−ij;g′}, with optimisation over t˜ taking all other prices, optimally determined,
as given. The second term in the buyer’s surplus in 3.3, [pibi (g
′′, tσg′′)+βV
b
i (g
′′)] , contains
the counterfactual payoffs for the buyer, if the relationship was broken. Let g′′ be the
counterfactual network and tσg′′ its associated prices. Different assumptions on g
′′ and
prices adjustments after disagreement imply alternative ways of endogenising the players
outside options.
8For a detailed explanation, see Muthoo (1999).
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As in Lee and Fong (2013), the pricing problem is networked in the sense that the surplus
over which bilateral bargain takes place depends on other bilateral negotiations taking
place in the graph. For games with one player only in one side, Hart and Tirole (1990);
Horn and Wolinsky (1988); Segal and Whinston (2003) propose approaches that describe
those interactions across simultaneous bilateral negotiations. Similarly, de Fontenay and
Gans (2014) generalise the framework to two-sided large games. Like in Lee and Fong
(2013), the pricing problem is as well dynamic: the framework captures the period effects
of failed agreements together with the impact of disagreement in the continuation values
V for the bargaining pairs. Finally, outside options are endogenously determined, as they
are not given by a fixed counterfactual outcome but by the outcomes potentially reached
under network-specific renegotiations and re-linking.
The framework in Lee and Fong (2013) defines g′′ to be g′−ij , equivalent to deleting link
ij in network g′ and tσg′′ = t
σ
−ij,g′ = {tσg′ \ tσij;g′}, such that in the current period, a price
for pair ij is not defined (as g′′ does not include the pair) and the contracts between
all other pairs remain unchanged. In other words, disagreement points imply that all
the contracts that involve the rest of the players in the negotiation network are binding,
so after i and j disagree, no contemporaneous changes in tg′−ij are allowed for. This
setup is consistent with the idea that bargaining takes place simultaneously for all linked
pairs. As a consequence, other buyers who might have chosen supplier j under the new
circumstance, cannot do so immediately and adjustments of this type will take time.
In the conceptualisation of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) this equilibrium can be interpreted
as the Nash equilibrium across many Nash bargains. As explained in Crawford and
Yurukoglu (2012), this is equivalent to considering a simultaneous moves game, where
a player is conformed by a pair ij, whose strategy is tij,g′ and whose payoff is the Nash
product of i and j’s surpluses. Then, the bargaining problem is solved as the Nash
equilibrium of that game. Such a device rules out the possibility of a player exploiting
an informational asymmetry due to the order in which negotiations take place. So, if
j is bargaining at the same time with buyers i and k, j has no information advantage
about the outcome of the process with k when bargaining with i and viceversa.
Given the simultaneity in all the bargains and the fact that disagreements are off-
equilibrium events, Lee and Fong (2013) leave prices for all other pairs fixed upon dis-
agreement in the current period. An alternative specification would be to define g′′ to be
the network that arises after deleting ij from g′, allowing for all the pairs to renegotiate
prices in the new setting, closer to the non-binding contracts setting described in Stole
and Zweibel (1996). This is the alternative I propose here. To observe the difference
this approach makes in the generation of disagreement points a small static example is
presented in Appendix H. In short, consider a seller that is bargaining simultaneously
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with two buyers of which he will choose one. One possibility would be that when bar-
gaining with the first buyer, the disagreement payoffs of the seller were those of trading
with second buyer at the price this could agree to pay under the current situation. But
actually, if the seller was to break the link with the first buyer, the conditions in which
she would bargain with the second buyer are those in which the seller’s outside option
was not trading at all.
Given the per-period profits defined in 3.1, the gains for buyer i from trading with j
depend on the continuation values for V (g′) and V (g′′), on the negotiated tij and an
outside price for the garment, xg′′ = x
9.
Sbij(g
′) = [(−tij(g′) + xg′′ + ρij)qi + β(V bi (g′)− V bi (g′′))] (3.4)
While each buyer negotiates with at most one seller in any network, as a result of the
uncoordinated linking decisions in the first stage, sellers might participate of multiple
simultaneous bargains at a given point in time. Given the sellers’ (capacity) constrains
to trade with one buyer only, using 3.2, the gains from trade for seller j when bargaining
with buyer i under network g′ is given by:
Ssij(g
′) = (tij(g′)−mi)qi + βV sj (g′)− max
k∈B,k 6=i
{[g′(kj)kj × [(tkj(g′(kj))−mk)qk + βV sj (g′(kj))]] ,
βV sj (g
′(∅j))} (3.5)
In some abuse of notation, g′(kj) = g′−ij \ {nj : g′nj = 1,n 6= k}, so the outside option for
seller j negotiating with buyer i is the best over the alternative partners she has under
g′ or not trading in the current period at all.
3.3.4 The Dynamic Specification
The system evolves with gτ following a Markov process with known transition P (gτ+1|gτ ,aτ ).
Assume conditional independence of the transitions between states, such that
P (gt+1, t+1|gt, t, at) = f(t+1)CDFg(gt+1|gt, at), with f(·) with finite first moment,
9An alternative specification that was explored defined the outside price for the buyer as depending
on the number of available (unlinked) sellers in the counterfactual network, following xg′′ = κ(S −∑B
k
∑S
j g
′′
kj)
−1
2 , with κ a constant.
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continuous and differentiable twice. Note then that τ affects the transition across states
g only via the choices of actions a, but not directly 10.
A Markov strategy for buyer i constitutes a mapping σi(g, i) : G ×R|Ai| → Ai so the
buyer only observes the current network, or state, and its individual draw of action-
specific shocks to choose ai. Note that only the current state is relevant in the mapping.
Consider stationary strategies only, such that i’s decision is the same in t and s, whenever
{gt, ti} = {gs, si}.
In this setting, the conditional choice probability of action ai being chosen by i, when
the state of the world is g is given by:
P σi (ai|g) = Prob(σi(g, i) = ai)
∫
I{σi(g, i) = ai}f (i)di (3.6)
where I is an indicator taking value one when the argument holds true and we integrate
over all the possible i’s. By 3.6, the probability of agent i announcing ai depends on the
current network and i, which is not observed by third parties. Therefore, P
σ
i constitutes
the probability that an agent different from i attaches to i choosing ai and it is then the
belief that a third party has on i’s choices (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).
With independent draws of  and conditional on her own action, the probability that
agent i assigns to the final negotiation network being g′, given that the observable state
is g and other players’s strategies are σ is just the product of the corresponding P σk ’s:
%σi (g
′|ai, g) =
∑
a−i∈
∏
k 6=i Ak
(∏
k 6=i
P σk (a−i[k]|g)
)
I{g˜(ai, a−i) = g′} (3.7)
where a−i is a vector containing actions ak of all the players k 6= i and a−i[k] is the kth
action in that vector. So the probability that i attaches to network g′ arising is just: (i)
the sum over all the possible vectors collecting actions ak for all the players k 6= i (which
amounts to all the possible combinations of the elements in the Ak sets, so the product
of these); (ii) of the product over all the k’s of the probabilities that i assigns to each
agent k 6= i playing action ak in the vector a−i, whenever the actions in a−i together
with action ai result in network g
′.
Denote with ci(g
′|g) the linking cost for i when the starting state is g and i’s choice
corresponds to network g′. Let O(.) be the mapping defined above, such that whenever
a network is proposed a new network eventually arises after all unstable links in the
proposed network have been broken. Defining vσi (ai, g) as the current and future profits
10This is Assumption CI in Rust (1994).
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net of the stochastic utility component, , if i chooses action ai when the state is g and
he behaves optimally in the future, we have in 3.8 the choice-specific value function:
vσi (ai, g) =
∑
g′
%σi (g
′|ai, g)(ci(g′|g) + [pibi (g′′, tσg′′) + βVi(g′′) : g′′ = O(g′, V σ)]) (3.8)
So the value for player i of choosing action ai is the sum of current and future payoffs
he would make under the different negotiation networks g′ compatible with action ai,
weighted by the probability i attaches to each of these g′ arising, conditional on the
current state g and the chosen action. The current and future payoffs are then given
by the cost from negotiating network g′ plus the expected payoffs, current and future,
attained under the stable network that arises from negotiation network g′.
At each state g, the corresponding value function (the integrated Bellman equation) is
defined as:
V σi (g) =
∫
[maxai∈Ai(ai,i + v
σ
i (ai, g))]f
(i)di (3.9)
which represents i’s current and future profits at the beginning of each period, before
the ’s are drawn, given that the state network is g and everybody is playing strategies
according to σ−i.
Note that under the assumptions of additive separability of the private information
component in the players payoff functions and the conditional independence of the tran-
sitions between states, the dynamic programming problem is fully characterised by the
Bellman equation in 3.9, which in turn is analogous to a static discrete choice problem,
with choice specific (intertemporal) values instead of period profits (Rust, 1994).
For a fixed set of payoffs {pi(·)} the equation above is a contraction mapping and has a
unique V σi that solves it for any given σ , under the assumptions of finiteness of the state
space and the restrictions imposed on the error term and its relation to stage profits
(Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002).
3.3.5 Markov Perfect Equilibria
Consider the pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game to be a set of
strategies σ∗ such that for any i, network g and shocks i:
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σ∗i (g, i) = argmaxai∈Ai [ai,i + v
σ∗
i (ai, g)] (3.10)
, where the restrictions in the price bargaining problem and stability of the network are
satisfied: so given V σ
∗
, period contracts tσ
∗
g satisfy the Nash problem in 3.3, with 3.4
and 3.5 defining players’ surplus for all stable g11 12.
It can be seen that a strategy profile σ is Markov Perfect if there is no player i and alter-
native strategy σ′i such that player i prefers σ
′
i over σi, when all other players are playing
σ−i. This is, ∀i,∀g and ∀σ′i alternative strategies: V σi (g, i|σi, σ−i) ≥ V σi (g, i|σ′i, σ−i).
The reader is referred to Maskin and Tirole’s original paper for definitions and proofs
(Maskin and Tirole, 1988). Intuitively, this equilibrium concept implies (i) that for each
state of the world, optimal policies are chosen by all players given their beliefs on the
future structure of the network and (ii) that those beliefs are consistent with rivals’
behaviour.
Lee and Fong (2013) argue that the above can be re-written in the space of probabilities,
following the procedures in the work by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). With P σ
∗
, the
conditional probability corresponding to the MPE σ∗, an analogous fixed point of the
best response probability function describes the solution of the system. To re-express
the problem in the space of probabilities, note that pii, Vi and %i(g
′|g, ai) depend on
players’ strategies only through Pi, the associated probabilities. Also, by the definition
of Pi and σ
∗, P ∗i (ai|g) =
∫
I{ai = σ∗i (g, i)}f i (i)di, so equilibrium probabilities are a
fixed point Λ(P ∗) = P ∗ with
Λi(ai|g;P−i) =
∫
I{ai = argmaxa∈Ai(a,i + vP
∗
i (a, g))}f i (i)di (3.11)
with vP being choice specific value functions derived from vσ and defined in terms of
conditional choice probabilities P ∗. In the terms of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Λi
constitutes the best response probability function for agent i and it is continuous (given
the assumptions on f) in the choice set, so that existence is guaranteed by Brower’s
Theorem. Under standard regularity conditions, existence in this type of game with
dynamic strategic interaction and incomplete information is guaranteed (Aguirregabiria
11Buyers and sellers interactions over the infinite horizon could induce several complex behavioural
patterns compatible with other equilibrium concepts, like more unrestricted concepts of subgame per-
fection. I follow the literature in restricting attention to Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies
(which in turn, in our context is also subgame perfect).
12The focus on pure-strategy equilibria only follows Aguirregabiria and Mira’s argument, according to
which a mixed strategy equilibrium in a complete information game can be interpreted as a pure strategy
in the game with incomplete information, such that the probability distribution of players’ actions is the
same under the two equilibria, as shown in Harsanyi’s ”Purification Theorem” (1973) (Aguirregabiria
and Mira, 2007).
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and Mira, 2007; Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010). More specifically, following Aguir-
regabiria and Mira (2007) to prove existence, at least one fixed point of the mapping
is to be found. This, in turn implies showing that the mapping is continuous in the
compact space of probabilities. It is sufficient to show that the choice-specific value
functions are continuous in P for all g. This will follow from the shape of the per-period
function, uniqueness in the pricing problem, continuity of prices on P and continuity of
pi in prices 13.
For the purpose of this paper, as in many other applications of models of industry
dynamics for empirical estimations, the discussions around existence is two-fold (Do-
raszelski and Pakes, 2007): one aspect of it, is connected to whether the computation
algorithms that find an equilibrium, sometimes required for estimation purposes, actu-
ally converge to policies that satisfy, with error, the equilibrium conditions of the model;
the second aspect is whether such conditions are guaranteed to hold exactly under the
assumptions of the model. With regards to the former, most papers exploiting itera-
tive algorithms to find MPE do converge, even when the proved sufficient conditions
for existence are not satisfied (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Regarding the latter, starting
from the general framework in Ericson and Pakes (1995), various assumptions have
been presented to guarantee existence in the context of specific applications, ranging
from allowing for mixed strategies to the more widespread alternative of introducing
incomplete information, for example, as firm-specific privately known scrap values or
entry costs (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007; Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010; Ericson
and Pakes, 1995). Lee and Fong’s existence assumption (A.3.1. in their paper) involves
allowing for a buyer - seller shock after the negotiation network is formed, drawn inde-
pendently over time and all players from a known distribution with full support, such
that small changes in conditional choice probabilities don’t trigger discontinuous jumps
in the choice specific value functions. In their application, however, their algorithm con-
verges to an equilibrium when those shocks are assumed away. The computer exercises
in section 3.4 show that this is also the case for the game presented here.
For arbitrary parameters, multiple equilibria is likely to arise in our context, as in most
games of the same class with best responses being non-linear functions of rivals’ actions.
A discussion of additional assumptions that have been imposed to guarantee uniqueness
in similar games can be found in Doraszelski and Pakes (2007). However, these are not
applicable to our setting over the whole of the parameters space and I will need to return
to multiplicity issues when estimating the game.
13And in our context, given the value functions, this simplifies to a system of linear equations, in
which the price enters linearly in profits of the parties
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3.4 Computation of Equilibria
Given probabilities P , solving for the equilibrium/a defined above, would either require
finding a solution to the B dynamic programming problems defined by V σi (g), and find-
ing the corresponding equilibrium probabilities via 3.11 or exploiting Hotz and Miller’s
(1993) invertibility approach, following (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).
Using stars for the MPE equilibrium, the associated transition probabilities and the
equilibrium value functions for all agents, σ∗, P ∗, {V P ∗i }, the Bellman expression V σi (g)
in equilibrium, implies:
V P
∗
i (g) =
∑
ai∈Ai
P ∗i (ai|g)[p˜iP
∗
i (ai|g) + eP
∗
i (ai, g)] + β
∑
g′
V P
∗
i (g
′)%P
∗
(g′|g) (3.12)
where p˜i is i’s expected period profit including the costs ci from choosing action ai,
p˜iP
∗
i (ai|g) =
∑
g′
%P
∗
(g′|ai, g)[ci(g′|g) + pii(O(g′), tP ∗O(g′))] (3.13)
%P
∗
are the induced transition probabilities between states g′ and g, summing up over
actions on %σi (g
′|ai, g) in 3.7:
%P
∗
(g′|g) =
∑
a∈∏k Ak
N∏
j=1
P ∗j (a[j]|g)I{O(g˜(a), V P
∗
) = g′} (3.14)
and eP
∗
i is the expected choice specific payoff shock to agent i choosing ai:
eP
∗
i (ai, g) = E[ai,i|σ∗i (g, i) = ai] =
∫
iI{σ∗i (g, i) = ai}fi(i)di (3.15)
Note that E(ai,i|g, σ∗i (g, i) = ai) is a function of ai, P ∗ and f. As {σ∗i (g, i) = ai} is
only true when {vP ∗i (ai, g) + i(ai) ≥ vP
∗
i (a, g) + i(a)for any a 6= ai} which means:
eP
∗
i (ai, g) =
1
P ∗i (ai|g)
×
∫
i(ai)I{i(a)−i(ai) ≤ vP ∗i (ai, g)−vP
∗
i (a, g) ∀a 6= ai}fi(i)di
(3.16)
It can be seen then that eP
∗
i depends only on f and value differences v˜
P ∗
i (g) = {vP
∗
i (a, g)−
vP
∗
i (0, g) : a ∈ A}. Likewise P ∗ is a function of f and the v˜: P ∗i (ai|g) = Prob{i(a) −
i(ai) ≤ vP ∗i (ai, g)− vP
∗
i (a, g) ∀a 6= ai|g}.
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The first proposition in Hotz and Miller establishes that the mapping from value differ-
ences to probabilities is invertible and then ei is a function of P
∗ and f only (1993).
The value function above can be then written in matrix notation, for the vector of V P
∗
i
across all network states g as follows:
VP
∗
i = (I− βi%P
∗
)−1(
∑
ai∈Ai
P∗i (ai) ∗ [p˜iP
∗
i (ai) + e
P ∗
i (ai)]) (3.17)
where I is the identity matrix of size |G|× |G|, % is the matrix of transition probabilities
from g to g′ for all possible g, so it has size |G|× |G|, P collects the probabilities for i of
choosing action ai conditional on each possible network g (|G| × 1), multiplied element-
wise by the profits under action ai, for each possible g configuration. So, given P
∗, the
above expression gives the expected value for player i in a given state g if all the players
behave currently and in the future according to the choice probabilities P ∗.
Let Υi(P ) = {Υi(g, P ) : g ∈ G} be the solution to 3.17 given P , this is, the expected
(current and future) profits for i when all players behave following P . Aguirregabiria
and Mira show that a fixed point in the following mapping is also a fixed point in de
Λ problem above, 3.11, and is then an MPE of the original game (Aguirregabiria and
Mira, 2007) 14:
Ψi(ai|g;P ) =
∫
I{ai = argmaxa∈Ai(a,i + p˜iPi (a, g) +
βi
∑
g′
Υi(O(g
′; Υ(P )), P )%Pi (g
′|a, g))}fi(i)di (3.18)
The main advantage of this representation in terms of the practical computation of the
MPE of our game is immediate: the Λ problem in 3.11 does not take future actions as
given, so to evaluate the function for a given agent, the implicit dynamic programming
problem needs to be solved. The Ψ problem in 3.18, instead, takes future actions as
given, via the Υ definition, so it reduces to a system of linear equations.
On this basis, a computation algorithm is developed by Lee and Fong (2013). The
following subsection presents an adaptation of Lee and Fong’s algorithm to our setting
and describes its implementation in the context of a specific exercise that will inform
that predictions of our model.
14The Representation Lemma in Aguirregabiria and Mira’s paper establishes the equivalence of the
fixed points sets across the two mappings (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). Early contributions in Berry
(1994) and Berry et al. (1995) prove uniqueness of the solution of an equivalent inversion problem and
properties of the contraction.
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3.4.1 The computation algorithm
Various algorithms have been suggested to compute Markov Perfect Equilibria 15. The
one proposed here follows the broad structure in the seminal work by Pakes and McGuire
(1994): each iteration has a starting value, that is updated according to the equilibrium
conditions of the game, the “distance” between the updated value and the starting value
is evaluated and if these are not close enough, according to a pre-specified cutoff, a new
iteration starts with the updated values as new starting points. Updating occurs at every
possible state of the world and for every point in the policy and value functions. The
starting functions in each iteration (either a guess for the fist iteration or last round’s
updated result) governing players’ behaviour and transitions over states are taken as the
true policies for rival firms and transitions, so updating value functions for each player
constitutes a single-agent dynamic programming problem. The most suitable cutoff,
naturally, depends on the implemented algorithm.
Unlike most of the applications of algorithms computing MPE of similar games, the
networked structure of the game proposed here implies that the profit functions cannot
be computed off-line and fed into the algorithm. Instead, because the equilibrium prices
depend on future values, which in turn depend on equilibrium prices, prices and stage
profits would need updating within each iteration as well. Within this structure, Lee
and Fong propose an iterative procedure that, applied to our setting, can be informally
described by the steps below.
Consider the profit equations for buyers and sellers, as described by equations 3.1 and
3.2. Start by fixing the exogenous components of the model: the size of the game, B
and S; prices of inputs, {mi}, final prices in the buyers’ domestic markets, {ri}, and
each buyer’s demand, {qi}; and the (exogenous) outside price for the buyers xi = x.
Choose a suitable set of parameters for the game: costs of linking, c and c; bargaining
parameters, bij for all players i and j; and matching qualities ρij for all players i and j.
1. Start with an initial guess of conditional choice probabilities, P 0 of size B×|Ai|×
|G|, period contracts, tP 0 of size B × S × |G|, and value functions VP 0 of size
(B + S)× |G|16.
2. Start the following iteration procedure until convergence:
15In the brief comments here I exclude algorithms that re-express the problem as a system of non-
linear equations and solve for it, as for large games like the one at hand, the advantages of Gaussian
methods have been discussed extensively (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007; Pakes and McGuire, 1994)
16The procedure presented in the next subsection has been run initialising the algorithm with random
CCPs, prices and values, as well as arbitrarily fixed arrays. Convergence is achieved in the relevant areas
of the parameter space irrespective of the initialisation
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(a) Use CCPs to construct the transition matrix for states %P (g′|g) and the con-
ditional transitions, %σi (g
′|ai, g), for every action, player and state.
(b) Given tP and VP find the sellers’ best response to each possible negotiation
network, this is, out of all the buyers linked to the seller under a given network,
identify the relationship that gives largest payoffs - treat no-linking as an
alternative.
(c) Compute players period payoffs under each possible network in all standing
bilateral relations.
(d) Use the state transitions and the period payoffs of the standing relations for
each player to generate the value functions. For simplicity, I perform this via
value function iteration.
(e) For each negotiation network (both standing and non-standing relations) com-
pute the outside options for each player in each bilateral negotiation she faces,
taking all other prices as given, using the value functions computed above.
(f) Given the bargaining parameters, for each linked pair solve the Nash Bargain-
ing problem to obtain prices. All pairs that exhibit no gains from trade for at
least one of the parties in trade are unstable. Note that in our context, the
simultaneous Nash Bargaining problems reduce to a system of (simultaneous)
linear equations.
(g) Update the CCPs for each buyer. In my application, I assume  follows a
Type I Extreme Value distribution, which makes the updating stage straight-
forward, obtaining CCPs as ratios of transformed inter-temporal profits 17.
(h) Feed in the CCPs updated in (2.g) and the prices and stability rule obtained
in (2.f) to start a new iteration in (2.a).
3. Perform step (2) until convergence is achieved. In Lee and Fong convergence
is evaluated element-wise as |VP τ+1 − VP τ | < ω with ω pre-specified, with τ
denoting iterations of step (2) (Lee and Fong, 2013). I set ω = 10(−6) 11+|V τ | which
is equivalent to using the sup-norm criterion discussed in Doraszelski and Pakes
(2007) 18.
The algorithm proposed here (again, following Lee and Fong (2013)) is not a contrac-
tion mapping so convergence is not guaranteed. Moreover, like in Pakes and McGuire
17The convenience of this parametric choice for computational purposes is immediate. The criticism
around the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives observed early in Debreu (1960), does not hold in
the dynamic context, as the choice specific value functions depend on all other alternatives via future
payoffs, even when the stage profits are a function of the (one) current action only.
18For robustness, the smaller exercises were run twice, once evaluating convergence on the values
and once evaluating convergence on the CCPs. No differences in the equilibrium reached were found,
although the convergence in CCPs was found less smooth (reasonably enough in the context of our
application) and slower, as the sup norm is evaluated over larger arrays: CCPs are player, action and
state specific.
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(1994) systematic non-convergence and cycling can arise due to the characteristics of the
game. Like in the classic entry-exit example, choices in the linking stage are such that
discontinuities in future values can arise, particularly when more than one buyer clump
choosing the same seller, bringing the future values discontinuously down for (some of
the) buyer(s) causing the corresponding links to break inducing another discontinuous
jump in values. One way of solving this is introducing additional randomness in the
linking stage. A second issue inducing cycling patterns in the convergence path is a
non-uniqueness feature immediately associated to the specification of the game: con-
sider two buyers linking with one seller (gij = gkj = 1); in the game presented here,
there are occasions in which either of the links could be individually sustainable provided
the other link breaks, and an iteration starting with both firms linking, can induce a best
response of none of them linking, so each buyer would hold the belief that the rival is not
linking, and insist herself on re-forming the link, going back to the starting point. One
possible way of solving this type of cycling pattern is to introduce an ordering in which
the breakage occurs (in line with Pakes and McGuire’s type of solution). This is, indeed,
naturally embedded in our game. In the presence of enough heterogeneity affecting the
surplus each seller makes with each individual link, only the link with higher surplus is
kept. A random device picks out one link only in the unlikely case of a tie occurring.
3.4.2 Realising Equilibria of a Small Game
A number of challenges, from the perspective of the computation of an equilibrium,
remain to be tackled. The first one is the size of the state space. Even in our application,
where each buyer chooses to link with one seller only and the equilibrium networks can
only feature one-to-one relations, as the set of players grows large tractability can become
an issue. The second one is the set of limitations in the uses of these kinds of models in
the presence of potentially multiple equilibria.
This subsection presents the results of a procedure that scans the space of parameters
for given primitives of the game, as a basis for discussing those challenges 19. This
implies defining a grid for each scalar parameter and computing an MPE of the game
for each possible combination of parameters, following the algorithm proposed in the
previous section. The main focus in this subsection is on the pattern of convergence and
computation times and I leave the discussions around the characterisation of equilibria
of the game for section 3.5.
For the sake of the computer exercise, the primitives of the game are as follows. Consider
one market with two buyers and two sellers only, so B = S = 2, indexed i = 1, 2 and
19The Matlab code that implements the algorithm described above is available upon request, as well
as the procedures that run the parameter sweeping and graphs.
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j = 1, 2. Let the players’ profit functions be defined by 3.1 and 3.2, with mi = m,
qi = q and ri = r and x exogenously determined, so buyers are symmetric in terms of
the size of their demand, their revenues in their domestic markets and the quality (or
price) of the inputs they require. Also, assume bij = bi, so the bargaining powers are
buyer-specific. To simplify the scanning exercise, fix the bargaining parameter for buyer
1, b1 = 0.5, the cost of re-linking with an existing supplier, c > 0, and the quality of
the matches for buyer 1, such that ρ11 > ρ12 = 0. The remaining free parameters of the
game are b2, c, ρ21 and ρ22, which are scanned on reasonably fine grids
20.
Size of the Game and Computation Time. The following describes the time it
takes to run through the first two iterations of the MPE algorithm, for a fixed vector of
parameters, for different sizes of the game (combinations of total number of buyers and
sellers). Time is measured in seconds and corresponds to a full run over the first two
iterations, irrespective of the convergence path. On top of the additional time required
to complete each iteration in larger games, the number of iterations until convergence
could also grow with the size of the game, depending on the parameters, as a larger
array needs to converge element-wise21.
In our specification, the set of possible states has cardinality (S + 1)B. While a small
game of size 2 × 2 gives only 9 possible states of the world, a slightly bigger market,
with, for instance, 5 buyers and 5 sellers, gives 7, 776 states. This in turn, requires
the computation of more than 77 thousand player-state values and 233, 280 conditional
choice probabilities.
The table below shows that the first two iterations of the algorithm in a 2×2 game takes
0.09 seconds, while on the bottom-right corner, a 4 × 8 game takes more than 40, 000
seconds, which is around 11 hours of computer time. While improvements in the coding
of the algorithm are possible to reduce computation times, this exercise shows that,
convergence aside, the number of players and consequently the size of the state space
can very quickly turn the computation of an equilibrium of the game unmanageable 22.
20Several versions of this parameter sweeping have been performed. The scanned grids for the largest
exercise explored b2 in 0.05 increments over the interval [0, 1], c ∈ [c = 0.5, 20.5], and both ρ2j ∈ [0, 4]
for j = 1, 2 in 0.25 increments. This gives a result of 66, 000+ parameter vectors.
21The computation time corresponds to an iMac running on OS X Version 10.9.3, processor 3.5 GHz
Intel Core i7, 32GB 16000 MHz DDR3, with four cores available but only one under use in Matlab
R2013b.
22Section 5 in Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) presents an excellent review of methods that could po-
tentially alleviate the dimensionality problem referred here.
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Table 3.1: Computation Times for Different Sizes of the Game
Buyers
Sellers 2 3 4
2 0.09 0.24 2.11
3 0.12 1.35 25.44
4 0.24 5.91 191.55
5 0.52 20.37 1,019.50
6 1.03 60.29 4,156.10
7 1.89 160.91 15,362.00
8 3.23 357.74 40,683.00
Non-Convergence. In the largest parameter sweep, of the 66, 910 different vectors
of parameters, 61.02% of them produce an equilibrium within the maximum number of
iterations. In the largest exercise, for computational purposes the maximum number of
iterations was dropped down to 500. While smaller experiments were run with up to
5, 000 iterations, convergence occurs most of the times within the first 30 iterations. The
convergence cutoff in all the exercises was 10−6 × (|1 + V|)−1. The parameters in the
remaining 39% of the runs can be divided into two groups. One group, accounting for
27.14% of the set of all the parameters, correspond to computations in which the CCPs
(and values) would visit cyclically a fixed set of points. The length of the cycle varied
from 2 to 5 points, with median and mean close to 2. The observed cycles occurred
in areas of the parameter space that suggest traps like those described in sub-section
3.4.1: those presumably generated by low heterogeneity and non-uniqueness and those
for whom changes in the discrete decision of linking would induce non-smooth jumps in
opponents’ values.
In smaller experiments, procedures to address cycle traps in iterative algorithms were
performed (mainly, re-starting the iterations with a convex combination of the nodes in
the cycle), with success in some areas of the parameter space. The remaining (almost)
12% of the vectors of parameters did not converge to an equilibrium within the maximum
number of iterations nor it converged to an absorbent cycle (of length smaller than or
equal to the size of the state space). The results in the rest of this chapter are drawn,
except otherwise stated, on the 40, 000+ vectors that produced an equilibrium. Further
work can be done to improve on the convergence rate over the rest of the parameters
space. Of the converging parameters, 98.17% of the cases, attain convergence within the
first 30 iterations and in an average close to 10 iterations.
Smoothness of Convergence. The algorithm described above is not a contraction
mapping, so the convergence parameter (this is, the sup norm over all entries in the Value
array across two consecutive iterations) is not necessarily monotonically decreasing over
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the iterations path. In our 2× 2 setting, again, I fix the parameter vector and compute
an equilibrium of the game for 50 different initializations of the CCPs. These include
assuming constant probabilities over all actions, spaces and players and random draws
from the uniform and normal distributions, starting on different seeds. The line graphs
below show the convergence (to the same equilibrium) path over the first iterations, for
three of the initialisations (arbitrarily chosen).
Figure 3.1: Convergence Path for Alternative Initialisations
Different parameter choices produce graphs in which the iteration path takes positive
slope more than once. Papers using related algorithms present similar patterns of local-
only contractions (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Pakes and McGuire, 1994).
Non-uniqueness. As stated above, the game proposed here in its general form and
with no restrictions on the parameters is likely to produce multiple equilibria. Methods
based on structures exploiting homotopic conditions have been used in applied papers
to trace multiple equilibria. This is considered out of the scope of this chapter and I will
limit the considerations on multiplicity to the relatively ad-hoc (and also quite wide-
spread) practice of re-computing equilibria multiple times varying the starting conditions
for a fixed parameter vector. Although the results in the table below in no way support
a claim on uniqueness, they show some robustness in the convergence towards the same
equilibrium or, in other terms, consistency in the selection mechanism in the presence
of multiple equilibria, for a choice of parameters 23. It is clear that in the context of
the game we propose we can construct cases in which multiplicity arises immediately:
lack of heterogeneity in the matching qualities and bargaining powers are compatible
with more than one equilibrium. If, for each buyer the gains from trade are the same
with both sellers, then at least two networks can arise as steady states: one in which
g11 = g22 = 1 and one in which g12 = g21 = 1. Given the restrictions in the model,
networks involving both buyers linking with the same seller cannot be stable and, for
the low outside options set for the buyers, not trading is never a solution. Higher costs
of linking will only induce heavier persistence on the initial linking choices, but these
23Note then that the choice of parameter vector is arbitrary and there is no theoretical reason for the
results presented here to hold over the whole of the parameter space.
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will be equally likely in this example. This case corresponds to the first line of the table,
labeled as Constructed Multiplicity.
Before going into further detail, note that the table below has been produced with only
5, 000 computations of MPE for each selected vector of parameters. Smaller exercises
have been performed with up to 10, 000 replications, finding non-significant qualitative
differences with what is presented below.
The first column in the table shows the average number of iterations of the MPE al-
gorithm until convergence, followed by its standard deviation. In the third column, I
present the proportion of iterations that reached network g11 = g22 = 1, labeled as
Equilibrium 1 below, as the state that occurs with probability close to one in the steady
state distribution over networks. For these cases, column four presents the average prob-
ability of network g11 = g22 = 1
24. To facilitate the discussion here, the parameters
are chosen in a range such that networks in which not all of the players are trading do
not arise in equilibrium. The possible steady state distribution over networks can give
network g11 = g22 = 1 occurring with probability close to one, or g12 = g21 = 1 with
equally high probability or a combination of both networks. Therefore, we only need to
report the probability of one of these happening. The final columns show the average
price and average value for buyer 1 when network g11 = g22 = 1 arises, accompanied by
their respective standard deviations 25.
For the sake of our informal discussion on multiplicity, it can be seen that the amount of
heterogeneity introduced in the game, via the quality of the matches and the bargaining
parameters, is directly linked with the convergence towards one single equilibrium 26.
As described above, the extreme case is the one in the first row of the table. In this case,
only 51% of the iterations fall in the Equilibrium 1 with buyer 1 trading with seller 1
and buyer 2 trading with seller 2, with probability close to 1 as the steady network. The
other half of the runs converge to the second possible equilibrium under these conditions:
one in which g12 = g21 = 1 happens almost surely, while P (g11 = g22 = 1) is close to
zero under the steady state distribution over networks. As stronger heterogeneity is
introduced both through ρ’s and bargaining powers (cases 4, 5, 6, 8), one equilibrium of
the two is picked in the majority of the runs.
24Standard errors are zero up to the 10−16th decimal place and is then not reported here.
25Parameters for each case are set as follows: 1) ρ11 = ρ21, ρ12 = ρ22, b1 = b2, c = c, although same
distribution over states is recovered with c < c; 2) as in case 1, except from ρ21 = 0 and ρ22 = 10
−3; 3)
as in case 2, but with large costs of linking: c = 10 × c; 4) as in case 1, except from ρ21 = 10−3 which
implies ρ21 < ρ11 and ρ22 = 10 which implies ρ22 > ρ12 ; 5) as in case 3, but with large costs of linking:
c = 10× c; 6) and 7) as in case 1 but with ρ22 = 2×ρ11, ρ12 = ρ22 with and without advantage to buyer
2; 8) as in case 4, but now b1 = 0.8 while b2 = 0.5.
26Clearly, this table is based on potential equilibria effectively reached via the proposed algorithm.
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Note finally that for the cases that reach a given equilibrium, the steady state distribution
over networks, the prices and values obtained from the MPE calculations are computed
with very little dispersion over runs.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of MPE over 5,000 runs, selected parameters
Setting Iter
Mean
Iter SD Equil 1 P (g11 =
g22 = 1)
t11 σˆt11 V
1
Equil 1 σˆV 1
Equil 1
1: No heterogeneity - Con-
structed Multiplicity
11.961 2.092 0.513 0.99999 34.352 0.004 1.328 0.000
2: Moderate Heterogeneity 11.532 2.819 0.585 0.99999 32.795 0.007 1.359 0.000
3: Moderate Heterogeneity
and High Costs of Linking
11.898 1.132 0.636 0.99999 48.316 0.005 1.049 0.000
4: Strong Heterogeneity 11.926 2.149 0.966 0.99999 35.904 0.004 1.477 0.000
5: Strong Heterogeneity
and High Costs of Linking
12.373 2.619 0.941 0.99999 39.007 0.004 1.415 0.000
6: Strong Heterogeneity
and Competing Buyers (A)
12.444 3.004 0.345 0.99999 35.901 0.006 1.477 0.000
7: Strong Heterogeneity
and Competing Buyers (B)
11.846 2.065 0.478 0.99999 35.901 0.006 1.477 0.000
8: Strong Heterogeneity
and Unequal Bargaining
Powers
18.353 2.391 0.873 0.99999 13.540 0.024 1.924 0.001
3.5 Parameters and Market Outcomes
The parameter sweeping described in the previous section is useful for illustrating the
main predictions of the model. The caveats discussed above around multiplicity chal-
lenge the validity of conclusions drawn from comparative exercises based merely on
exploring changes in equilibrium outcomes after variations in the fundamental param-
eters of the game. The references to the equilibrium computations in this section are
then illustrative only and serve the purpose of supporting a qualitative description of
the mechanics of the game 27.
The game presented here is such that the architecture of buyer-seller relations and the
prices underlying these are a result of the surplus-sharing rules, the heterogeneity in
the matching quality and the existence of linking costs. Below I summarise in seven
statements, the main ways in which these three sets of parameters can affect the ob-
served networks and prices, to turn, in the next chapter to the discussion on structural
estimation.
27For these illustrations, consider the same simple setting of two identical buyers with a unit demand
over an indivisible product that can be supplied by two sellers that are constrained to producing for, at
most, one or other buyer in each period. The key parameters we are interested in are the bargaining
power of the second buyer, b2, (given that that of the first buyer was fixed at 0.5 for the whole of the
sweeping exercise), the cost of linking with a new buyer, chigh, and the quality of the matches of the
second buyer with either seller, ρ21 and ρ22. Once more, recall that the there is no cost of breaking a
link and that the cost of re-linking with an old supplier is fixed for the whole exercise. Similarly, ρ11
and ρ12 are set so the quality of the match between buyer one and seller one is higher than that between
this buyer and seller two.
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First, a buyer with no bargaining power (take-it-or-leave it offers from sellers) will
not link when costs of forming a link are sufficiently high. This is a straightforward
statement. When one buyer has no bargaining power, the probability of observing only
the other buyer trading increases with the costs of forming a new link. As in our sweeping
exercise, fixing the bargaining parameter of buyer 1, b1 = 0.5, note that whenever b2 = 0,
buyer 2 doesn’t trade, in the presence of non-zero costs of linking. When the costs of
forming a new link are the same as those of maintaining a link, buyer 2, even with no
bargaining power might still form links and the ergodic distribution over states show
networks in which only buyer 1 trades with probability 0.46. As the cost of forming links
increases, networks with buyer 1 as the only buyer in the market arise with a steady
state probability of above 0.85 (with c above a certain threshold, this probability is 0.99).
Remember that the no-linking alternative for the buyer was set to a value unappealingly
low. Then, under this set up, it can be seen that when the costs of forming a new link are
non-zero, if a buyer is trading, then the profit-sharing rule cannot be one in which the
seller captures all the surplus in a relation. The bargaining parameters to be estimated
with our data, then, need to be consistent with this observation.
Second and related to the previous point, when both buyers have at-least-some bar-
gaining power, networks with one buyer only occur with probability close to zero. The
out-of-the-market option for the buyer was set low enough so that trade always domi-
nates the option of not-linking. So long as each buyer can extract at least some of the
surplus produced in trade, they will both be active. This can be under networks that
are coordinated, so that there is no clumping of both buyers choosing the same seller
or with miss-coordination, happening when both buyers choose the same seller. Note
however that buyers’ linking choices occur simultaneously so no purposeful coordination
is possible. Recall as well that the presence of private shocks prevent buyers from mak-
ing certain conjectures over rivals’ choices. Clumping occurs with significant non-zero
probability only when buyer 2 has no bargaining power. Above that, irrespective of the
parametrisation of the heterogeneity in the matching quality, both buyers trade and they
do so by linking with different sellers. In our exercise, this implies observing a network
where the only two links are g11 = 1 and g22 = 1 or one in which these are g12 = 1 and
g21 = 1.
Third, in equilibrium, buyers choose different suppliers. In the game proposed here,
sellers are constrained to supplying one unit of the product only. Whenever two buyers
link in negotiation with the same seller, one of them (precisely the one that offers lower
gains from trade to the seller) will not trade in that period, paying -if any- the associated
cost of having linked and obtaining the outside value. This induces the buyer moving
away from that particular seller, onto the second best option. The other buyer, who
offers the largest gains to the seller, will trade. However, given that larger negotiation
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sub-graphs for the seller improve her bargaining position, this will drive the price up,
making states of clumping less valuable for the remaining buyer, even when she succeeds
to trade. This result is important for the structural estimation, as the links we observe
in the data will be the result of equilibrium behaviour that does not involve unrealised
links (which we, obviously, cannot observe).
Fourth, when faced with more than one potential buyer, the link that prevails with
a given seller is the one that maximises the gains from trade for the seller which de-
pends, via negotiated prices, on the relative bargaining powers and the matching quali-
ties. Other things equal28 buyers with lower bargaining power are preferred and better
matches are preferred as well. Note however, that the effect of the quality of the match
on the seller’s choice is mediated by the bargaining parameter itself and the higher the
bargaining power of the buyer, the lower the effect of the quality of the match on the
price and, therefore, on the seller’s profits.
Fifth, the presence of heterogeneity in the matching qualities induces sorting but not
necessarily the most efficient outcome. This is immediately related to the shape of
the period profits. As the quality of the matching ρij enters additively in the unit
profits of the buyer, it is clear that, other things equal, buyers would in principle be
inclined to linking with their best match. However, when the best match for both buyers
corresponds to the same supplier, in equilibrium, the outcome network corresponds
to that which exhibits higher gains from trade from the seller’s perspective, with the
“discarded” buyer moving away to the second best alternative. This does not always
imply that in the presence of matching-level heterogeneity the fully efficient network
arises. To see this, consider a case in which ρ21 > ρ22 > ρ11 > ρ12 and ρ11 + ρ22 >
ρ21 + ρ21. In such a setting, both buyers prefer, other things equal, seller one. However,
the gains from trade for that seller are higher with buyer 2. This can force buyer 1 to link
with his second best alternative, seller 2. Although this outcome maximises seller 1’s
and buyer 2’s profits, it leads to a network that does not produce the industry efficient
outcome. The decentralised linking protocol proposed here leads to the prevalence of
the network that maximises industry-wide gains from trade, within capacity constraints
and in the presence of matching heterogeneity in the ρ ordering of this example, only if
ρ11 + ρ22 ≤ ρ21 + ρ12.
Sixth, higher costs of linking generate stronger persistence in pre-existing links and
drive prices up. This as well constitutes a natural result from the structure of the game.
The effect of the cost of forming a new link operates in two ways. As it negatively affects
the period profits for the buyer, irrespective of the result in the bargaining stage, other
things equal, higher linking costs lower the value of opening new links for a buyer. With
28Critically, buyers’ sizes, retail and input prices.
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it, the future value of moving away from the current supplier is also low, making the
relative gains from the current relation higher and driving the price up, for a fixed set
of bargaining parameters. This can then mimic settings in which the buyer allocates
systematically orders to its existing supplier(s).
Seventh, the network structure affects both the prices, via outside options, and the
discrete choice decision in a way that is similar to entry / exit problems. In our simple
setting, buyers are allowed to choose one link only, linking decisions are non-coordinated
and other buyers’ choices affect the profitability of a given link directly. This feature
resembles the strategic aspect of standard entry / exit games in which firms decide
whether to enter a market (start a relationship with a seller) with profits being dependent
on whether she finds herself a monopolist in the market after entry (she is the only party
negotiating with the seller) or whether she is competing with other firms (she bargains
with a seller who is sustaining multiple negotiations at the same time). On top of this
direct effect, the choices of rivals situated in other areas of the graph play a strategic role
as well. To see this, consider a buyer facing two different possible suppliers, s1 and s2 and
assume that the buyer we are interested in, buyer 1, negotiates and trades with s1 and
another buyer, buyer 2, trades with s2, under set costs of linking, qualities of the matches
and other exogenous primitives. Upon successful trade, each buyer needs to make a new
choice of suppliers for the next period. Buyer 2 will be perceived as more likely to re-link
with s2 than any other supplier. From buyer 1’s perspective, then, the probability of any
state of the world arising with buyer 2 linking with any seller different from s2 is lower.
This affects the continuation value for all the choices buyer 1 could potentially make in
the current period and the equilibrium prices associated to these. To continue with the
analogy to entry / exit games, the problem presented here could be interpreted as one in
which each seller represents a market and each buyer is a firm who needs to decide what
market to enter. Each market can hold one monopolist only, whose cost (price to be paid
for the garment) depends on (the identity of) other incumbents or entrants both via the
competition in the current period and the probability distribution over states that can
be reached in the future. A problem that is similar to the one described here is that
studied by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2010), who find this network effect as the underlying
mechanism supporting entry deterrence. However, for the purpose of their model and its
estimation, they propose an independence assumption across markets (sellers in analogy
to our setting) that simplifies the game substantially.
Finally, note that up to here we have imposed symmetry in three relevant aspects of
the buyers’ characteristics: we have assumed that they charge the same price in their
domestic markets ri = r, that they place orders of the same size qi = q and that they
require the same quality of inputs mi = m. Other things equal, it can be easily seen that
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larger buyers will win the competition for a seller when many-to-one situations arise.
Although higher ri’s will also increase the surplus the seller can extract, this is only via
the gains from trade for he buyer in the bargaining process. This implies that, capacity
constraints aside and heterogeneity assumed away, a supplier will prefer a large buyer
with low end-market prices than a smaller buyer with high prices. The cost of the inputs
enter linearly in the sellers profit function as well, having still a greater impact in the
stability of a given link than that of ri.
All of these29 are observed in the data, together with the active links (who trades with
whom) and the prices at which trade takes place. The game proposed here models
these two as results of the equilibrium behaviour consistent with values of three (sets of)
parameters: the cost of linking, the bargaining powers of the buyers and the shape of
the matching-specific heterogeneity component. The following chapter proposes a first
exploration to the structural estimation of these using observed matches and prices.
29Except for ri, which I will show it can cancel out in the estimation procedure
Chapter 4
The Structural Approach
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter described a dynamic game of incomplete information in which
buyers choose a supplier for a product, from a list of available sellers in a market. The
game gives, as its main outcome, a configuration of a buyer - seller network and a set
of contracts associated to it. These were the result of a process of competition between
buyers for suppliers of heterogeneous qualities and a sunk cost of starting a relation.
This chapter discusses and assesses the applicability of the econometric approach devel-
oped in Lee and Fong (2013) for estimating the structural parameters of the game. In
terms of its structure, their estimation algorithm resembles that of Bajari et al. (2007)
with two stages performing a forward simulation routine to compute value functions and
an iterative procedure that evaluates candidate parameters to compare the results pro-
duced by these with conditional choice probabilities recovered non-parametrically from
the data, as in Hotz and Miller (1993). There are two aspects in which Lee and Fong’s
algorithm explicitly differs from that of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin. First, a fixed point
problem in prices-to-values is nested in the computation of value functions, looping from
computed values to prices and back to values iteratively until convergence to guarantee
internal consistency of these two. This is similar to what was done in Chapter 3 when
realising an example of a small game and computing its equilibrium(a). Second, the
estimation of the structural parameters is done via the minimisation of a distance score
that compares conditional choice probabilities that need to be computed for each pa-
rameter candidate. In the exercise I perform in this chapter using simulated data, this
proves very costly in terms of computer times and the advantages of the method over
alternatives that rely on computing fully the equilibrium of the game for each candidate
are dubious.
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There are a number of specificities of the data and the problem at hand that make Lee
and Fong’s algorithm not immediately applicable. This has led to the introduction of
extensions and alternative steps in the algorithm in three dimensions: (i) the way in
which conditional choice probabilities are obtained from the data; (ii) the use of data
on prices; (iii) the construction of the score to minimise. The extensions related to (i)
and (iii) follow suggestions in Bajari et al. (2007) and Hotz et al. (1994), while those in
(ii) respond to the availability of additional information in our data. These extensions
lead to sixteen different ways of applying the algorithm to my setting.
After framing the techniques used here in the empirical IO literature, the goal of this
chapter is to present the algorithm and its alternatives and discuss the results of applying
them to estimating the parameters of the simple game presented in Chapter 3 using
simulated data. The main aim of this exercise is to shed light on the suitability of the
methods to my setting and in no way constitutes an attempt of evaluating the merits of
the econometrics underlying Lee and Fong’s algorithm in broader terms. What I present
here pursues a different goal and does not display the rigour necessary to propose claims
that could exceed the limits of this first exploration.
The next section, 4.2, discusses the econometric approach, with references to the recent
literature on the estimation of dynamic games of incomplete information. Then, in 4.3,
I present the structure of the chosen estimation algorithm, following the developments
in Lee and Fong (2013). Section 4.4, describes the operational assumptions needed to
implement the econometric approach to estimate the proposed game using our data.
Finally, section 4.5 presents the results from a small Monte Carlo exercise that studies
the performance of the algorithm and its variations and discusses the main difficulties
encountered when applying it to our setting.
4.2 The Econometric Approach
The game proposed in Chapter 3 constitutes a dynamic game of incomplete information.
Lee and Fong (2013) propose a two-step procedure to estimate the parameters in this
type of problem when actions are networked in a non-trivial way.
The computational difficulties associated to the estimation of dynamic problems are
well understood. Until recently, the origin of these difficulties has been the need for
solving the underlying dynamic programming problem: continuation values needed to
be generated by finding a fixed point in the value function for each player, repeating
this process for different parameter candidates to search for the one that mimicked the
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observed behaviour best 1. The burden imposed by this type of procedure naturally
increases with the number of players, making the computational problem particularly
severe in the context of strategic games. The literature in this area, in the last decade,
has then focussed on alleviating the computational costs imposed by the fixed point
procedure.
The developments that are more relevant to the work I present here exploit the Invert-
ibility Result proved in Hotz and Miller (1993) in the context of a single-agent dynamic
discrete choice problem: under relatively general assumptions, it can be shown that there
exists a one-to-one mapping between the choice specific value functions and the condi-
tional choice probabilities induced by the dynamic programming problem, in a fashion
that is similar to static discrete choice problems. Moreover, the invertibility of that
mapping allowed for estimating non-parametrically the continuation values, using the
choice probabilities in the data, without computing the fixed point problem described
above 2. Early generalisations of this original idea were presented in Hotz et al. (1994)
offering an extension, based of forward simulation techniques, of the findings in Hotz and
Miller (1993) to problems with no terminal state. Rust’s chapter in the 1994 Handbook
offered a survey of these methods under a unifying framework (Rust, 1994).
Different adaptations of these techniques to games with strategic interaction were pro-
posed (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Bajari et al. (2007); Pakes et al. (2007) as
salient, but not exclusive, examples) and the reader is referred to Ackerberg et al. (2007)
and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for comprehensive surveys on the literature.
The immediate additional complication associated with moving from single agent to
multiple-agent problems is the (potential) multiplicity of equilibria. As pointed out in
Pakes et al. (2007), non-uniqueness in games of strategic interaction implies the impossi-
bility of working out the probability distribution over possible outcomes, conditional on
the parameters and the set of observable variables. This, in turn makes most standard
estimators unsuitable for settings in which multiple equilibria are possible, aggravated
when the relevant dimension of heterogeneity across agents grows and, with it, the scope
for multiplicity as it tends to be the case in network formation games.
The type of game I propose belong to the class in Ericson and Pakes’s general frame-
work for Markov industry dynamics (1995). Their first and second Theorems state the
conditions that underlie the “one-MPE-data” assumption, that most of the economet-
ric approaches relevant to my work make. Proposition 1 in Pakes et al. (2007) states
that, under certain assumptions, each equilibrium of the game generates a finite chain
1These complications are not exclusive to the multiple-agent setting. The single agent problem in
Rust (1987) already evidenced this.
2This is stated as Proposition 1 in Hotz and Miller (1993).
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of actions and states that depend only on their current and immediately observable re-
alisations. This (once more finite) chain defines a recurrent class of states that are the
only visited states. Then, given a data generating process consistent with a given re-
current class, the policies of the players that correspond to that data generating process
need to be the same across all equilibria. In other terms, given the current state, the
distribution of future states can be computed and policies are well defined functions of
the parameters and observables (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes et al., 2007).
A number of alternative two-step estimators were developed, making use in one way
or another of the “one-MPE-data” assumption and some form of non-parametric cir-
cumvention of the explicit computation of continuation values. The general structure
of the estimators is similar across all these alternatives. They all share a first stage in
which transition probabilities over states and players’ conditional choice probabilities
are obtained from the data. A second stage then searches for the parameters that best
match the observed behaviour, using the conditions of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in
the corresponding game. This requires no actual computation of en equilibrium.
The first step in this direction was, of course, that taken in Hotz and Miller (1993).
The improvements on their framework have largely been devoted to i) introducing more
engaged interactions between individual current profits and rivals’ actions and ii) re-
ducing the sample bias induced by the fact that continuation values are estimated in a
first stage and “fed into” a second stage from which the parameters are recovered with,
potentially, sample bias 3.
It is in the tradition of these two-step estimators that I exploit the advances in Lee and
Fong (2013) to recover the structural parameters of the game I am interested in. In its
most general form, the estimation procedure suggested in Lee and Fong (2013) imposes
some additional challenges when implemented in my setting. The first one is that, like in
many other applications, the state space is indeed large and exponentially growing with
the number of players. Even when all states of the world were visited with equal proba-
bility, stepping in each of these at least once would require an unrealistically long panel.
Moreover, as it will be seen below, the type of data I work with, shows high recurrence
in linking choices, generating observations compatible with a distribution over states
that never visits some of its nodes. The second one is that in my setting I do observe
the prices of interactions that take place in the data, so the fixed point that recovers
prices needs to be internally consistent not only with the computed value functions, but
also with the prices in the data. Finally, the computer times are prohibitively long even
3The severity of this depends, among other things, on the size (relative to the data) of the state space
and the second stage method, especially if the estimating objective function exhibits non linearities
over the estimated values, as in the context of likelihood-based techniques. See Pakes et al. (2007) and
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for further discussion on this.
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when no full equilibria of the game is computed. Actually, the algorithm in Lee and
Fong’s approach requires computing equilibrium CCPs for deviations of the parameters,
which makes the computation almost as taxing as solving for the equilibrium fully.
The following section presents the algorithm as developed by Lee and Fong, with the
variations that correspond to my setting.
4.3 The Algorithm
As in Lee and Fong (2013), consider one market only for notational simplicity4.
The first part of the algorithm below describes the generation of value functions via
forward simulation.
I assume that f  is distributed Type I Extreme Value. Following Hotz and Miller
(1993), if the probability of player i choosing each action under each state, Pi(ai|g)
(the conditional choice probabilities), can be estimated from the data, differences in the
choice specific value functions, vσi (ai, g) in equation 3.8 in the previous chapter, can be
recovered as:
vi(a, g)− vi(a′, g) = ln(Pi(a|g))− ln(Pi(a′|g)) (4.1)
for any two actions a and a′. Then, the estimated policy function for agent i would be
given by:
σˆi(g, i) = argmaxa∈Ai{vi(a, g) + a,i} = argmaxa∈Ai{ln(Pi(a|g)) + a,i} (4.2)
For any set of policy functions {σi, σ−i} consistent estimates of value functions for agent
i and all rivals playing those strategies, can be obtained using:
Vˆi(g, σ, θ) = E
[ ∞∑
t
βti(pii(g
t, t)−c(gt|gt−1)+ti,σi(gt−1,ti))|g
0 = g, gt = O(g˜(σ(gt−1, t))), θ
]
(4.3)
4Note, however, that for the estimators to have desirable properties, all the states in a certain recurrent
class need to be visited infinitely often. In the context of our panel, where a number of markets are
observed over time, this would require (for example) assuming that the initial state in each market is a
drawn from the ergodic steady state distribution of states.
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Expectations are taken over present and future ’s, the O rules and t are consistent with
Vˆ , following the Nash bargaining procedure.
Let θ be the vector of parameters. The approximation of these value functions is done
iteratively using the forward simulation in Bajari et al. (2007), following the steps below5:
1. Fix θ.
2. Set t and O(·), in the first ‘round’ of the process to be an initial guess.
3. For each g, iterate to generate Vi(g;σ; t
k, Ok, θ), where in each iteratiion τ :.
(a) Set gτ = g, the network fixed above.
(b) For each agent i, draw error shocks τi for each action that can be taken.
(c) For each agent i, calculate actions aτi = σˆi(g
τ , τi), as the profit maximising
action.
(d) Using the ai’s for all players obtain the negotiation network g˜(a
τ ).
(e) Using O(·), obtain the stable network that arises from the predicted negoti-
ation network, g′ = O(g˜(aτ )).
(f) For each i compute the stage profits pii(g
′, t)− ci(g˜(aτ )|g′) + τai,i.
(g) Update the network to be gτ+1 = g′ and repeat steps 3.a to 3.g up to T times.
This constitutes one path of play.
(h) Generate multiple paths of plays following the steps above, starting with
network g in the first iteration.
(i) Average each i’s discounted stream of payoffs for the multiple simulated paths
of play to obtain an estimate of Vˆi(g;σ; t;O
τ , θ).
4. Repeat step 3 for all the possible states of the world6.
5. Update tk+1 and Ok+1 using the Vˆi estimated for each i and g, solving the bar-
gaining problem.
6. Use tk+1 and Ok+1 to re-start the process in step 2.
7. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until Vˆi(g;σ; t
k;Ok, θ)− Vˆi(g;σ; tk−1;Ok−1, θ) < ω), where ω
is a specified cutoff.
5Although the algorithm is presented differently the main structure corresponds to that in Lee and
Fong (2013).
6Note this is different from Lee and Fong (2013).
Chapter 4. Structural Approach 60
The steps above, in our context can be modified to allow for the observation of prices.
Step 5 computes prices in the Nash Bargaining problem for all the linked pairs under
all possible states of the world, given θ. However, for the networks that are present in
the data, prices can be directly observed and excluded from this step, restricting the
computation of prices to the counterfactual instances (in disagreement points) and to
unobserved states. This leads to two alternatives that will be explored in the following
section.
The following part of the algorithm estimates policy functions and finds the parameters
that minimise deviations from observed data.
1. Obtain equilibrium CCPs, σˆi(g), non-parametrically from the data.
2. For each i, compute the optimal policy σ˜i(·; θ) given that all other players are
playing σˆ−i following:
(a) Start with candidate policy σ˜τi = σˆi.
(b) For iteration τ let στ = {σ˜τi , σˆ−i}.
(c) For the probabilities implied in στ obtain simulated value functions Vˆi(g;σ; θ)
by running the forward simulation described above.
(d) Update conditional choice value functions vσi (·) for all actions and states given
Vˆi(g; σ˜; θ) and prices obtained after the forwards simulation.
(e) Update the CCPs for player i, obtain σ˜τ+1 by: P σi = exp(v
σ
i (ai|g))/(
∑
a∈Ai exp(v
σ
i (a|g))).
(f) Repeat steps 2.a to 2.e until the P σi for all i and in all states under the optimal
policy converge, up to a pre-specified threshold. Store the optimal policy of
player i given that all other players are playing σˆ−i as σ˜i(·; θ). As a result,
there is one of these per agent.
3. Obtain an estimate of θ by minimising the sum of squared deviations in the choice
probabilities induced by σ˜i(·; θ) against the policy σˆi obtained from the data:
θˆ = argminθ
∑
g
∑
i
∑
a∈Ai
(
P
{σ˜i,σˆ−i}
i (a|g)− P σˆi (a|g)
)2
(4.4)
The general algorithm above involves at least two aspects in which data limitations can
induce bias.
The first one is the non parametric estimation of conditional choice probabilities from
the data, for all players and actions and under each possible state of the world. In the
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context of my problem, the state space is large even for a very small set of players.
As established already in the stylised facts in Chapter 2 persistency in choice is high,
implying that even in long panels, the probability of observing actions being taken
in every state of the world are relatively low. The alternatives that I explore in the
next section will involve (i) working with the ‘true’ CCPs, an advantage I have with
simulated data, (ii) estimating the CCPs non-parametrical with a frequencies estimator
and using kernel smoothing to estimate the CCPs in unobserved states, (iii) making
the parametric assumption that unobserved states exhibit CCPs that correspond to
the unconditional choice probabilities over all the observed states, for each player; (iv)
making the parametric assumption that all actions in unobserved states can be played
with equal probability.
Second, the minimum-distance score that is used for recovering the parameters compares
element-wise and adds over every player, action and state. As suggested in Bajari et al.
(2007) an alternative to explore could be to sum over the observed states only, at a risk
of bias that depends on the application.
4.4 Data Restrictions and Operational Assumptions
Our data constitutes a collection of m = 1 . . .M markets, observed over time, each
with primitives Bm, Sm, Gm and pim (estimated). Besides the formal assumptions
introduced in Chapter 3, namely, Assumption AS and Assumption CI in Rust (1994)
and the parametric construction for , there are a number of additional operational
assumptions that help match our problem better, restrict the size of the game and
circumvent data restrictions.
Assumption 1: One Main Order. For narrowly defined markets (see below for a
definition), at each point in time, the decision of the buyer can be simplified to that of
how to allocate her main or largest order. In a market-quarter realization, each large
buyer has a median of 1 supplier, a mean of 1.5 and the 95th percentile is 4. Table
C.43 shows that for the bulk of the data the largest order accounts for more than 90%
of the buyer’s demand. Therefore, the network decision of the buyer in each quarter
will involve to choose one supplier to produce the main order in that market and I will
consider this a choice independent of that of simultaneous allocations of smaller orders,
which I will not include in the analysis.
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Assumption 2: No Across-markets Interactions. As shown in the descriptives
presented in Chapter 2 each large buyer participates in a high number of product cate-
gories simultaneously. The formulation here assumes that the linking decision the buyer
makes in a given category is not related to those made in other product categories. This
is supported by the evidence I presented in the binary regressions in Table ?? of Chapter
2. Although this restriction needs further empirical scrutiny, it is clear that allowing
for sophisticated inter-market considerations can very easily expand the size of the state
space and choice sets making the problem untractable.
Assumption 3: Constant revenues in the retail market for each buyer. Our
data does not contain information on the retail markets. The formulation of the profit
function of the buyers and that of the Nash bargaining problem assumed that in their
retail markets, the price and quantities that the buyer sells are the same, irrespective of
the seller producing the garment. This is compatible with a setting in which (i) there
are no demand-relevant differences in the garment produced by different manufacturers
and (ii) retailers decide end prices ex-ante. While the first assumption doesn’t seem too
far-fetched, the second one seems to involve a higher compromise. However, anecdotal
evidence collected in interviews with large buyers support this idea and we were explained
that when the same product is sourced from different suppliers over time, the price
remains unchanged, especially for lines of products that are highly commoditized (basic
and seasonal products in Appendix F).
Assumption 4: Constant demand from each buyer. The game I proposed also
relies on the idea that players do not anticipate growth in the size of the order. This
means that when computing the future value of each relation and then, the values over
states, players assume that future orders of a buyer have the same size as her current
orders. This could be modified introducing expectations over potentially buyer-specific
growth paths. This is an extension that has been evaluated.
Assumption 5: Buyers ‘search’ in a restricted neighbourhood within the
product category. Alternative definitions of a market are possible and so far I have
used markets and products as synonyms. However, when markets are defined as product
categories (HS code at six digits of disaggregation), choice sets can be prohibitively
large for the structural procedure. Even imposing additional restrictions, like those
in the reduced form regressions of Section ??, the state space can grow too large if
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we allow the buyer to contemplate a high number of potential suppliers7. The exercises
performed in Chapter 2 and presented in table ?? showed that the predicted probabilities
of a seller being allocated an order (of a given product -HS6- at a certain point in time)
was, other things equal, ‘small’ when the standard of the seller, measured in deciles
in the distribution of prices, was far from that in which the order finally fell. The
intuition behind this is that a product category (for example, Men’s shirts made of
cotton) is still a very broad category. Assuming that any manufacturer can supply
garment to buyers as dissimilar as Tommy Hilfigher and Primark seems unsuitable. The
operational assumption I propose, then, is to divide each product category in deciles of
its distribution of prices. Then, a market in a given point in time is a combination of a
product and a decile8. Using this definition, implies assuming that a buyer’s “search”
for a supplier happens in a small neighbourhood within the product category, where the
neighbourhood is determined by the price of the order. Because prices are an outcome
in the model, this assumption will need to undergo further testing in the structural
estimation stage.
Assumption 6: One Equilibrium in all Markets. One of the highest requirements
of this econometric approach, like in similar two-step estimators, is that of the ‘unique-
ness’ assumption it implicitly imposes on the data. Estimates of the policy functions
and transition probabilities require the availability of rich enough data on actions and
states, generated from the same equilibria. This can prove quite demanding on many
empirical settings, leading to the implementation of different generalising assumptions
in the equilibrium selection protocol in applied work. A vast number of papers tends
to pool data across markets under the assumption that the same equilibrium is being
played in all the markets (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Ryan,
2012; Suzuki, 2013). If the underlying data generating process violates this assumption,
then the estimated policies will be a combination of those under the true equilibria and
inference is not possible. Recent research has explored ways of testing for the unique-
equilibrium-across-markets hypothesis (notably, Otsu et al. (2014)) and future research
could implement these.
4.5 Results from a Preliminary Monte Carlo Exercise
Following the discussion in the Section 4.3, here I present an exercise that recovers the
parameters of a game from which data is simulated, visiting the alternatives for the
7Table 3.1 showed the exponential growth with the number of sellers in computer times required per
iteration in the MPE computation. Even when equilibria is not computed, the number of points the
forward simulation needs to visit can get prohibitively large.
8This definition gives 480+ markets in our data.
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estimation introduced in the previous section. These are:
1. On the estimation of CCPs:
(a) Using the ‘true’ underlying probabilities computed as the equilibrium of the
game.
(b) Using a frequencies estimator with a kernel for unobserved states.
(c) Parametric assumption 1: unobserved states exhibit CCPs that correspond
to the unconditional choice probabilities over all the observed states, for each
player.
(d) Parametric assumption 2: all actions in unobserved states can be played with
equal probability.
2. On the computation of prices:
(a) Treat all prices as unobserved.
(b) Exploit observed prices.
3. On the distance score:
(a) Summing over all possible states of the world.
(b) Summing over observed states only.
The combination of these alternatives gives 16 possible estimations, which are performed
over simulated data for a 2×2 setting. For this exercise I simulate data coming from the
MPE computed using the algorithm presented in Chapter 3 when the true bargaining
parameters and cost of linking are chigh = 12 and b1 = b2 = 0.5 and these are the
parameters to be estimated. Heterogeneity is fixed and left outside of the estimation
with ρ11 > ρ12 and ρ22 > ρ21 with ρ21 = ρ12 and ρ11 < ρ22. The computation of the
MPE produces, reasonably, strategies under which buyer 1 always (under every state
of the world) chooses seller 1 and buyer 2 always chooses seller 2. This gives simulated
data as ‘extreme’ as it can be, in the sense that only one choice per player is observed
and only one state is visited. Although this might seem unrealistic, the ratio of observed
to unobserved states (1/8) is similar to that of what we can observe in actual (non-
simulated) data for networks of realistic dimensions.
Before discussing the results of the comparative exercise, a comment on computation
costs is in order. The algorithm as proposed by Lee and Fong (2013) and ‘augmented’
with alternatives here, does not necessarily economize on computing time, relative to
methods that compute the full equilibrium of the game for each candidate parameter.
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The standard linearity simplification that papers using BBL or BBL-inspired techniques
cannot be exploited in this setting (Bajari et al., 2007).
To reduce computer times, the minimisations in the estimation routines for all exercises
except from that of the true probabilities, were run on a constrained set, setting a
scanning grid around the true value of the parameters. The unconstrained exercise is
necessary for a full assessment of the methods presented here and is being performed at
the time of this submission.
True Probabilities in CCPs. When the ‘true’ underlying probabilities are used as
estimated CCPs, which we can do in this simulated exercise, the performance of the
estimators in terms of biases depends on the use of the prices. When the observed prices
are fed into the generation of the value functions (so only the unobserved prices need
to be generated), the parameters are recovered exactly (up to the 4th decimal, at least)
irrespective of whether the minimisation is done over a the score considering every state
or only observed states. Instead, when the prices are treated all as unobserved, the
empirical mean of the estimates shows a significant bias, with cˆhigh = 4.9, bˆ1 = 0.63 and
bˆ2 = 0.68.
Frequency Estimator with Kernel. When the CCPs are estimated using a fre-
quency estimator for the observed states and a discrete kernel approximation for the
unobserved ones, the results of the estimation routine are strongly biased and, again,
coincide across the two alternatives of objective function. When all prices are treated
as unknown, the empirical means are cˆhigh = 12.05, bˆ1 = 0.68 and bˆ2 = 0.88. When,
instead the observed prices are used, cˆhigh = 12.17, bˆ1 = 0.61 and bˆ2 = 0.72. All the
estimates are severely biased upwards. Given that these estimations were constrained to
scan around the true values of the parameters, no comparison of the cˆhigh = 4.9 obtained
when true probabilities were used and the cˆhigh here is actually conducive.
Frequency Estimator with Unconditional Assumption. When the unobserved
CCPs are imputed the value of the unconditional probability of each action being chosen
by the player, the results show a smaller but still significant bias. Once more, there are
no significant differences over alternative specifications of the objective function. When
all prices are treated as unknown, the empirical means are cˆhigh = 11.59, bˆ1 = 0.62 and
bˆ2 = 0.78. When, instead the observed prices are used, cˆhigh = 11.05, bˆ1 = 0.49 and bˆ2 =
0.43. The sign of the bias in this case depends and, although chigh is underestimated, the
bargaining parameters are closer to their true values in the specification with observed
prices than in any alternative procedure proposed here.
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Like in similar two-step approaches, having the value functions estimated rather than
computed induces sampling errors. In our setting, this seems to be - as expected -
significantly aggravated by the size of the state space and the proportion of it that
is never observed in the data. Further alternatives to mitigate this small-sample bias
problem need to be explored.
The example used here is, as explained above, as ‘extreme’ as it can be and the problems
in the estimation of the CCPs is as bad as it can be: agents are only observed under one
state of the world and they are always observed taking the same action. The underlying
parameters are such that the unconditional choice probabilities reflect the probabilities
in every state as well, possibly explaining the ‘better’ performance of the estimators with
the unconditional assumption imposed on unobserved states, as opposite to the Kernel
and the equal-probabilities assumption.
This characteristic of the MPE and simulated data is likely to be the main driver of the
lack of differences between the minimisations ran over the score including all the states
and that only restricting to the ones that are observed. This is an avenue to be explored
further in order to simplify the computation procedure.
In addition, the almost-exact recovery of the parameters when true prices and true
probabilities are used is encouraging as well and implies that there is a potential gain
in exploiting this information available in our data.
The exercises presented here are rather limited and constitute just a first exploration
of the performance of the two step estimator in our context. The main goal of this
study was to evaluate potential paths of improvement of the econometric approach to
fit our setting. Conclusions on this and a (necessary) more extensive and rigourous
computation are in order.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The research presented here, as introduced in Chapter 1, aimed at contributing towards
understanding how manufacturers’ heterogeneity affects the configuration of trading
relations and prices in a dynamic environment. The advances in that direction were
four: (i) the construction of a dataset containing detailed information on interactions
between manufacturers in a developing country and buyers in the rest of the world; (ii) a
reduced form characterisation of the interactions between heterogeneity and two market
outcomes: the ‘persistency’ in the choice of supplier and the price-cost margin in the
supplied orders; (iii) the construction of a game of buyer - seller linking with bargaining,
that realises the observed relations; (iv) a first evaluation of structural techniques to
estimate such game with our data.
As shown in the Appendix, our dataset allowed a characterisation of buyer - seller rela-
tions in trading markets unprecedented in the literature. The empirical facts collected
here suggest that relations are highly persistent, almost exclusive within the product
category and growing over time, conditional on survival. In particular, the probabil-
ity of survival after a first year of relationship is positively related with the intensity
of trade (volume and number of products) and prices. Controlling for volumes, input
prices and product-specific effects, manufacturers that are paid higher prices tend to
survive beyond the first year of relation more frequently. Beyond the first year of re-
lation, survival of the relation seems to be related to the continuity or frequency (in
terms of the number of seasons) of trade in buyer-seller pair. In addition, supporting a
picture of exclusive dealing, engaging in trade with a second large buyer increases the
probability of breaking up a relation with the incumbent large buyer within the first year
of trade. Likewise, for established relations, the hazard rate of stopping trade increases
significantly when the supplier starts a new relation with another large buyer. Finally,
traded volumes in established relations tend to grow over time, driven by the allocation
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of a higher number of orders to the seller, rather than by increasing the volume of the
orders. In addition, the margin between input and output prices at the order level also
grows with subsequent orders and it is highly persistent over time.
The goal in 2 was to explore the relation between the heterogeneity across suppliers
and two market outcomes, closely linked to micro-level decisions common to most trade
matching settings: who trades with whom and what prices are paid for the items sold.
Exploring this relation required capturing a measure of seller-level heterogeneity. The
existing literature pursuing comparable endeavours has either gone down the route of
fully parametric estimations of production functions or has identified an observable char-
acteristic - typically, size - to capture such heterogeneity. In various settings, the latter
has proved to be questionable: in markets where quality and product differentiation
plays a significant role, volumes are not necessarily a good proxy for the success of the
seller. Similar arguments have been raised against the use of prices for such purposes.
Instead, the approach presented here exploited the high level of disaggregation of our
data to extract sellers’ types as a fixed effect in a volumes-to-prices equation. The high
dimensional two-way fixed effects problem here, mimicked exercises that the literature
on Labour Economics has performed for decades. This approach was fully discussed in
the Appendix.
A first characterisation of the distribution of seller’s types showed that the dispersion
in these types was higher in those product categories that are typically more fashion
sensitive. As expected also, the distribution of types of suppliers trading with large
experienced buyers constituted a shift upwards of the one corresponding to non-large
buyers.
I then constructed a measure of the heterogeneity across sellers an individual buyer is
facing when allocating an order. This required assuming what the set of available sellers
to that buyer would be, for the choice under evaluation. In the main text I used a
general approach considering all available suppliers in the relevant product category. In
the Appendix, I included a robustness check involving a more sophisticated construction
of such choice sets. Under both approaches, I confirmed the hypothesized result: the
better the suppliers the buyer is trading with, the less likely it is to switch to unknown
suppliers. Moreover, the higher the dispersion of types in the outside option - this is,
in the set of unknown but available suppliers - the less likely the buyer is to move away
from his known manufacturers.
The second market outcome of interest was the price - cost margin in allocated orders.
Under different specifications, we found that, other things equal, when the buyer is
allocating an order to a supplier and the heterogeneity across outside options (alternative
suppliers) is high, the price - cost margin is also higher meaning. This evidence of a
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‘premium’ for heterogeneity in markups is compatible with bargaining protocols in which
prices derive from any form of surplus splitting between trading parties.
The theoretical chapter presented here exploits the characterisation in 2 to construct
a game theoretic model where decision makers choose optimally who to trade with
and bargain over prices. In simple terms, the game ‘starts’ with all buyers simultane-
ously choosing one supplier from a list of available manufacturers by comparing partner-
specific inter-temporal profits. The profits derived under each possible choice depend on
the cost of forming links, a match-specific component, the future realisations of the net-
work and the prices that the buyer would pay under each configuration of the network.
These prices depend non-trivially on the choices of other buyers: the seller’s outside
option is determined by the offers it can obtain from other buyers that have chosen it
as potential supplier. The seller, capacity constrained, will only be able to produce for
one of the buyers at most.
The interaction between (i) heterogeneity at the matching level, (ii) sunk costs of forming
a link and (iii) competition between buyers determine the architecture of the network of
trade and its prices. The more formal aspects of the game built directly on the work by
Lee and Fong (2013) and are therefore related to Ericson and Pakes’s framework to study
industry dynamics (1995). Among the various papers that propose dynamic oligopoly
models, the specifics of my setting make the game similar to those in structural papers
that need to nest the computation of the stage profits inside of the dynamic programming
problem defined by the corresponding value functions (Benkard, 2004; Markovich and
Moenius, 2008). In particular, analysing industry dynamics in the light of networked
strategic interactions, my framework is related to the work by Aguirregabiria and Ho
on the US airline industry (2010; 2012).
In Chapter 3 I implemented for the first time Lee and Fong’s algorithm to compute
Markov Perfect Equilibria of the proposed game, repeatedly over a fine grid of param-
eters. This opened a discussion on issues around convergence, computation costs and
multiplicity. The final remarks in this chapter emphasised the mechanisms that induce
the empirical observations in the institutional environment under study
The game theoretic model presented in Chapter 3 offered the structure needed for ‘re-
covering’ the parameters that characterise the salient facts documented in Chapter 2 on
inter-firm relations in the RMG sector in Bangladesh. The three sets of parameters of
interest in our setting were a scalar containing the sunk cost of linking, a vector of bar-
gaining parameters (one entry for each buyer) and a matrix containing a match-specific
quality (one entry per potential pair). Chapter 4, in this preliminary version of my
structural work, treats the matching-qualities as observed and reduces the parameter
set to the cost of linking and the bargaining powers. This restriction simplified the
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analysis in this chapter and is left to be relaxed at a later stage, when a more systematic
discussion on identification is presented and the challenges described below are sorted.
This final chapter, therefore, studied the two-step procedure proposed in Lee and Fong
(2013), building on the work by Bajari et al. (2007), to recover the parameters that
realise the equilibrium observed in our data, expressed in active trade and observed
prices. I presented a number of operational assumptions required for estimating the
game in Chapter 3 using our data. I discussed three aspects in which my setting imposes
challenges to the applicability of the structural approach developed by Lee and Fong.
The first of these is the availability of prices in our data. Second, the difficulties in
the non-parametric estimation of conditional choice probabilities from the data when
the state space is large and choices are highly persistent. Third, and related to the
previous point, the construction of the distance score adding over states that have no
instances observed in the data. This discussion led to a pseudo Monte Carlo exercise
that compared (sixteen) alternative estimation procedures.
The overall estimation procedure was based on forward simulation as in Bajari et al.
(2007) to obtain value functions. Following Lee and Fong, a prices-to-values fixed point
routine was performed to generate prices consistent with those values. I explored the
possibilities of (i) generating all prices in the system and (ii) excluding from the fixed-
point routine the prices observed in the data, that would then act as ‘constraints’ in the
iterative procedure that solves the simultaneous Nash problems. The second stage of the
estimation finds the optimal policies for each player and computes the conditional choice
probabilities that would arise under alternative candidate parameters in the equilibrium
play. These probabilities are compared with those estimated directly from the data.
I explored different alternatives for this step, using the ‘true’ underlying probabilities
in the simulated data as a baseline. These alternatives were: (i) using a standard
non-parametric frequency estimator with a kernel to approximate probabilities in the
unobserved bins of the conditional transitions, (ii) assuming that the choice probabilities
in unobserved states coincide with the observed unconditional probabilities and (iii)
attaching equal probability to all actions being chosen by the players in unobserved
states. Finally, I looked at constructing the distance score (which in this setting is the
objective function in the minimisation problem that searches for the estimates of the
parameters) using all the states of the world and only adding up over observed states.
Such exercise showed some evidence implying that restricting the objective function to
the observed states, using an auxiliary parametric assumption on the conditional choice
probabilities in unobserved states and exploiting the data on prices could be fertile paths
to explore towards constructing a more suitable econometric approach.
There are two specific paths this research is following, at the time of this submission.
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The first one involves exploring further, in reduced form, some of the topics that were
briefly covered in Chapter 2. In particular, measuring unobserved heterogeneity with
our data constitutes a topic on its own. As mentioned in the corresponding chapter, the
approach implemented here has a number of limitations, connected to the interpretation
of the fixed effects recovered from the price equations and the identification of those in
the presence of low connectivity. Similarly, the dataset available to us offers a number
of alternative channels to test empirically the preliminary hypothesis of competition
between buyers, and this is a path to be pursued in the short run.
The second one is connected to the structural aspect of this research. The analysis of
the structural framework proposed in Chapter 3 and its associated set of econometric
methods in Chapter 4 reveal a number of issues that need to be addressed in order to
structurally estimate the model. I consider three to be of immediate relevance.
First, even in simplified versions of the game, the computational burden, both for equilib-
ria and for simulation of values, can be prohibitively taxing. Taking a recent suggestion1,
at the time of this submission two simplifications in the pricing stage are being explored.
They imply different sets of assumptions that would show that simpler versions of the
gains from trade are sufficient statistics for the computation (or simulation) of value
functions.
Second, Chapter 4 assumed matching heterogeneity was known both to players and
the econometrician, to facilitate the assessment of alternative estimation approaches.
However, both of these are unrealistic. While introducing unobservability for the players
in that component of the game can be a very challenging task, I am currently studying
identification considerations for (i) recovering the match-specific qualities exactly when
these are known by the players but unobserved for the econometrician and interactions
take place in a high number of markets; and (ii) recovering only key parameters of the
distribution of the match-specific qualities.
Third, the exploration in Chapter 4 suggest that further study is needed on the impli-
cations of data limitations. In particular, the size of the theoretical state space and that
of the set of observed states proved a relevant source of potential bias in the estimation
procedure. Like in most of the papers exposed to this same problem, the solution that
is being evaluated involves performing comparison tests with alternative estimates, ex-
post. The operational results obtained in the Monte Carlo stage show that restricting
the objective function to the observed states, using an auxiliary parametric assumption
on the conditional choice probabilities in unobserved states and exploiting the data on
1By Victor Aguirregabiria
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prices could be fertile paths to explore towards constructing a more suitable economet-
ric approach. Naturally, the validity of these ideas needs to be rigourously studied in a
settings in which the Markov Perfect Equilibrium takes different shapes.
Appendix A
Sources of Data
A.1 The Main Source of the Data and its Structure
The main dataset used for this project was constructed collecting the records in Bills
of Entry and Exit used for exporting and importing via the main Custom Stations
in Bangladesh. The data comprises the information in the main forms in the Asy-
cuda System, as electronically documented by each Custom Office. The National Board
of Revenue in Bangladesh, under the corresponding confidentiality agreements, shared
records for the period 2003-2012.
As described in further appendices, the most prominent features of this data are that
(i) we observe the identity of all the parties involved in each transaction: buyers of
Bangladeshi products in the rest of the world, manufacturers in Bangladesh exporting
to the rest of the world and buyers in Bangladesh purchasing goods from the rest of the
world; (ii) the data is very disaggregated and cross-sectional units are defined by specific
items (products classified using Harmonized Codes) within a transaction taking place
on a date (dd/mm/yyyy) between a given buyer and a given seller; (iii) moreover, with
the caveats to be discussed in the following appendices, we can trace back the imported
inputs needed to produce for a given export consignment.
Although our dataset contains the universe of the trade records in all the product cat-
egories in the period under study, in what follows we focus only on the garment sector,
defined for the rest of the project as the collection of all the product categories within
knitted garment (Harmonized Code 61) and woven garment (Harmonized Code 62).
With this as the main source of data, we constructed two major datasets, one for each
type of trade flow - Exports and Imports -, performing the cleaning, arranging and
robustness checking procedures described in the appendices to follow.
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A.2 Additional Sources of Data
For various steps in the construction of the main datasets and to carry out some of the
analysis presented in the body of the text, data from other sources was used, as detailed
below.
A.2.1 UN Comtrade Data
This contains import and export flows in Bangladesh as compiled in the United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Records were mainly used to
cross-check values and quantities (weights) with our main data, up to the sixth digit of
disaggregation of the Harmonised Codes.
This source of data was also used to analyse the evolution of demand for imported
garment in the main destinations of Bangladeshi exports.
The use of the Comtrade data in this project complies with the Policy on Use and
Re-dissemination of UN Comtrade data, and will be cited as ”DESA/UNSD, United
Nations Comtrade database”.
A.2.2 Board of Exporters
The Board of Exporters has .doc lists of all the registered exporters divided in broad
product categories. For each exporter, they record the name of the plant or firm, an
address and the number of employees and machines at the time of registration with the
Board. This data was digitalised (almost) manually and was used for cross-checking the
identification of ownership structures and locations of firms for over the approximately
7,500 records of firms in garment categories. Unfortunately, the data on employment
and machinery was considered of low quality standards and was not used in this project.
A.2.3 BOND Licenses
Two datasets were constructed containing information on BOND licences. The first
one comprises the Bonded Warehouses Codes Lists, documenting the warehouse code
and the firm name and address. The second one contains the BOND Licence Number
and status, the name of the unit or firm, its address, the Business Identification Number
(BIN) and other firm-level identifiers. Both datasets were used in the process of cleaning
the variable that allows for matching inputs and outputs at the order level, as described
in D.
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A.2.4 Euromonitor Data
The data on Euromonitor’s Dashboard and Supporting Tables for the Apparel and
Clothing Sectors in Europe, Canada and the United States were used: (i) to explore
the shares of the large buyers of garments in their own domestic markets and (ii) to
unify buyers’ identifiers whenever the name of the Global Brand Owner differed from
the National Brand Owner or the Global or Local Brand Name, as any of these could
be used interchangeably in the Customs records.
A.2.5 World Bank Survey
For descriptive purposes only, we have accessed the anonymized panel for the 2007
and 2011 waves of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey in Bangladesh restricting our
analysis to the firms whose main product was in any of the garment categories. These
explorations were used to support or contrast other evidence we have gathered and was
treated an anecdotal material, as representability and anonymization limited any further
exploitation of this source of data.
A.2.6 Series of Prices of Cotton
Monthly time series of the price of raw cotton were obtained from the United States
National Cotton Council’s Economics Data Center. For the period of our data, we
have both the so called ”A” Index and the spot price. While the first one is a proxy
for the world price of cotton, averaging the cheapest five quotations from a selection
of the principal upland cottons traded internationally (CFR Far Eastern main ports
terms or CIF Europe values), the second one represents cash sales of cotton, with prices
reported by the Market News Branch of USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service. For
our calculations, except when otherwise stated, we use the proxy for the international
price.
A.2.7 Exchange Rates
These were obtained directly from the Custom Offices with daily frequencies for the
conversion of the currency of invoice to local currency. Unless specified, values in the
documents associated to this project are in US dollars.
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A.2.8 Members List - Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Ex-
porters Association (BGMEA)
The Association is the competent authority for processing the necessary applications for
export / import permissions and tax reliefs, so they maintain accurate records of the
identities of the exporters, including ownership data in some cases. All woven exporters
outside export processing zones need to register with BGMEA, while knitwear-only
manufacturers and EPZ firms have alternative associations they can be affiliated to. We
obtained the list of Regular and Associated Members in BGMEA, containing the names,
addresses, contact details and parent company (in some cases) of all the firms within
BGMEA. This was used to in the identification of manufacturers and in the process of
cleaning BGMEA identifiers for the purpose of matching inputs to outputs.
A.2.9 VAT Data
This was provided by the National Board of Revenue and contains the Business Identi-
fication Number (BIN) of all the firms operating in the garment sector until 2010 (7,033
records), with their business denomination, address and contact details. This data was
used for merging with the Customs records via BIN.
A.2.10 BIN codes for Exporters
This constitutes Bangladesh Customs’ list of new and old Business Identification Num-
bers (BINs) of importers or exporters in all sectors, for those firms that have changed
their code from the 10-digit system to the 11-digit system. This dataset comprises more
than 145,000 records and contains the old and new identifiers, name and address of the
firm. This was used for cross-checking the identification of firms using the VAT data
and to detect changes in identities due to changes in the BIN registration system.
A.2.11 World Trade Organisation Tariff Download Facility
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and non-MFN tariffs for garment and garment relevant
sixth digit codes were obtained from the WTO records to follow, year by year (2005
- 2012), the tariffs imposed to imports of relevant inputs for garment production into
Bangladesh and for imports of knitted and woven garment into United States and Eu-
rope.
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A.2.12 ESCAP World Bank: International Trade Cost
Used to analyse the evolution over 2005 - 2012 of international trade costs in manufac-
turing, for flows from Bangladesh to United States and relevant European countries and
into Bangladesh from relevant countries supplying fabric and other inputs.
A.2.13 Exporter Dynamics Database, World Bank
Used for producing comparisons of entry and exit dynamics over 2005 - 2012 in relevant
garment product categories, for Bangladesh and 4 selected international competitors.
A.2.14 Firm Level Data, Factories Under Accord
Firm-level variables including number of workers and characteristics of the infrastructure
in selected plants were obtained from Accord, an agreement between RMG buyers to
monitor safety issues in their supplying plants.
Appendix B
Quality of the Main Data and
Coverage
B.1 Coverage and Quality of Data
B.1.1 Exports Data
This dataset contains all the records that correspond to exports. A line in this dataset
can be read as an item (product as classified using the Harmonized Codes to the 6th
digit) within a shipment from a seller in Bangladesh to a buyer elsewhere on a given
date. As many shipments are multi-product, the dataset is more disaggregated than the
level of the transaction.
Together with other relevant information, the most salient variables in this data contain
identifiers for the buyer and the seller (see the corresponding section for our work on
cleaning the identities of the players), a classification and description for the product,
the statistical value of the product, its net mass in kilograms and characteristics of the
shipment (mode of transport, terms of delivery, ports, countries, currency of invoice,
exchange rate conversions, etc.).
The National Board of Revenue compiled the records coming from the different Custom
Stations. The data before 2005 was considered of low quality, as comparisons with UN
Comtrade sources and reports from BGMEA showed poor coverage of the universe of
trade, both on the exports and imports side. This coincides with the migration into the
Asycuda system in the main Custom Stations. Discarding the records before 2005 and
restricting the attention to the garment sector only, including both woven and knitwear
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products, the Exports Dataset contains 3, 059, 844 observations. The distribution of
these over years and custom offices look as follows:
Table B.1: Frequencies of Observations over Years, Exports Data
Year Freq. Percent Cum.
2005 250,749 8.19 8.19
2006 321,318 10.5 18.7
2007 319,456 10.44 29.14
2008 388,744 12.7 41.84
2009 352,715 11.53 53.37
2010 507,459 16.58 69.95
2011 486,569 15.9 85.85
2012 432,834 14.15 100
Total 3,059,844 100
Source: Own Calculations.
Table B.2: Frequencies of Observations over Custom Stations, Exports Data
Station Code Freq. Percent Cum.
Dhaka 101 288,470 9.43 9.43
Dhaka-K 102 25,724 0.84 10.27
Chittagong House 301 510,978 16.7 26.97
Chittagong - EPZ 303 320,340 10.47 37.44
Chottagong Main 305 1,912,337 62.5 99.93
Benapole 601 1,995 0.07 100
Total 3,059,844 100
Source: Own Calculations.
These correspond to five Customs Stations in Bangladesh: Dhaka Custom House (101)
and Dhaka Export Processing Zone (101/1073), Dhaka Kamalapur (102), Chittagong
Custom House (301), Chittagong Export Processing Zone (303), Main Chittagong (305),
Benapole (601, land).1
As the table above shows, the non-EPZ Stations in Chittagong concentrate the vast
majority of the observations. Unfortunately, the raw data we obtained from Offices
other than Chittagong exhibited some limitations. In particular: (i) there is no data
from Custom Offices 101 and 102 available for year 2009 or after September 2010; (ii)
the information sent from Benepole only covers years 2011 and 2012; (iii) the identities
of the exporters was missing for a large proportion of the observations across al Custom
Offices, for years 2011 and 2012.
Using aggregated data, we verified that in any given year between 2005 and 2011, the
selected Custom Stations process more than 94% of the total exports (in volumes and in
1Note that 301 records as 305 from 2007 onwards.
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values) in garments from the country. Of these customs offices, between 2005 and 2011
the non-EPZ Chittagong (305 / 301) accounts for an average of 90% of the exports we
observe. After September 2010, due to a change in the system used to record import
and export bills, we only have records collected in Chittagong, the main custom station.
Still, for the period September 2010 to September 2012, our data accounts for more than
87% of the exported values in garment in Bangladesh.
Using the years in which data from both Dhaka and Chittagong is available, we corrob-
orated that at the firm level, manufacturers tend to use one or other (set of) Custom
Station. For this restricted sample, the proportion of transactions that the firm operates
via Chittagong is above 91% already in the 25th percentile and it is zero (meaning all
the exports circulate via Dhaka offices) in the 10th. The intermediate percentiles mostly
exhibit proportions between 80% and 90%. This implies that each Custom Office seems
to be self-consisted when transactions are aggregated at the seller level. Equivalent con-
clusions were reached when aggregating at the buyer level and at the buyer-seller level.
These exercises were performed by quarter, by year and over the whole of the panel,
excluding the years for which data from any one of the stations was missing.
Benapole is indeed a very small station, dealing with trade transported via land, which
is a negligible choice of mode of transport for the bulk of the trade in the sector we are
considering.
Finally, the missing identities in the later data will be partially solved when checking
the identifiers for the exporters as described below. However, in most of the analysis
carried out in this project, the problematic observations were excluded. Appropriate
notes will disclose when this is the case.
B.1.2 Imports Data
This dataset contains all the records that correspond to imports. Again, a line in this
dataset can be read as an item (product as classified using the Harmonized Codes to the
6th digit) within a shipment from a supplier somewhere in the world and an importer
or manufacturer in Bangladesh. As many shipments are multi-product, the dataset is
more disaggregated than the level of the transaction.
Together with other relevant information, the most salient variables in this data contain
identifiers for the importing firm and the country of origin of the shipment, a classifica-
tion and description for the product, the statistical value of the product, its net mass
in kilograms and characteristics of the shipment (mode of transport, terms of delivery,
ports, countries, currency of invoice, exchange rate conversions, etc.).
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The National Board of Revenue compiled the records coming from the different Cus-
tom Stations. After appending the data coming from the different sources, our dataset
contains 6, 546, 504 observations, of which 0.45% (29,309 lines) constitute partial dupli-
cations that are left in the base dataset. The treatment of these differs with the different
uses we gave to the dataset, but in all the cases, our calculations are free from distortions
induced by these duplications.
As with the exports dataset, the data before 2005 was considered of low quality, after
poor comparisons with UN Comtrade sources and reports from BGMEA. However, the
observations corresponding to 2003 - 2005 were left in the dataset, for the purpose of
cross-checking some of our assumptions in the matching inputs-to-outputs procedure.
The distribution of the oversations over years and custom offices look as follows:
Table B.3: Frequencies of Observations over Years, Imports Data
Year Freq. Percent Cum.
2002 23 0 0
2003 6,257 0.1 0.1
2004 195,618 3 3.09
2005 412,461 6.32 9.42
2006 488,640 7.49 16.91
2007 520,804 7.98 24.89
2008 797,125 12.22 37.11
2009 1,044,918 16.02 53.13
2010 950,635 14.57 67.7
2011 1,279,179 19.61 87.31
2012 827,898 12.69 100
Total 6,523,558 100
Source: Own Calculations.
Table B.4: Frequencies of Observations over Custom Stations, Imports Data
Station Code Freq. Percent Cum.
Dhaka 101 1,003,614 15.34 15.34
Dhaka-K 102 412,145 6.3 21.64
Chittagong House 301 3,744,752 57.23 78.87
Chittagong - EPZ 303 184,107 2.81 81.68
Chottagong Main 305 641,487 9.8 91.48
Mongla 1 501 22,480 0.34 91.83
Mongla 2 502 54 0 91.83
Benapole 601 534,691 8.17 100
Total 6,543,330 100
Source: Own Calculations.
As in the case of the exports, the non-EPZ Stations in Chittagong concentrate the vast
majority of the observations. Data from these Custom Stations is available for the whole
of the period of the panel. Unfortunately, for the rest of the Offices we face the following
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restrictions: (i) Dhaka Custom Offices (101 and 102) only report information from 2008
onwards; (ii) information coming from the EPZ in Chittagong is as well only available
from 2008 until the end of the panel; (iii) like on the exports side, data coming from
small custom offices is only available for part of the period covered (2008 and 2009 for
601 and 2010 - 2012 for Mongla).
Like on the exports side of the data, the most worrying restriction is that of the missing
data from Dhaka before 2008, for the purpose of doing firm-level or relationship-level
analysis over time exploiting the whole of the 2005 - 2012 period. Again, the garment
manufacturers that we observe on the exports dataset tend to use one or the other (set
of) Custom Station almost exclusively for their imported inputs. Exercises equivalent
to those performed with the exports data at the importer level, by quarter, by year and
over the whole of the panel, excluding the years for which data from any one of the
stations was missing, confirmed this conclusion.
A potential issue of concern would be the missing data from Benapole. This is a Custom
Station that deals with in-land commerce and it is almost fully dedicated to imports
coming from India. The missing data before 2008 and after 2009 could be a problem if
significant volumes of garment-relevant inputs were coming through this custom office.
The product codes imported through Benapole over the period we observe correspond
87% of the times to categories that are not related to garment. The remaining 13%
could potentially be related to garment (mainly chemicals and dying products) and half
of the times, these imports correspond to firms we identify as garment exporters. For
this reason, when working with the import-export matched data, we have accounted for
the fact that some manufacturers might be sourcing via Benapole outside the observed
2008 - 2009.
As we are interested in the imports that are related to the RMG sector only, the universe
of the imports into the country is not as relevant. To select the right product categories ,
all the imports undertaken by garment exporters (whose identities are obtained from the
exports dataset) were analysed. All the product categories at two digits of aggregation
that were imported by garment manufacturers were kept in the data, irrespective of the
identity of the importer.
Of the 6.5 million observations in our data, less than 27% correspond to imports per-
formed by our garment exporters. However, considering the universe of transactions in
the product categories that the garment exporters import, we have almost 90% of the
observations in the original dataset. For completeness, we keep all the product categories
and flag the non-garment-relevant 10%+.
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B.2 Variables Management and Transformations
B.2.1 Prices and Quantities
Statistical values for the shipments, both for exports and imports, are already present
in the data. According to the information we obtained from the NBR, these statistical
values are calculated using the data in the bill of entry or export directly: taking the FOB
price, converted into BD Takas at an exchange rate that the Central Banks provided
every month or daily, depending on the year. If no insurance is specified in the bill, it
is computed as 1% of the FOB. Similarly, if freight is not included, it’s computed as 1%
over the (FOB + insurance). Landing charges are computed as 1% of (FOB + insurance
+ freight).
In the data, we always observe the mode of the transaction -i.e., FOB, CIF, CNF, etc.-
, the value in the invoice and the currency of the invoice, the exchange rate and the
statistical value. Using the details above, we were able to reconstruct one or other
record (invoice or statistical value) consistently in the best part of the data.
For many of the calculations in this project, quantities and prices were winsorized trans-
forming the top and bottom 0.5% of the quantities and values within each HS4 product
category.
B.2.2 Alternative Product Classifications
At different points in this projects, for convenience and ease of exposition, imported
inputs for the garment sector were re-classified using the information we had on the HS
classifications, into categories according to the material of the input and the type of
input. The following explains the re-classification procedure.
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Figure B.1: Reclassification of Relevant Imported Inputs - Part I
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Figure B.2: Reclassification of Relevant Imported Inputs - Part II
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B.2.3 Firm Identifiers
As explained above, one of the more salient feature of the datasets we work with is that
we observe the identities of both parties in trade, in the case of the exports and the
identity of the importing firm, in the case of the imports.
B.2.3.1 Sellers’ Identities
The dataset, as constructed from the records in the Custom Offices, identify the ex-
porters using the Business Identification Number (BIN) of the firm. This constitutes a
10 (or 11, in the new system) digits number. The first digit corresponds to the Com-
missioner to which the productive activity is settled (not the administrative location).
Firms that have productive activities in two different locations corresponding to different
Commissioners are assigned one of the two by the National Board of Revenue, according
to the size of the business in each location. Each Commissioner is divided into circle
offices (for example, in Dhaka there are around 30 circles) and the second and third
digits in the code correspond to the circle in which the productive activity of the firm is
located. The fourth digit corresponds to the tax category of the firm, according to its
yearly turnover. This is re-assessed at the end on each fiscal year, which might lead to
changes in the BIN number for the firm (the whole number changes, not only this digit).
The main categories are 1: VAT, 2: Turnover, 3: Small Cottage Industry, 4: Others.
Digits five to nine are the actual firm identifier within the National Board of Revenue
(NBR) and it is assigned by the circle processing the application. The tenth digit is a
number coming from a random numbers generator to avoid duplications.
The main complication of using BINs as firm identifiers was that the firm code (digits
5 to 9) is not necessarily unique across plants under the same ownership structure.
One ownership structure might register different divisions within the same firm under
different BINs, for tax purposes, inducing misidentification of the sellers. Moreover,
the same plant could potentially have - completely - different BIN codes over time, if
its turnover bracket or location change. Therefore, over time a firm whose essential
characteristics remain unchanged might change BINs to obtain tax incentives or fall
under special subsidies schemes offered by the government. The information in our raw
data didn’t allow us to spot one or the other misidentification issue.
We dealt with these two concerns in five ways, generating an alternative (to BIN codes)
firm identifier that was used in the study for robustness checks.
First, using data (up until 2010 only) from the VAT Office within NBR, each BIN
number in our dataset was matched with the name of the firm, its address and contact
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details. Whenever two different BIN codes were matched with the same firm name and
address, these were unified to be considered the same firm.
Second, we matched the BINs in our dataset with the database that Bangladesh Customs
holds on updates of BIN codes for all the exporters and importers. In this dataset, each
entry contains an old BIN code, a new BIN code, the name and address of the firm.
Most of the code migrations are associated to switches from 10 digits to 11 digits codes.
We crosscheck the information in this database with our dataset and there’s an overlap
of 110 firms, whose identities are unified as appropriate. However, these coincide with
unifications done in the previous step.
Third, we were able to crosscheck our data with the lists of Members and Associate Mem-
bers of the Association of RMG Exporters. The Association is the competent authority
for processing the necessary applications for export / import permissions and tax reliefs,
so they maintain accurate records of the identities of the exporters, including ownership
data in some cases. Woven sellers outside Export Processing Zones are bound to be
registered with the Association, while knitwear-only exporters and the small fraction of
firms in Export Processing Zones can also use other channels for exporting / importing
(BKMEA and BEPZA). Using the data from the Association, the original number of
7033 distinct sellers observed in the panel before September 2010 was brought down to
6027 firms. The identification of firms was done in stages using the correspondence be-
tween BINs and internal codes of the Association, matches in the names and addresses
and coincidences in the BINs and documents produced in the applications for exports
permissions. This procedure was found to unify within the same identifier, different
BINs exporting at the same time and different BINs over time.
Fourth, we used the Bond Licence Numbers in the dataset we obtained from the BOND
Commissionaire to unify BIN numbers that held the same Bond Licence, as plants that
share bonded warehouse facilities under the same licence are typically part of the same
ownership structure.
Finally, we explored the trajectories of all the firms appearing in the panel within a
suitable time-window after a seller drop out 2 . The idea of the exercise was to check
whether the characteristics and trading patterns of a new firm were similar enough to
those of a dropping seller, to suggest they could actually be the same firm. The key
aspects that were analyzed were the timing of the death and births, the location of the
firms, the main products and volumes exported and the main buyer for each of these.
2Time windows were set at 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 9 months and finally using the mean/-
median with two standard deviations / median absolute deviations of the gap between transactions for
the dropping firm.
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Using these criteria with different weights assigned to each factor, we found no strong
evidence to impute the same identity to any two firms.
As a result of the steps above, we have the BIN codes as conservative plant identifiers
and an alternative identifier for the firms using the unifications above. Most of the
exercises done using this data were carried out using both identifiers, as a robustness
check. For the purpose of these project, when not specified otherwise, we will refer to a
firm or a plant as units identified with their BINs.
B.2.3.2 Buyers’ Identities
At the most downstream level, we have information on the firms located elsewhere
buying ready-made garment from Bangladesh. Strings containing names and addresses
of these firms - buyers from now on- where introduced manually in the system that
originated our data. Spelling mistakes, varying criteria across Custom Offices or over
time and differences in administrative procedures induced difficulties in the mapping of
transactions to well delimited unique buyers. Using the names recorded as identifiers,
the raw data contained nearly 340,000 different buyers pooling all the years together.
After a cleaning procedure focussed on correcting the mistakes mentioned above, the
list went down to about 7,000 different buyers and a pool of small firms collected in a
broad category of firms for which the cleaning was not possible.
The cleaning procedure was done in stages.
First, using the uncleaned strings, the names of the (almost) 1,000 largest buyers were
manually cleaned.
Second, using these strings, one relevant substring was chosen for each of them and
the whole of the data was scanned to find matches in the uncleaned strings 3. In this
procedure, almost 80% of the matches were unique and, after the relevant controls, the
names were corrected. the multiple matches cases were analysed one by one and, when
suitable, replacements were introduced accordingly.
Third, the remaining uncleaned strings were modified to discard strange characters and
unify expressions such as ”INT.”, ”INTL.”, ”INTERNATIONAL”, etc.. The scanning
routine was performed again over these modified strings.
Fourth, from the remaining uncleaned lines, the largest (almost) 1,000 buyers were se-
lected and the first and third steps were repeated. Fifth, with now 2,000 identified clean
3When the clean name of the firm wouldn’t render a compelling substring, the related uncleaned
strings were leaned manually. A - fictitious - example of this would be a clean name like ”THE COM-
PANY INC.”, whose possible substrings would generate matched with clearly unrelated firms.
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names, the remaining uncleaned strings were scanned now allowing for: (i) a spelling
mistake involving one character only (including one missing or one extra character); (ii)
one parsing mistake, involving one extra or one missing space only; (iii) two parsing mis-
takes of any kind; (iv) a character swapping, involving two characters; (v) combinations
of (i) and (ii); (vi) combinations of (i) and (iii); combinations of (iii) and (iv); combi-
nations of (iv) and (i). The more conservative scans performed really well, allowing for
corrections in most of the remaining uncleaned lines. Criteria (v) and above produced
multiple potential matches and only 15% of these were used to introduce corrections. At
this stage, about 90% of the lines in the exports dataset ad a clean name for the buyer.
Robustness checks of these stage were performed exploiting the buyers addresses and a
soundex, to identify matches of names that ”sounded” similar.
Fifth, a large number of line-by-line corrections were introduced, using a .do file that
contains over 100,000 replacement statements.
Sixth, the denominations in the Euromonitor Data were used to unify identities that
showed in our data sometimes using local denominations of a brand, global denomina-
tions of a brand, national denominations of the firm or group or the name of the parent
company in cases of joint ownership.
Seventh, publicly available company reports of the 15 largest buyers were explored to
correct identities of firms in the presence of mergers and acquisitions. Using this source
of information, 9 relevant changes were introduced.
Eigth, for the top 100 buyers, the patterns of trade were observed, with special focus
on the volumes of trade, product categories and destination of the shipment to spot
miss-imputations.
As a result of these steps, 96% of the lines in the exports dataset, explaining 97% of the
traded values, have a clean name for the buyer.
B.3 Comparison with Comtrade Data
To better assess the representativeness and robustness of the coverage of our main
datasets, we compared our records to those in the UN Comtrade database4.
In broad terms, disagreement with UN Comtrade Data is expected to occur due to a
number of reasons:
4DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Appendix B. Data - Quality and Coverage 90
• After received from the national authorities, data is standardized by the UN Statis-
tics Division, using Comtrade standardization protocols that can induce discrep-
ancies with the data we have from the National Board of Revenue.
• The Comtrade data might feature records coming from different sources of infor-
mation.
• In the Comtrade data values of disaggregated commodities do not necessarily sum
up to the total trade value at higher levels of aggregation. This is mainly due to
potential restrictions in disclosure from the reporting country.
• The time-wise coverage of our data and that in Comtrade differs.
• Our data comprises records of the largest Custom Offices but not the Universe of
trade with Bangladesh.
• Product classification criteria might differ.
More specifically, the only overlap our panel has with the data available in the UN
Comtrade database is for years 2005 to 20075. Also, the Explanatory Notes in the
Bangladesh section of the Comtrade search engine reports that all the data corresponding
to 2005 and 2006 for Bangladesh was obtained from FAO, while that of 2007 has the
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics as ultimate source of data.
All the three years are presented by Comtrade with a note stating that ”Data for this year
has been re-processed to make correction to the data”. All the imports are reported CIF
and exports are reported FOB. While our data features the Customs daily (or monthly in
some cases) exchange rates to convert foreign to local currencies or viceversa, Comtrade
data uses a fixed currency conversion rate (from Bangladesh Takas to US Dollars) is
used for each year, according to the following rates:
Table B.5: Currency Conversion Table, Comtrade Database (BDT to USD)
Flow
Year Import Export
2005 0.015544 0.015539
2006 0.014493 0.014495
2007 0.014521 0.014521
Source: DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database, Explanatory Notes and Publications.
5As explained above, our records before 2005 were considered of low quality and not used for any
part of our analysis, except when stated in the procedure of matching inputs and outputs.
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For the purpose of the comparisons of values, we unified the exchange rate conversions
to use those reported by Comtrade, to avoid discrepancies induced by currency rates.
Product classifications also show minor mismatches when data from both sources are
matched at the product - time levels. When the match is performed at 6 digits of
aggregation in the HS codes (2002 or as reported), there are three product categories
(611512, 611520, 611691) that are present in the Comtrade Data and that we don’t have
in the Customs Data (for years 2005 or 2006) and there are other codes (610310, 611510,
611522, 611529 , 611530, 611594, 611595, 611596) in the Customs Data (2007 only) that
don’t show in the Comtrade Database.
An additional source of discrepancy in the comparison of volumes is that 98% of the data
obtained from the Comtrade dataset has the traded volumes (in kilograms) estimated,
possibly from the quantities traded reported in an alternative measurement unit. No
details on the estimation procedure are available, but it can be seen below that while
the comparisons of volumes recorded in both Datasets looks very weak, that in values
performs relatively well. This might be evidence of discrepancies of information across
sources due to the manipulation of quantities in the Comtrade data.
Given that the Comtrade at different aggregation levels doesn’t necessarily match, the
comparisons at 4 digits are done using the reported UN Comtrade data rather than the
aggregation of the subcategories. Only when the data at four digits is not available, the
aggregation of six digits categories is used.
B.3.1 Exports
The following histograms show the distribution of ratios in traded values (US dollars)
as reported in Comtrade Data to that reported in our Customs Data. Ratios below one
imply higher values reported in the Customs data.
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Figure B.3: Histogram of Ratio of Values Comtrade/Customs per HS6 - Woven
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Figure B.4: Histogram of Ratio of Values Comtrade/Customs per HS6 - Knit
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
The tables below show the ratios for each product category and year combination. The
tables that correspond to volume ratios are omitted (available on request) and tables
with ratios in values are presented.
The comparison was done at six digits of disaggregation. In the interest of space, I
present here the comparison up to the fourth digit of aggregation only.
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Table B.6: Ratio of Exported Values (USD, Comtrade currency conversion) Comtrade
Data / Customs Data: Four Digits Codes
Year
HS4 2005 2006 2007 Total
6101 0.991 0.912 0.955 0.953
6102 0.863 0.957 0.976 0.932
6103 0.957 0.938 0.984 0.960
6104 0.986 0.911 1.285 1.061
6105 0.999 0.919 0.943 0.954
6106 0.996 0.909 0.883 0.929
6107 0.995 0.946 1.020 0.987
6108 0.971 0.951 2.400 1.441
6109 1.002 0.904 0.896 0.934
6110 0.988 0.975 0.990 0.984
6111 0.994 0.857 0.954 0.935
6112 1.000 0.902 0.924 0.942
6113 0.984 0.988 1.292 1.088
6114 1.001 0.888 0.800 0.896
6115 1.000 0.932 0.957 0.963
6116 0.999 1.018 1.000 1.006
6117 1.000 0.979 1.495 1.158
6201 0.932 0.944 1.088 0.988
6202 0.883 0.926 1.024 0.944
6203 0.966 0.927 0.978 0.957
6204 0.964 0.916 1.024 0.968
6205 0.992 0.936 0.907 0.945
6206 1.004 0.919 1.009 0.977
6207 0.976 0.945 0.976 0.965
6208 0.996 0.952 1.048 0.999
6209 0.965 0.956 0.912 0.945
6210 1.014 0.986 1.168 1.056
6211 0.961 0.862 1.061 0.961
6212 0.903 0.926 0.913 0.914
6213 1.000 0.953 1.370 1.108
6214 1.000 0.960 1.351 1.104
6215 1.001 0.609 1.876 1.162
6216 0.998 0.950 0.996 0.981
6217 0.978 0.953 1.346 1.092
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
The time lines that follow plot the volumes and values, in kilograms and dollars, respec-
tively for knitwear and woven. Line graphs on volumes are presented first.
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Figure B.5: Evolution of Volumes - HS4 Knitwear
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
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Figure B.6: Evolution of Volumes - HS4 Woven
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
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Figure B.7: Evolution of Values - HS4 Knitwear
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Appendix B. Data - Quality and Coverage 97
Figure B.8: Evolution of Values - HS4 Woven
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
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For reference for the above graphs, what follows shows the relevance of each product
category in the broad garment sub-sector. The y-axis measures the exports (kilograms)
of a given HS4 product, grouped by sub-sectors (knit or woven), in years from 2005 to
2007 period. The first graph is done using Comtrade Data, while the second one is done
using Customs Data.
Figure B.9: Relative Sizes of HS4, Woven and Knit - Comtrade
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Figure B.10: Relative Sizes of HS4, Woven and Knit - Customs
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
B.3.2 Imports
On the imports side, as we are only interested in the imports that are used as inputs for
the garment sector, I only compare the most relevant product categories that correspond
to fabric or alternative ”basic” inputs for the sector. For the selection of import cate-
gories, I extract BIN numbers of the exporters in the Customs dataset and merge with
the imports data at the sellers level. More than two thirds of the garment exporters
import at least one type of basic input. These are ranked according to the exported
volumes over the panel and the top three categories at the 2-digits level are selected for
the comparison.
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At six digits, the comparison between sources of data looks poor, product-by-product.
Aggregation at four digits show a slightly better match between data sources, possibly
explained by differences in nomenclature assignments. Although there are some product
categories that show a very high or very low ratio, both in values and volumes, it can be
seen in the bar graphs that the most relevant products show a reasonable comparison
of the two sources of data.
Additional limitations in our Customs data for the years 2005-2007 might induce poor
results in this comparison. As explained, our Customs Data is available only for one of
the custom offices (301, Chittagong) for this period in the Imports data.
Table B.7: Ratio of Net Weight (KG) Comtrade Data / Customs Data
Year of Declaration
HS4 2005 2006 2007 Total
5201 1.014 1.118 1.204 1.112
5202 0.935 0.276 1.163 0.791
5203 1.890 1.788 1.247 1.642
5204 6.823 0.793 8.070 5.229
5205 0.715 0.589 0.728 0.677
5206 1.044 0.883 0.860 0.929
5207 0.792 2.216 1.652 1.553
5208 0.681 0.249 0.372 0.434
5209 0.662 0.335 0.447 0.481
5210 0.673 0.507 0.704 0.628
5211 0.957 0.080 0.203 0.413
5212 0.548 0.028 0.106 0.227
5801 1.385 0.948 1.881 1.405
5802 0.960 2.463 8.076 3.833
5803 54.371 0.987 27.679
5804 13.341 3.348 18.742 11.810
5806 1.993 2.320 3.939 2.751
5807 8.178 3.280 7.684 6.381
5808 1.365 11.055 1.678 4.699
5809 0.524 0.002 0.002 0.176
5810 0.948 0.636 0.030 0.538
5811 2.863 2.857 1.339 2.353
6001 0.793 0.225 0.333 0.451
6002 0.609 0.049 0.139 0.266
6003 0.515 0.090 0.138 0.247
6004 0.376 0.005 0.292 0.224
6005 1.757 6.792 3.539 4.029
6006 0.671 1.394 3.139 1.735
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
For reference for the above tables, what follows shows the relevance of each product
category in the group of selected main inputs. The y-axis measures the values of the
imports aggregated over all years from 2005 to 2007 period. The first graph is done
using Comtrade Data, while the second one is done using Customs Data.
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Table B.8: Ratio of Imported Values (USD, Comtrade currency conversion) Comtrade
Data / Customs Data
Year of Declaration
HS4 2005 2006 2007 Total
5201 1.079 1.162 1.228 1.156
5202 0.759 0.137 0.649 0.515
5203 1.237 1.013 1.248 1.166
5204 3.882 0.527 4.036 2.815
5205 0.679 0.516 0.615 0.603
5206 1.091 0.825 0.854 0.923
5207 0.871 2.273 1.405 1.516
5208 0.647 0.172 0.284 0.368
5209 0.665 0.301 0.385 0.450
5210 0.691 0.443 0.533 0.556
5211 1.048 0.110 0.214 0.457
5212 0.540 0.028 0.085 0.218
5801 0.764 0.603 1.050 0.805
5802 0.940 0.889 4.031 1.953
5803 114.314 1.486 57.900
5804 20.782 6.335 28.097 18.405
5806 1.756 1.462 2.588 1.935
5807 3.250 1.462 2.066 2.259
5808 1.756 6.832 0.394 2.994
5809 0.513 0.007 0.002 0.174
5810 1.025 0.692 0.033 0.583
5811 2.536 2.392 1.263 2.064
6001 0.567 0.144 0.196 0.302
6002 0.613 0.046 0.119 0.259
6003 0.508 0.070 0.098 0.225
6004 0.338 0.003 0.187 0.176
6005 1.251 3.622 1.757 2.210
6006 0.688 1.880 3.705 2.091
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Figure B.11: Relative Sizes of HS4, Woven and Knit - Comtrade
Source: Own calculations using DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade database.
Appendix C
Additional Descriptives of the
Sector
The following sections contain tables and graphs with general descriptives that are re-
ferred to in the main text.
C.1 Descriptives on the International Context
Table C.1: Percentage of Garment Imports Flow to US, 2010
Country Percentage
China 39.85
Vietnam 8.03
Bangladesh 5.37
India 4.42
Table C.2: Percentage of Garment Imports Flow to EU, 2010
Country Percentage
China 45.53
Turkey 12.58
Bangladesh 9.37
India 6.76
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Figure C.1: Import Flow of Garments from World to US, 1991-2013 (COMTRADE)
Figure C.2: Import Flow of Garments from Bangladesh to US, 1991-2013 (COM-
TRADE)
Figure C.3: Import Flow of Garments from China to US, 1991-2013 (COMTRADE)
Figure C.4: Import Flow of Garments from India to US, 1991-2013 (COMTRADE)
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Figure C.5: Import Flow of Garments from Vietnam to US, 1994-2013 (COM-
TRADE)
Figure C.6: Import Flow of Garments from World to EU, 2000-2013 (COMTRADE)
Figure C.7: Import Flow of Garments from Bangladesh to EU, 2000-2013 (COM-
TRADE)
Figure C.8: Import Flow of Garments from China to EU, 2000-2013 (COMTRADE)
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Figure C.9: Import Flow of Garments from India to EU, 2000-2013 (COMTRADE)
Figure C.10: Import Flow of Garments from Turkey to EU, 2000-2013 (COM-
TRADE)
Figure C.11: International Trade Costs in US Manufacturing (ESCAP-WB)
Figure C.12: International Trade Costs in UK Manufacturing (ESCAP-WB)
Figure C.13: International Trade Costs in France Manufacturing (ESCAP-WB)
Appendix C. Descriptive Tables 105
Figure C.14: International Trade Costs in Germany Manufacturing (ESCAP-WB)
Figure C.15: International Trade Costs in Bangladesh Manufacturing (ESCAP-WB)
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C.2 Exporter Dynamics - World Bank Data
Table C.3: Exporter Dynamics - Bangladesh I (World Bank Data)
All Garments (HS 61+62) - Bangladesh
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Exporters 4,623 5,095 5,105 6,055 6,312 6,529 6,565
Number of Entrants 1,464 1,350 1,958 1,783 1,781 1,718
Number of Exiters 992 1,340 1,008 1,526 1,564 1,682
Export Value per Exporter: Median
(thousand USD)
592.61 713.29 464.43 510.67 405.62 442.49 536.85
Export Value per Exporter: First
Quartile (thousand USD)
67.86 75.64 67.77 69.59 54.41 60.55 71.69
Export Value per Exporter: Third
Quartile (thousand USD)
2,904.15 3,775.61 2,353.89 3,082.91 3,024.30 3,382.04 4,314.79
Unit Price per Exporter: Median 16.98 17.56 19.36 20.25 20.13 20.99 27.02
Unit Price per Entrant: Median 15.20 16.91 17.81 16.56 18.74 23.11
Unit Price per Exiter: Median 14.08 15.14 15.92 17.55 16.43 17.04
Export Value per Entrant: Median
(thousand USD)
67.82 68.46 71.90 47.33 56.66 57.20
Export Value per Exiter: Median
(thousand USD)
38.38 50.07 43.36 55.97 43.84 44.90
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Share of top 1% Exporters in TEV (To-
tal Export Value)
0.33 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.42
Number of HS6 Products per Ex-
porter: Median
6 5 5 5 4 4 4
Number of Destinations per Exporter:
Median
5 5 4 4 4 4 4
Firm Entry Rate 0.58 0.53 0.65 0.57 0.55 0.53
Firm Exit Rate 0.44 0.53 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.52
Firm Survival Rate 1.10 1.36 1.19 1.15 1.10
2-year Firm Survival Rate 0.80 1.00 0.84 0.79
3-year Firm Survival Rate 0.63 0.82 0.66
We are aware of the inconsistency in the figures reported as firm survival rates and we treat these figures with
caution. For completeness and as referred in the main text, all statistics on the selected indicators are computed
and presented as offered in the World Bank Database.
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Table C.4: Exporter Dynamics - Bangladesh II (World Bank Data)
Men’s Woven Suits and Ensembles (HS 6203) - Bangladesh
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Exporters 1,249 1,472 1,393 1,673 1,774 1,861 1,894
Number of Entrants 541 406 624 608 626 616
Number of Exiters 318 485 344 507 539 583
Export Value per Exporter: Median
(thousand USD)
216.02 243.19 172.37 200.53 158.31 168.58 194.97
Export Value per Exporter: First
Quartile (thousand USD)
29.44 33.58 29.64 32.16 23.52 28.71 34.64
Export Value per Exporter: Third
Quartile (thousand USD)
943.00 1,213.09 911.66 1,191.42 1,204.07 1,122.28 1,570.77
Unit Price per Exporter: Median 8.90 9.14 9.76 10.34 10.28 10.56 13.38
Unit Price per Entrant: Median 8.70 8.91 10.07 9.29 9.75 12.21
Unit Price per Exiter: Median 8.20 8.67 8.23 9.81 9.22 9.57
Export Value per Entrant: Median
(thousand USD)
37.03 29.34 39.04 26.35 27.19 35.96
Export Value per Exiter: Median
(thousand USD)
22.23 32.24 23.16 31.31 22.15 26.91
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Share of top 1% Exporters in TEV (To-
tal Export Value)
0.18 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24
Number of HS6 Products per Ex-
porter: Median
2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Number of Destinations per Exporter:
Median
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Firm Entry Rate 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.33
Firm Exit Rate 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.31
Firm Survival Rate 0.47 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.48
2-year Firm Survival Rate 0.33 0.42 0.35 0.32
3-year Firm Survival Rate 0.24 0.32 0.27
Table C.5: Exporter Dynamics - Bangladesh III (World Bank Data)
Women’s Woven Suits and Ensembles (HS 6204) - Bangladesh
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Exporters 1,078 1,164 1,056 1,321 1,323 1,435 1,403
Number of Entrants 413 339 551 466 532 489
Number of Exiters 327 447 286 464 420 521
Export Value per Exporter: Median
(thousand USD)
131.15 169.29 127.32 128.63 132.79 118.47 145.45
Export Value per Exporter: First
Quartile (thousand USD)
23.28 29.40 22.79 28.40 27.59 25.35 31.50
Export Value per Exporter: Third
Quartile (thousand USD)
599.63 762.34 502.36 612.06 662.15 643.64 879.48
Unit Price per Exporter: Median 10.06 10.42 11.69 12.02 11.86 12.30 15.52
Unit Price per Entrant: Median 9.46 10.90 11.54 10.75 11.77 14.14
Unit Price per Exiter: Median 9.15 9.36 10.19 11.04 11.03 11.28
Export Value per Entrant: Median
(thousand USD)
31.94 27.80 36.94 32.34 33.53 35.51
Export Value per Exiter: Median
(thousand USD)
22.26 35.00 19.67 31.51 34.43 27.70
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Share of top 1% Exporters in TEV (To-
tal Export Value)
0.17 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Number of HS6 Products per Ex-
porter: Median
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Number of Destinations per Exporter:
Median
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Firm Entry Rate 0.35 0.32 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.35
Firm Exit Rate 0.30 0.38 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.36
Firm Survival Rate 0.43 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.44
2-year Firm Survival Rate 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.30
3-year Firm Survival Rate 0.21 0.27 0.22
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Table C.6: Exporter Dynamics - Bangladesh IV (World Bank Data)
Men’s Woven Shirts (HS 6205) - Bangladesh
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Exporters 883 973 843 896 818 910 928
Number of Entrants 384 284 375 321 399 361
Number of Exiters 294 414 322 399 307 343
Export Value per Exporter: Median
(thousand USD)
90.63 87.80 92.58 108.46 84.52 96.53 126.84
Export Value per Exporter: First
Quartile (thousand USD)
19.56 17.88 22.94 22.23 16.21 20.06 28.83
Export Value per Exporter: Third
Quartile (thousand USD)
663.47 773.99 640.09 817.64 1,013.65 847.69 1,202.85
Unit Price per Exporter: Median 9.58 9.76 10.93 11.51 11.93 12.58 15.91
Unit Price per Entrant: Median 8.78 9.60 10.97 11.43 11.87 13.95
Unit Price per Exiter: Median 8.18 8.77 9.78 10.68 11.13 11.14
Export Value per Entrant: Median
(thousand USD)
29.36 28.23 30.70 20.02 28.53 35.55
Export Value per Exiter: Median
(thousand USD)
22.19 27.59 27.45 29.90 21.47 20.06
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Share of top 1% Exporters in TEV (To-
tal Export Value)
0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.18
Number of HS6 Products per Ex-
porter: Median
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of Destinations per Exporter:
Median
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Firm Entry Rate 0.39 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.39
Firm Exit Rate 0.33 0.43 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.38
Firm Survival Rate 0.37 0.40 0.31 0.42 0.39
2-year Firm Survival Rate 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.26
3-year Firm Survival Rate 0.13 0.17 0.14
Table C.7: Exporter Dynamics - Bangladesh V (World Bank Data)
Women’s Woven Shirts and Blouses (HS 6206) - Bangladesh
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Exporters 582 620 521 609 557 643 603
Number of Entrants 288 215 306 233 322 263
Number of Exiters 250 314 218 285 236 303
Export Value per Exporter: Median
(thousand USD)
64.60 69.86 57.57 69.23 72.33 75.38 91.18
Export Value per Exporter: First
Quartile (thousand USD)
13.79 16.90 17.51 21.46 20.97 21.26 21.22
Export Value per Exporter: Third
Quartile (thousand USD)
292.66 271.66 195.73 283.62 314.20 345.00 418.16
Unit Price per Exporter: Median 11.74 12.61 13.96 14.25 14.47 14.94 19.12
Unit Price per Entrant: Median 11.77 12.53 12.66 13.51 13.22 16.84
Unit Price per Exiter: Median 10.69 11.54 12.05 13.01 13.44 13.25
Export Value per Entrant: Median
(thousand USD)
32.19 26.90 32.91 30.82 36.00 34.45
Export Value per Exiter: Median
(thousand USD)
23.61 28.53 23.58 32.57 31.87 37.13
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Share of top 1% Exporters in TEV (To-
tal Export Value)
0.14 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17
Number of HS6 Products per Ex-
porter: Median
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of Destinations per Exporter:
Median
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Firm Entry Rate 0.46 0.41 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.44
Firm Exit Rate 0.43 0.51 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.47
Firm Survival Rate 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.35
2-year Firm Survival Rate 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.27
3-year Firm Survival Rate 0.11 0.15 0.13
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C.3 General Descriptives of the Sector
Table C.8: Major Apparel Items Exported From Bangladesh, in Millions of USD
Year Shirts Trousers Jackets T-shirts Sweaters
1995-96 807.66 112.02 171.73 366.36 70.41
1998-99 1043.11 394.85 393.44 471.88 271.7
2001-02 871.21 636.61 412.34 546.28 517.83
2004-05 1053.34 1667.72 430.28 1349.71 893.12
2007-08 915.6 2512.74 1181.52 2765.56 1474.09
2008-09 1000.16 3007.29 1299.74 3065.86 1858.62
2009-10 993.41 3035.35 1350.43 3145.52 1795.39
2010-11 1566.42 4164.16 1887.5 4696.57 2488.19
Source: Series obtained from BGMEA Databases.
Table C.9: Top 10 knitwear Exports from Bangladesh, FY2010-2011, in Million USD
HS8 and Product Description Mil.USD
T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or crocheted,
of cotton.
4,430.17
Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and simi-
lar articles, knitted or crocheted, of textile materials,
n.e.s.
1,551.30
Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar
articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton.
730.50
Men’s or boys’ shirts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton. 633.43
T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or crocheted,
of textile material other than cotton.
266.41
Women’s or girls’ briefs and panties, knitted or cro-
cheted, of cotton.
172.64
Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar
articles, knitted or crocheted, of man-made fibres.
152.40
Women’s or girls’ blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses,
knitted or crocheted, of cotton.
135.51
Women’s or girls’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton.
132.76
Men’s or boys’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton.
127.97
Source: Series obtained from BGMEA Databases.
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Table C.10: Top 10 woven Exports from Bangladesh, FY2010-2011, in Millions USD
Product Description Mil.USD
Men’s or boys’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of cot-
ton.
3298.29
Women’s or girls’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of cot-
ton.
1200.25
Men’s or boys’ shirts, not knitted or crocheted, of cot-
ton. and 1024.51
Men’s or boys’ shirts, not knitted or crocheted, of tex-
tile materials, other than wool, fine animal hair, cotton
and man-made fibres.
513.96
Men’s or boys’ jackets and blazers, not knitted or cro-
cheted, of synthetic fibres.
273.62
Women’s or girls’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of tex-
tile materials, other than wool, fine animal hair, cotton
and synthetic fibres
199.57
Men’s or boys’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of tex-
tile materials, other than wool, fine animal hair, cotton
and synthetic fibres.
194.35
Women’s or girls’ blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses, not
knitted or crocheted, of cotton.
193.61
Men’s or boys’ trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of syn-
thetic fibres.
158.04
Women’s or girls’ jackets and blazers, not knitted or
crocheted, of synthetic fibres.
119.90
Source: Series obtained from BGMEA Databases.
C.4 Auxiliary descriptives based on our Data
For the purpose of tables C.11 and C.11 below, HHI index is generated as follows:
HHIN = (HHI − 1
N
)/(1− 1
N
)
HHI =
∑
1toN
(si)
2
with si, the share of firm i in industry and industry in this case is the whole market
(knitwear and woven). The first column is just HHI, ranging from 1/N to one, and the
second column is HHIN ranging from zero to one.
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Table C.11: Herfindhal-Hirschman Index, sellers
Year Mean N
2005 0.00105 0.00137 3101
2006 0.00098 0.00128 3352
2007 0.00101 0.00128 3673
2008 0.00107 0.00132 4100
2009 0.00112 0.00137 3992
2010 0.00122 0.00145 4354
2011 0.00117 0.00141 4144
2012 0.01714 0.01740 3883
Total 0.00313 0.00339 30599
Table C.12: Herfindhal-Hirschman Index, buyers, definitions above
Year Mean N
2005 0.00805 0.00838 2969
2006 0.00838 0.00869 3246
2007 0.00813 0.00841 3613
2008 0.00759 0.00783 4117
2009 0.00814 0.00837 4230
2010 0.00843 0.00865 4631
2011 0.00865 0.00890 3929
2012 0.01105 0.01134 3468
Total 0.00853 0.00879 30203
Table C.13: Proportion of Exports under the Order System
Buyer Proportion
ASDA 1.00000
CAND 0.99901
CARREFOUR 0.99969
GAP 0.99989
HANDM 0.99847
KMART 0.99998
LEVIS 0.99959
NEXT 0.99979
PRIMARK 0.99969
TESCO 0.99995
VANHEUSEN 1.00000
VF 0.99989
WALMART 0.99995
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Table C.14: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level ALL BUYERS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
90.66 639.4 0.01 82144.38 38451
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
6.60 28.73 0 1006.35 38451
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
16.99 123.16 0.13 13521.43 38451
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 4.69 11.73 1 412 34912
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
3.23 6.78 1 218 24193
Count of products per b, q 2.56 2.56 1 26 38451
Count of trade partners per b, q 2.77 4.08 1 68 37888
Table C.15: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level ASDA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
1642.93 1482.87 561.92 9200.74 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
103.97 31.16 39.18 156.36 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
15.62 12.7 10.07 83.19 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 45 8.52 30 61 30
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
27.93 10.71 16 55 14
Count of products per b, q 13.71 2.98 7 19 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 14.48 2.61 10 20 31
Table C.16: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level CAND
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
3270.12 2407.56 617.13 11229.83 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
205.17 99.06 48.16 395.44 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
14.66 3.84 9.99 29.39 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 81.77 31.55 35 152 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
51.46 19.02 19 83 13
Count of products per b, q 15.45 4.46 6 22 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 30.23 11.99 12 50 31
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Table C.17: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level CARREFOUR
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
1262.56 650.42 444.96 2851.84 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
110.63 48.04 28.83 209.06 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
11.68 4.12 8.6 29.91 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 50.39 15.24 23 77 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
39.06 15.73 7 65 17
Count of products per b, q 14.39 3.26 8 21 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 21.1 5.19 10 36 30
Table C.18: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level GAP
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
5287.77 6249.04 1603.66 37993.44 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
255.39 92.18 101.2 438.94 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
19.94 17.15 13.72 111.13 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 96.81 40.3 43 183 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
52.33 18.32 31 93 15
Count of products per b, q 14.42 2.41 11 20 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 19.84 3.45 13 26 31
Table C.19: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level HANDM
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
10123.07 14138.39 1858.14 82144.38 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
452.81 229.26 136.38 1006.35 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
19.46 15.02 13.62 99.55 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 216.83 87.81 84 412 30
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
132 41.87 68 218 18
Count of products per b, q 20.52 2.92 16 26 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 47.68 8.84 33 68 31
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Table C.20: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level KMART
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
3715.22 3427.36 2364.15 21833.41 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
266.42 39.81 210.15 361.75 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
14.2 14.19 9.42 89.95 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 121 14.69 88 153 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
77.27 13.44 60 119 22
Count of products per b, q 18.48 3.15 13 26 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 45.68 5.66 37 59 31
Table C.21: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level LEVIS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
2262.25 1120.17 614.72 6404.69 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
180.35 59.41 61.04 304.3 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
12.4 4.58 9.45 34.16 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 42.94 15.64 15 66 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
25.18 10.89 8 44 17
Count of products per b, q 5.9 1.47 4 9 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 5.47 1.14 4 9 30
Table C.22: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level NEXT
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
432.02 810.55 4.87 3810.81 26
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
19.85 25.52 0.31 79.76 26
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
15.51 9.45 6.02 59.07 26
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 15.54 19.25 1 57 26
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
10 11.75 1 40 17
Count of products per b, q 5.85 5.31 1 17 26
Count of trade partners per b, q 9.12 9.98 1 33 26
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Table C.23: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level PRIMARK
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
1656.87 1787.64 381.15 10630.47 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
129.25 48.06 47.03 255.39 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
11.44 5.88 8.08 41.62 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 50.3 8.6 32 63 30
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
25.7 8.99 17 49 10
Count of products per b, q 10.35 2.86 6 17 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 17.77 2.54 13 23 31
Table C.24: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level TESCO
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
1309.02 743.75 483.46 4944.78 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
118.01 33.87 43.44 187.44 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
11.62 7.69 7.54 51.3 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 40.83 8.05 24 60 30
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
20.4 9.22 11 34 10
Count of products per b, q 15.19 2.87 7 19 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 18.84 4.75 12 29 31
Table C.25: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level VANHEUSEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
3291.71 2187.71 1077.18 12371.67 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
223.95 92.76 82.36 415.43 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
14.06 4.03 11.17 32.86 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 87.5 23.48 52 134 28
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
58.8 10.49 45 80 20
Count of products per b, q 9.94 2.97 4 15 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 26.19 7.38 15 40 31
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Table C.26: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level VF
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
4140.55 2197.34 1534.39 13525.7 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
340.82 119.32 128.6 561.93 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
12.06 3.62 9.39 30.4 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 77.90 15.25 52 107 30
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
41.82 11.03 24 73 22
Count of products per b, q 12.45 2.13 9 19 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 16.84 4.32 11 25 31
Table C.27: Summary Statistics at the buyer-quarter level WALMART
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 10,000 USD per b, q - all
products
4337.01 1171.04 2220.57 7044.51 31
Volumes in 10,000 kg per b, q - all
products
389.69 125.69 168.81 668.66 31
Unit Values in USD per b, q - all
products, w.a.
11.6 3.1 8.85 26.22 31
Simultaneous active orders per b, q 80.77 23.12 42 124 31
Simultaneous allocation of orders
per b, q
60.93 19.24 33 88 15
Count of products per b, q 18.23 3.15 13 25 31
Count of trade partners per b, q 39.35 10.26 24 60 31
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Table C.28: Summary Statistics at the order level ALL BUYERS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
347.26 2073.42 0.11 603394.75 100383
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
25.28 191.41 0 58525.73 100383
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
18.74 128.4 0.1 19018.05 100383
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
14.46 23.33 0 1887.93 100383
Duration of order in quarters 1.5 0.78 1 31 100383
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.49 0.93 1 47 100383
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.23 0.48 1 4 100383
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
8.43 107.81 0 27533.17 65517
Table C.29: Summary Statistics at the order level ALL NON-LARGE BUYERS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
263.75 2167.05 0.2 603394.75 82942
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
20.4 206.86 0.01 58525.73 82942
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
16.68 50.35 0.1 5626.3 82942
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
12.08 19.14 0.01 1887.93 82942
Duration of order in quarters 1.45 0.75 1 31 82942
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.45 0.89 1 47 82942
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.21 0.46 1 4 82942
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
8.52 121.02 0 27533.17 51867
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Table C.30: Summary Statistics at the order level ASDA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
643.78 1205.21 1.38 19539.04 772
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
40.28 60.58 0.05 548.13 772
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
20.5 62.45 3.37 1475.31 772
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
19.21 21 0.05 130.33 772
Duration of order in quarters 1.75 0.89 1 6 772
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.73 1.06 1 8 772
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.34 0.52 1 3 772
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
7.32 4.99 0.76 69.64 362
Table C.31: Summary Statistics at the order level CAND
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
719.83 1277.11 0.4 19443.57 1398
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
45.26 75.21 0.02 990.24 1398
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
18.68 25.88 2.99 651.99 1398
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
22.9 29.37 0.02 411.05 1398
Duration of order in quarters 1.76 0.89 1 7 1398
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.47 0.82 1 8 1398
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.19 0.44 1 4 1398
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
9.09 4.32 1.58 58.62 926
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Table C.32: Summary Statistics at the order level CARREFOUR
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
463.2 665.2 1.1 5378.87 833
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
40.52 58.78 0.06 524.84 833
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
14.47 20.82 2.74 363.08 833
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
19.99 25.18 0.06 183.8 833
Duration of order in quarters 1.79 0.79 1 6 833
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.87 1.38 1 11 833
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.31 0.57 1 4 833
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
6.46 3.46 0.33 36.85 536
Table C.33: Summary Statistics at the order level GAP
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
1080.07 2761.37 0.35 63078.57 1514
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
52.3 103.77 0.01 1479.3 1514
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
36.47 163.61 2.76 5816.36 1514
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
23.35 37.68 0.01 390.14 1514
Duration of order in quarters 1.88 0.9 1 7 1514
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.77 1.17 1 10 1514
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.43 0.56 1 4 1514
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
7.53 5.24 1.12 151.33 1318
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Table C.34: Summary Statistics at the order level HANDM
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
802.87 1559.09 0.11 25891.76 3795
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
35.61 53.26 0 856.55 3795
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
61.18 596.93 4.8 19018.05 3795
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
19.21 23.02 0 428.27 3795
Duration of order in quarters 1.7 0.75 1 6 3795
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.66 1.02 1 9 3795
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.34 0.55 1 4 3795
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
10.15 10.72 0.16 390.66 2707
Table C.35: Summary Statistics at the order level KMART
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
514.47 1261.8 0.23 43354.3 2353
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
35.66 52.23 0.02 651.38 2353
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
18.2 50.21 0.98 1665.05 2353
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
21.74 25.07 0.02 250.6 2353
Duration of order in quarters 1.56 0.82 1 9 2353
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.68 1.11 1 11 2353
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.32 0.59 1 4 2353
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
6.94 3.43 0.36 85.72 2157
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Table C.36: Summary Statistics at the order level LEVIS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
905.55 1557.46 0.32 18658.07 755
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
72.08 119.6 0.01 1326.5 755
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
17.72 35.72 3.76 720.49 755
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
39.81 50.58 0.01 339.57 755
Duration of order in quarters 1.67 0.88 1 6 755
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.31 0.68 1 6 755
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.16 0.43 1 4 755
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
6.44 2.84 2.45 21.6 620
Table C.37: Summary Statistics at the order level NEXT
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
497.49 772.2 1.32 4996.66 221
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
22.92 31.23 0.07 224.83 221
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
32.96 67.17 6.02 733.58 221
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
11.71 12.52 0.07 78.07 221
Duration of order in quarters 1.72 0.88 1 5 221
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.75 1.08 1 7 221
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.4 0.64 1 4 221
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
9.16 4.15 2.22 27.78 143
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Table C.38: Summary Statistics at the order level PRIMARK
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
754.26 1633.9 4.93 24872.25 669
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
58.82 105.54 0.25 962.49 669
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
14.04 14.48 3.25 208.29 669
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
22.33 32.14 0.25 481.25 669
Duration of order in quarters 2.27 1.14 1 9 669
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.51 0.99 1 11 669
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.18 0.44 1 4 669
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
7.17 3.3 1.05 21.14 574
Table C.39: Summary Statistics at the order level TESCO
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
776.35 1383.86 1.07 13199.39 516
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
70.22 123.94 0.06 1361.45 516
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
15.94 30.7 3.14 423.9 516
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
23.01 26.89 0.06 192.68 516
Duration of order in quarters 2.31 1.47 1 11 516
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
2.26 1.76 1 12 516
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.46 0.64 1 4 516
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
7.51 4.36 0.18 42.26 265
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Table C.40: Summary Statistics at the order level VANHEUSEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
548.54 834.11 0.2 9447.51 1762
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
37.22 56.31 0.01 798.98 1762
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
18.21 54.36 2.24 1898.39 1762
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
23.94 25.68 0.01 257.61 1762
Duration of order in quarters 1.44 0.71 1 7 1762
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.46 0.68 1 7 1762
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.15 0.39 1 4 1762
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
9.65 29.36 2.48 1168.12 1574
Table C.41: Summary Statistics at the order level VF
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
1014.55 1694.69 3.49 13204.13 1241
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
83.53 143.22 0.29 1068.33 1241
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
14.27 12.77 3.01 180.83 1241
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
39.01 54.98 0.29 472.81 1241
Duration of order in quarters 1.87 1.03 1 9 1241
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.76 1.26 1 12 1241
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.41 0.67 1 4 1241
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
7.12 5.76 0.29 123.3 1044
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Table C.42: Summary Statistics at the order level WALMART
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Value in 1000 USD per order - all
products
828.99 965.2 0.23 7735.90 1600
Volumes in 1000 kg per order - all
products
74.17 86.57 0.01 727.19 1600
Unit Values in USD per order - all
products, w.a.
12.3 8.01 0.16 151.3 1600
Quarterly average volume per order,
1000 kg
47.8 53.3 0.01 384.6 1600
Duration of order in quarters 1.55 0.73 1 6 1600
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS6
1.68 1.37 1 17 1600
Count of Different products in or-
der, HS4
1.27 0.6 1 4 1600
Price of Importer fabric in order,
USD, w.a.
6.45 2.8 1 41.14 1398
Table C.43: Participation of largest order in (large) buyer’s demand
Percentiles
1% 0.35
5% 0.52
10% 0.62
25% 0.93
Mean 0.91
50% 1
75% 1
90% 1
95% 1
99% 1
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Table C.44: Counts of players per HS6 - Selected Woven (I)
HS6 Aggregated over Quarters
Size HS6 Size LB Size UDs Count LB Count
Buyers
Count
Sellers
Sellers
w/UD
620311 0.01 11.95 0.86 11 124 105 96
620312 0.12 8.93 0.94 14 275 191 168
620319 0.09 12.89 0.90 17 358 336 264
620321 0.00 3.97 0.86 3 17 16 15
620322 0.01 23.57 0.86 13 123 112 103
620323 0.00 5.34 0.83 4 20 12 12
620329 0.01 4.42 0.83 9 127 112 93
620331 0.02 25.30 0.93 14 144 161 135
620332 0.53 28.99 0.95 19 1089 1115 727
620333 0.92 19.09 0.96 19 1068 753 531
620339 0.61 35.16 0.95 19 1046 977 631
620341 0.16 14.45 0.93 17 557 453 343
620343 0.97 31.55 0.94 19 1138 962 668
620411 0.02 4.53 0.91 13 165 130 113
620412 0.02 9.52 0.88 13 235 236 197
620413 0.03 28.13 0.95 9 95 92 84
620419 0.01 20.17 0.81 10 128 137 121
620421 0.00 47.22 0.87 10 56 60 55
620422 0.01 6.24 0.94 10 127 107 98
620423 0.00 7.63 0.78 6 24 24 19
620429 0.01 5.10 0.85 8 105 102 91
Columns describe: The importance of large buyers in each product category (Size LB); The size of the
HS6 product within exports (Size HS6); The proportion of lines in the product category that ”use the
facility” (size UDs); The total number of large and semi-large buyers playing in the HS6 (Count LB);
The total number of buyers (large and non-large) active in the HS6 (Size Buyers); The total number
of sellers playing in the HS6 (Count Sellers); The total number of sellers that ”use the facility” in the
HS6 (Sellers w/UD).
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Table C.45: Counts of players per HS6 - Selected Woven (II)
HS6 Aggregated over Quarters
Size HS6 Size LB Size UDs Count LB Count
Buyers
Count
Sellers
Sellers
w/UD
620431 0.02 11.95 0.88 15 208 184 156
620432 0.32 29.46 0.93 19 828 928 638
620433 0.36 15.15 0.93 19 595 414 331
620439 0.24 24.28 0.94 18 716 723 518
620441 0.00 11.96 0.55 5 62 78 62
620442 0.24 29.19 0.92 17 862 1135 715
620443 0.02 8.11 0.92 11 161 178 158
620444 0.00 25.95 0.72 7 83 76 72
620449 0.09 21.54 0.93 16 357 445 336
620451 0.00 35.26 0.84 10 57 56 53
620452 0.40 39.85 0.92 19 894 1105 735
620453 0.03 14.90 0.78 17 161 166 149
620459 0.09 37.79 0.92 16 452 510 378
620461 0.06 27.71 0.91 15 286 251 211
620462 5.90 35.76 0.96 19 2269 2227 1151
620463 0.31 19.91 0.91 18 722 613 460
620469 1.26 27.92 0.96 19 1233 1267 799
620510 0.03 22.02 0.75 15 261 234 178
620520 4.61 39.80 0.96 19 2809 2194 1068
620530 0.26 28.39 0.97 15 643 419 315
620590 3.17 29.10 0.98 19 1918 1243 748
620610 0.02 8.14 0.90 13 254 289 233
620620 0.08 29.06 0.94 17 508 514 388
620630 0.66 25.34 0.90 18 1304 1342 795
620640 0.05 34.47 0.90 17 261 253 211
620690 0.58 29.02 0.92 19 981 983 639
Columns describe: The importance of large buyers in each product category (Size LB); The size of the
HS6 product within exports (Size HS6); The proportion of lines in the product category that ”use the
facility” (size UDs); The total number of large and semi-large buyers playing in the HS6 (Count LB);
The total number of buyers (large and non-large) active in the HS6 (Size Buyers); The total number
of sellers playing in the HS6 (Count Sellers); The total number of sellers that ”use the facility” in the
HS6 (Sellers w/UD).
Table C.46: Probability of Survival of Relations with large buyers, conditional on
cohort
Probability of Survival
First Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2005 1.00 0.69 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.28
2006 1.00 0.59 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.18
2007 1.00 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.24 0.21
2008 1.00 0.54 0.42 0.33 0.29
2009 1.00 0.51 0.36 0.34
2010 1.00 0.63 0.43
2011 1.00 0.61
2012 1.00
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Figure C.16: Survival Function at the relationship level.
Analysis time is normalized so each time unit corresponds to a year of relationship between the buyer and the seller,
irrespective of the calendar-time. Censoring both above and below are corrected for. Break-ups that coincide with
cases in which the buyer stops purchasing the main product that she used to supply from a given seller within 6
months after the breakup are excluded.
Figure C.17: Survival Function at the relationship level, by type of buyer.
Analysis time is normalized so each time unit corresponds to a year of relationship between the buyer and the seller,
irrespective of the calendar-time. Censoring both above and below are corrected for. Break-ups that coincide with
cases in which the buyer stops purchasing the main product that she used to supply from a given seller within 6
months after the breakup are excluded. SMR refers to specialized mass retailers and is divided into lower end retailers
and higher end retailers; NSMR include non specialised mass retailers and are, in general, super and hypermarkets;
BR stands for brands and include higher end brands and brands conglomerates.
Figure C.18: Survival Function at the relationship level - Estimated Alternatives .
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Figure C.19: Traded value, per buyer, by quarter, 2005q1 - 2011q4 (not deseason-
alised)
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Figure C.20: Traded value, per buyer-seller pair, by quarter, 2005q1 - 2011q4
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Table C.48: Evolution of Relations Over time - Panel A, with dummies for new
comers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.042∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.001∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SMR*Trend 0.036∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.004∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Low SMR*Trend 0.120∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.006∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
NSMR*Trend 0.020 0.038∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.001 0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
BR*Trend 0.087∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.006 0.003 0.018
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Squared Trend -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SMR*Squared Trend -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low SMR*Squared
Trend
-0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NSMR*Squared Trend -0.001∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BR*Squared Trend -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
New Comer*Trend -0.056∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.002 -0.023
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
New Comer*Squared
Trend
0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.002∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Relation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.573∗∗∗ 9.118∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Observations 62059 62059 62059 62059 62059
R2 0.014 0.008 0.066 0.003 0.009
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered.
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Table C.49: Evolution of Relations Over time - Panel B, with dummies for new
comers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.044∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.364
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.42)
SMR*Trend 0.229∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.60)
Low SMR*Trend 0.130∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.011∗ -1.766
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (2.34)
NSMR*Trend 0.063∗∗ -0.004 0.004 -0.008∗ -2.087
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (2.03)
BR*Trend 0.265∗∗∗ 0.048 0.055∗ -0.007∗ -8.100
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (5.32)
Squared Trend -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.017
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
SMR*Squared Trend -0.002 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Low SMR*Squared Trend -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.125
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15)
NSMR*Squared Trend -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.000∗∗∗ 0.125
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
BR*Squared Trend -0.010∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 0.000∗∗ 0.489
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34)
New Comer*Trend -0.092∗∗ -0.030 -0.027 -0.003 5.599∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (3.16)
Now Comer*Squared Trend 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.000 -0.309
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Relation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.817∗∗∗ 11.746∗∗∗ 9.889∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗ 17.555∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (1.79)
Observations 62059 48826 48823 48823 62059
R2 0.030 0.027 0.012 0.072 0.002
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered.
Table C.50: Evolution of Relations Over time All Large Buyers - Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.074∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.002 0.041∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Squared Trend -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.662∗∗∗ 10.153∗∗∗ 2.510∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 2.132∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Observations 8334 8334 8334 8334 8334
R2 0.030 0.015 0.130 0.002 0.008
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
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Table C.51: Evolution of Relations Over time All Large Buyers - Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.156∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.984
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (1.47)
Squared
Trend
-0.005∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
Constant 2.900∗∗∗ 12.650∗∗∗ 10.814∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 8.226∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (1.81)
Observations 8334 7579 7577 7577 8334
R2 0.019 0.061 0.027 0.167 0.003
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.52: Evolution of Relations Over time SMR - Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.095∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.006∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Squared Trend -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.756∗∗∗ 10.074∗∗∗ 2.682∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09)
Observations 3153 3153 3153 3153 3153
R2 0.058 0.028 0.159 0.014 0.019
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.53: Evolution of Relations Over time SMR - Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.199 0.101∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.005 1.331∗
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.43)
Squared Trend -0.004 -0.002∗ -0.002∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.039∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 3.044∗∗∗ 12.483∗∗∗ 10.507∗∗∗ 1.980∗∗∗ 2.559
(0.37) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (4.38)
Observations 3153 2832 2830 2830 3153
R2 0.055 0.109 0.073 0.126 0.002
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.54: Evolution of Relations Over time NSMR - Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.048∗ 0.047∗ 0.001 -0.001 0.033
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Squared Trend -0.001 -0.002∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.487∗∗∗ 10.100∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 2.153∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Observations 3678 3678 3678 3678 3678
R2 0.011 0.015 0.116 0.005 0.013
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
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Table C.55: Evolution of Relations Over time NSMR - Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.088∗∗ 0.038 0.029 0.009 -1.196
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (1.89)
Squared Trend -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.000∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
Constant 2.512∗∗∗ 12.617∗∗∗ 10.900∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗ 9.905∗∗
(0.20) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (2.26)
Observations 3678 3313 3313 3313 3678
R2 0.030 0.016 0.005 0.180 0.004
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.56: Evolution of Relations Over time BR - Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.099∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.018 0.001 0.018
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Squared Trend -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.865∗∗∗ 10.417∗∗∗ 2.448∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 2.227∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
Observations 1503 1503 1503 1503 1503
R2 0.057 0.024 0.125 0.002 0.030
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.57: Evolution of Relations Over time BR - Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.260∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.009 -5.488
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (6.12)
Squared Trend -0.010∗ -0.001 -0.001∗ 0.000∗ 0.339
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37)
Constant 3.450∗∗∗ 13.027∗∗∗ 11.183∗∗∗ 1.844∗∗∗ 16.573∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.14) (0.13) (0.02) (1.36)
Observations 1503 1434 1434 1434 1503
R2 0.043 0.133 0.069 0.266 0.028
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.58: Evolution of Relations Over time New Comers - Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traded value, logs Traded volume,
logs
Average price, w.a.,
logs
Share of main prod-
uct in overall trade
Number of prod-
ucts
Trend 0.066∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.006 -0.004 0.022
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Squared Trend -0.001 -0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.258∗∗∗ 9.706∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12)
Observations 2243 2243 2243 2243 2243
R2 0.065 0.032 0.115 0.004 0.007
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Appendix C. Descriptive Tables 135
Table C.59: Evolution of Relations Over time New Comers - Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of orders
active
Value of Fabric,
logs
Volume of Fabric,
logs
Average price of
fabric
Import Intensity
Trend 0.117∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.065∗ 0.006 1.097
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.48)
Squared Trend -0.004∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.000∗∗∗ -0.037
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Constant 2.541∗∗∗ 12.203∗∗∗ 10.321∗∗∗ 1.887∗∗∗ 4.288
(0.08) (0.17) (0.16) (0.02) (6.11)
Observations 2243 1936 1934 1934 2243
R2 0.020 0.130 0.071 0.236 0.001
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only relationships that survive 4 quarters of
interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. All regressions include buyer - seller fixed effects and control for seasonal effects.
Table C.60: Evolution of Volumes, averaging over Orders, within Relations
(1) (2)
Average volume of allocated orders, logs Count of orders allocated to supplier
Quarters of effective interaction 0.011 0.126∗
(0.02) (0.06)
Quarters of effective interaction, squared -0.001 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00)
Relation Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Seasonal Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes
Constant 9.496∗∗∗ 2.954∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.06)
Observations 6202 6202
R2 0.032 0.014
Panel regressions with fixed effects for cross sectional units (buyer-seller relation). Standard errors are clustered
at the buyer level. Note that quarters of effective interaction do not coincide with calendar quarters. Only
relationships that survive 4 quarters of interaction (gaps allowed for) are considered. Orders are dated on their
first shipment and aggregated over quarters for each cross sectional unit.
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Table C.61: Evolution Input-Output Margin in Orders within Relations Over time -
Alternative
Margin between Price-per-kilo of garment and Price-per-kilo of fabric,
logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear Trend 0.003∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Forward Count of (oth) large buy-
ers placing orders simultaneously in
product category
0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quadratic Trend -0.000
(0.00)
L.Margin 0.199∗∗∗
(0.04)
L2.Margin 0.114∗∗∗
(0.01)
L3.Margin 0.068∗∗
(0.02)
L4.Margin 0.076∗∗∗
(0.02)
L5.Margin 0.058∗∗∗
(0.02)
Volume of Order, logs -0.082∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Import Intensity -0.000∗∗∗
(0.00)
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-Seller Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.707∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 2.493∗∗∗ 2.539∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 12047 12047 5297 12047 12047
R2 0.378 0.380 0.473 0.391 0.392
Standard errors are clustered at the relationship level. Only relationships that survive for more than a year are taken into
account. Orders with high volumes of imported inputs are considered (see Appendix D for alternatives).
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Table C.62: Evolution Price of Orders within Relations Over time - Alternative
Average Price of Order, logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear Trend 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Forward Count of (oth) large buy-
ers placing orders simultaneously in
product category
0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quadratic Trend -0.000∗∗
(0.00)
L.Average Price 0.280∗∗∗
(0.04)
L2.Average Price 0.160∗∗∗
(0.03)
L3.Average Price 0.071∗∗∗
(0.01)
L4.Average Price 0.082∗∗∗
(0.01)
L5.Average Price 0.081∗∗∗
(0.02)
Volume of Order, logs -0.063∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Import Intensity -0.000∗∗∗
(0.00)
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer-Seller Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.661∗∗∗ 2.623∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 3.263∗∗∗ 3.301∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 12061 12061 10311 12061 12061
R2 0.465 0.470 0.543 0.484 0.485
Standard errors are clustered at the relationship level. Only relationships that survive for more than a year are taken into
account. Orders with high volumes of imported inputs are considered (see Appendix D for alternatives).
Table C.63: Evolution Price of Inputs in Orders within Relations Over time - Alter-
native
Average Price of Fabric in Order, logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear Trend 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Forward Count of (oth) large buy-
ers placing orders simultaneously in
product category
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quadratic Trend -0.000∗∗
(0.00)
L.Average Price of Fabric 0.110∗∗∗
(0.01)
L2.Average Price of Fabric 0.091∗∗∗
(0.02)
L3.Average Price of Fabric 0.082∗∗∗
(0.01)
L4.Average Price of Fabric 0.100∗∗∗
(0.01)
L5.Average Price of Fabric 0.063∗∗∗
(0.01)
Volume of Order, logs -0.027∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Import Intensity -0.000∗
(0.00)
Constant 2.118∗∗∗ 2.092∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 2.377∗∗∗ 2.404∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
Observations 12061 12061 5784 12061 12061
R2 0.584 0.588 0.644 0.590 0.591
Standard errors are clustered at the relationship level. Only relationships that survive for more than a year are taken into
account. Orders with high volumes of imported inputs are considered (see Appendix D for alternatives).
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Figure C.21: Kernel Density Estimate: Sellers’ types
Table C.64: Share of Demand from Large Buyers in each quintile of the distribution
of sellers’ types
Large Buyer
Quintiles Specialized Non-Specialized
1 0.028 0.048
2 0.056 0.061
3 0.115 0.235
4 0.296 0.290
5 0.470 0.247
Types computed excluding large buyers.
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For reference, see volumes and average price of each type of product in the table below:
Table C.66: Quantities (in millions of kg) and Average Price (in hundreds of Tk)
HS4 Volumes and Prices
5111 10 5.8
5208 834 5.8
5209 734 4.8
5210 57 5.9
5211 87 4.5
5212 138 6.0
5407 157 8.0
5512 136 6.0
5513 165 5.8
5514 47 6.3
5515 27 5.8
5516 14 4.9
5801 21 4.9
5802 9 2.0
5803 0 6.0
5804 2 12.7
5806 8 7.5
5809 1 4.5
5903 20 7.8
5906 2 8.9
5907 0 28.1
6001 120 5.1
6002 50 5.3
6003 33 6.8
6004 2 5.9
6005 5 7.2
6006 37 5.9
6011 0 5.5
6021 0 14.2
6022 0 12.2
6031 0 0.3
6039 0 1.4
6049 0 116.2
Total 82 10.2
C.5 A general characterisation: A note on the dynamics
of relations
On average, each quarter, buyers (of all sizes) receive shipments fulfilling 4 to 5 different
orders, involving -less than- 3 different suppliers. Pooling all product categories together,
large buyers, in turn, hold an average of 64 orders per quarter, with the top specialised
mass retailers (H&M, GAP) allocating up to 100 new orders per (active) quarter. Over
all the product categories, these buyers deal with up to almost 50 suppliers at a time
(with an average of 20), with the higher end brands (Levis, Next, VF) showing a lower
number of sellers per quarter, averaging between 5 and 16.
Both for large and non-large buyers, orders tend to be limited to one or two products
under the HS6 classification. On top of the higher number of orders placed by large
buyers, their orders are on average of bigger size than those placed by smaller players:
while the average size of the orders placed by non-large buyers is of 20,000 kg. of
garment, this ranges from 1.5 to more than 4 times that figure for large buyers. Most
orders are fulfilled in shipments that span for more than one quarter, with averages per
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buyer ranging from 1.5 (slightly longer than the 1.45 duration of the orders for non-large
importers) to 2.3 quarters (see tables C.14 to C.42).
While the comparison between large and non-large buyers regarding the volumes of their
orders gives a very clear picture, the weighted unit values (or prices) of these orders show
large variations across buyers. The non-specialised mass retailers (in general, super and
hypermarkets like Carrefour, Walmart, Tesco) have orders whose unit value is on average
close to that of the non-large buyers, or even below that. At the other end, specialised
retailers (H&M, Gap, Next) show average prices that double and triple that of orders
placed by non-large buyers. These differences in average prices seem to have some
correspondence with the price of the fabric imported by the manufacturers to serve the
corresponding orders. Only a few of the large buyers (H&M, Next, Vanheusen) have an
average input price above the mean of that of orders placed by non-large buyers.
In this section I offer a general characterisation of buyer - seller relations on five aspects.
First, I look at the duration of relations and the probability of trade relationships with
large buyers breaking up, with specific attention to survival after a first year of trade.
Then, I explore the general time trends in volumes, prices, order allocation and inputs
over the duration of relations with large and non-large buyers. I then turn to exploring
some aspects of price setting and profitability. I finally offer some descriptives on firm-
level heterogeneity to finally turn to its role in the probability of observing the formation
of certain trading relations or links.
C.5.1 Survival and Duration of Buyer - Seller relations
The buyers we are interested in, altogether, start 1,362 new relations over the duration
of our panel. The probability of each of these relationships surviving after their first year
is around 0.57, with a gradual decay averaging a 0.37, 0.32, 0.27, 0.21 probability of the
relationship remaining active in a second, third, fourth and firth years, respectively 1.
These figures are reasonably consistent with those computed at the seller-product level
using the Exporters Dynamic Dataset available in the World Bank Database Library
(selected indicators are included in tables C.3 to C.7 of Appendix C).
Before moving further into the characterisation of the relationships between buyers and
sellers, a distinction on the nature of the traded products is in order. Our focus is on
the four main broad product categories of woven garment. Each of these is divided
into subcategories, according to the HS nomenclature and we work with 48 products.
1When looking at the survival table in C.4, note the panel starts in 2005, where we register the start
of all relationships that are active in that year, as we don’t have information prior to January 2005.
Censoring, both above and below, will be corrected for later on in this section.
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Of all of these, only 9 categories can be considered as, strictly speaking, seasonal with
shipments taking place only in specific times of the year. These correspond to certain
products made of wool, furs, animal fibres or their synthetic alternatives. In our dataset,
they account for less than 0.002% of the traded values and we observe no manufacturers
specialised in these products (see table F.1 in Appendix F on seasonality for details)
In the same appendix, the regressions in table F.2 of the (log of) traded values over
seasons show that at the level of the buyers, there is a stronger presence in the last
season (October to December), which is often the case in garment, due to the higher
unit price of the traded garments and the higher volumes of trade. This fact, and the
specificities at the level of the buyer, also observable in figure C.19 in Appendix C, are
taken care of in all the exercises in this section.
Table C.67 presents the results of the estimation of a Probit model on the probability
of a relationship between a large buyer and a supplier surviving its first year 2. Of these
relations, 359 can be defined as one off interactions. These include relations that start
in the last quarter of our panel, end in the first quarter of our panel or are restricted
to trade within one quarter only and below a minimum threshold (see D for alternative
thresholds). The regressions in table C.67 exclude these one-off interactions. The main
estimating equation is:
Pr(sij = 1|X) = Φ(θi + τ0;ij +Xijβ) (C.1)
With Φ(.) denoting the CDF of the normal distribution, i indexing buyers and j indexing
sellers. The outcome variable, sij ∈ {0, 1}, indicates whether relation ij survived the
first year of trade. Fixed effects for the buyer and the cohort of the relation are included
and denoted above with θi and τ0;ij , respectively. Xij contains covariates at the level of
the seller or the pair, collection measures that correspond to the first year of relation or
pre-relationship information. Note, however, that the data used here still has a cross-
sectional structure.
Across all specifications, those relations that exhibit more intense trade, both in terms of
the traded volumes (and values) and the number of products show a higher probability of
survival 3. While this is not surprising, after controlling for the volume effect, the richer
specifications show a positive relation between the unit value of the traded products and
the probability of survival. This holds true both for the specifications that include the
2Year 1 is defined as the 365 days subsequently after the date of the first shipment between the
buyer and the seller.Marginal Effects (at average) of Probit MLE are presented. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with clustered re-sampling. All specifications include cohort fixed effects. Key: s: seller;
q : quarter; b: buyer; m: market. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.50, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
3Volumes, values and count of products are averages over the quarters in which the relationship is
active.
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unit value as a weighted average over all the trade between the buyer and the seller in
their first year and for those that use a measure of the seller’s position in the distribution
of prices that the buyer pays. The variable labeled Unit price, relative position measures
the weighted (over products) average of the normalised distance between the price the
seller is paid by the buyer and the median price the buyer pays in that product category
to its first-year suppliers4. This relation between unit values and survival is observed
also in the specifications that control for the input prices.
These results show that sellers that are paid by the buyer, on average, an above-average
price survive onto at least a second year of trading with the large buyer with higher
probability. There are at least two stories compatible with this observation. First, the
buyer can be rewarding with, ceteris paribus, higher prices those manufacturers that he
values the most and then wants to keep for the following period. Second, it could be that
there are intrinsic seller (or buyer-seller) heterogeneity dimensions that are captured by
the price term, for instance, quality aspects that are not controlled for by the price of the
fabric. Not mutually exclusive, both interpretations are plausible and posit challenges
to the exogeneity assumptions in the specifications proposed in this first exploration.
The sections that follow will partly address these issues but we remind the reader the
exploratory nature of these estimations.
The outcome variable in all these specifications implicitly conditions on the relation
having started. This probably explains why the size of the seller prior to the start of
the relationship does not sort survivors and non-survivors. This fact coincides with the
anecdotal evidence gathered in conversations with large buyers: the general screening of
potential suppliers in aspects like productive capacity or minimum social compliance and
quality standards is undertaken before the trading relation starts. It is not surprising
then that after the manufacturers have passed a certain threshold capacity to be able
to trade with the large buyer, this no longer affects the probability of sustaining the
relationship.
The effect of trading with another large buyer on the outcome could take either sign.
Sellers that have active relations with large buyers can exploit this as a signal to other
potential buyers in a context in which at least part of the payoff-relevant heterogeneity
of the seller is not immediately observable. Large buyers are known to exert higher
monitoring efforts and quality controls, especially in social compliance matters. Then,
observing a seller trading with a given large buyer can be interpreted as a guarantee
that the seller has passed a certain overall quality threshold. At the same time, there
4Here, the positions are computed as distances to the median price and normalised by the median
absolute deviation. Alternatives of this specification have used means and standard deviations, with
similar results. Weights over products are given by the relative volumes of trade of each product in the
first year of the buyer-seller relation.
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are at least two reasons why trading with other large buyers can erode the probability
of a relationship surviving. The first one became apparent to us in conversations with
buyers: a seller producing for two large buyers at the same time is a potential source of
leakage of designs and information. The second one is that, manufacturers being capacity
constrained, in general cannot handle production of large quantities for more than one
large buyer simultaneously. While sellers in general serve multiple small buyers at the
same time, they tend to deal with only one large player at a time. The results in table
C.67 are more compatible with the views of buyers competing for the manufacturer, than
complementing each other via signaling mechanisms 5. Across specifications, having
traded with another large buyer reduces the probability of the relation carrying on
forwards.
Finally, these preliminary regressions also show that the seller’s behaviour with regards
to the intensity of imported inputs does not predict significantly the probability of
survival. This is consistent with the view that the decisions on the material inputs
to fulfil orders placed by large buyers rest with the buyer itself6. Appendix D explains
the administrative procedure through which the buyer specifies the characteristics of the
products to buy from the seller, the type and quantity of fabric needed for manufacturing
the order and, in the majority of the cases, the upstream firm that will supply the fabric.
5Clearly, the two mechanisms can operate at the same time, driven by different dynamics behind
them.
6The imports intensity variable is constructed as the ratio of weight of all imported fabric over
the weight of the exported garments, considering only the orders for which inputs and outputs were
successfully matched and at least some fabric was imported. See D for details on the matching process.
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Unconditional counts of partnerships at the seller level also support the (almost) exclu-
sive dealing picture: sellers trade with at most one large buyer at a time in the median,
with the average number of large buyers per seller-season being 1.2 7. Further explo-
rations show that if we consider a simple break-up of a buyer-seller relation to be the
end of trade flows between parties, in 65% of the cases, the seller is observed starting a
new relationship with another large buyer within 120 days of the break-up 8.
Beyond the first year of the relationship, survival patterns follow the general description
above: The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates in graph C.16 (Appendix C) show that,
after the relationship moves onto a second year, the probability of break-up decreases
slowly with each year of partnership 9. Plots of these functions dividing the relationships
according to the type of buyer are also informative. Graph C.17 shows that the survival
profile of higher end specialised mass retailers, like H&M and GAP, looks similar to
what is observed in high street and higher end brands or brands conglomerates, like
Vanheusen, Levis and VF. Lower end specialised retailers, such as Primark and C&A,
exhibit survival patterns closer to those of non-specialised buyers (Walmart, Tesco, Asda,
Carrefour). Log-rank tests support this evidence and, overall, are compatible with buyers
located in the high-volume / lower-quality end of the spectrum having a higher rotation
of suppliers.
Table C.68 below presents the results from fitting Cox survival models on the duration
of relations. The equation for the hazard of break-up of a relation at time t, follows the
proportional hazard structure:
h(t)ij = h0(t)exp(δk;ij + τ0;ij + θi + ψj +Xijtβ) (C.2)
Again, i and j denote buyers and sellers respectively. δk;ij is a fixed effect for the
main product, indexed by k, for the pair ij, τ0;ij designates a fixed effect for the cohort
of the relation and θi and ψj are buyer- and seller- specific dummies
10. Clearly, each
specification runs over different subsets of these fixed effects and not all of them. Finally
X contains regression at the player or pair level, varying or invariant with respect to t.
7Time here was defined as a quarter and alternative explorations were done using 5 and 6 seasons
per year, with marginal qualitative differences in the statements here.
8For the definition of a simple break-up I exclude cases in which the break up coincides with the exit
of the seller from the panel. For the purpose of these counts, a relation is said to end if the relationship
is not censored above -more on this in this section- and if there are no more shipments between the
parties for at least 548 days (1.5 years). Alternative explorations were done with cutoffs in 1, 2 and 3
years, with no substantive differences in the results presented here.
9Alternative estimated Nelson-Aalen survival rates are presented in graph C.18.
10Note in the results table that some specifications interact these, as τ0;ij × θi, for example.
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Parametric alternatives using an exponential distribution are included in table C.47 in
appendix C and the results coincide with those presented here 11. Censoring above and
below are accounted for and the duration variable is constructed as 365 days intervals
from the first occurrence of trade. Cohort years correspond to the first year of trade
and failure in a relationship is identified when trade stops for more than 365 consecutive
days, within the censoring-free panel 12. Fixed effects for the main product traded in
the relation, the cohort of the relation, the buyers, interactions of these and cohorts and
the sellers are introduced in turn in each of the specifications below. Across all of them,
the shifters for low-end specialised retailers and non-specialized mass retailers exhibit a
higher hazard ratio relative to higher-end specialised firms, which in turn, don’t induce
a risk of failure significantly different from that of brands 13. It can also be observed
that, after controlling for the traded product, higher average prices in the relationship
induce lower hazard ratios. Looking at the price in the first order the buyer places with
the seller, the conditional rate of failure of the relationships decreases by 0.19 (up to
0.27, depending on the specification) with 1% increases in the price of the starting order.
However, when seller fixed effects are allowed for (last two columns of the table), the
rate of failure doesn’t seem to change with prices.
Traded volumes, either aggregating over each year of relation or isolating the volume
of the first order, doesn’t seem to predict significant differences in the hazard ratios,
once seasonal intensity is taken into account14. Pairs that interact over a higher number
of quarters or seasons in the year, are overall less likely to see their relationship ending
conditional on having survived thus far. Alternatives specifications including the number
of products traded rendered the similar results, with rates of failure approximately
0.45 points lower for every additional quarter (or season) of interaction. Introducing
manufacturer fixed effects brings the hazard ratio even further down, showing rates of
failure that are now 0.6 lower. Survival, then, seems to be positive related to the number
of quarters in the year the pair actively interacts, in other words, the continuity of the
relationship, rather than the traded volume or the diversification over different products.
Finally, across all specifications, the seller starting a new relation with another large
buyer within the year increases the hazard rate of breaking down the existing relation
by at least 0.16. When attention is restricted to new relations with specialised retailers
(in column (7) of table C.68), the impact is even larger reaching 0.6. The last two
11We omit here a discussion on the proportional hazards assumption and present in the Appendix
an alternative parametric estimation with accelerated failure times. Given the descriptive nature of our
exploration, further testing of these assumptions are not presented here.Weibull and loglog parametric
structures were also evaluated rendering virtually the same results.
12All relations still active within the last 365 days before the end of our panel are considered potentially
censored.
13Note that in the table, coefficients instead of hazard ratios are shown.
14This evidence difference to what is observed in Eaton et al. (2008) when studying relations between
Colombian and US firms.
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columns in the table show that when controlling for seller-specific shifters, the rate of
failure of existing relations when starting new relations with large buyers is considerably
larger. In terms of probabilities, the estimated coefficients imply that new relations
induce a probability of breaking up with current buyers approximately 0.71 higher when
the current buyer is specialised and 0.64 when it is a non-specialised buyer 15.
Then, these descriptive survival regressions suggest that beyond the first year of relation,
the duration of buyer-seller relations is related to firm-specific characteristics, potentially
reflected in the prices agreed for the orders, the continuity of the relation in terms of
how persistent over seasons trade is and, critically, whether the seller starts trading with
another large buyer.
15Column (8) runs over the relationships with specialized buyers of all types and column (9) includes
relations with non-specialized retailers only.
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C.5.2 The Evolution of Buyer - Seller Relations
Over the course of the years in our panel, large buyers show, on average, a positive
inter-annual growth when both traded volumes and values are examined. Growth rates
are specially high for retailers that were considerably small in 2005, like Next, VF,
Vanheusen and C&A. Of the more established retailers, H&M and GAP, with large
starting volumes also grow fast over the course of the panel. Except from the take-
off cases (Next, VF, C&A), large buyers don’t seem to change significantly the overall
number of suppliers they deal with. New relations balance out with end of relations
giving a very mild change in the count of active suppliers per large buyer across years.
A similar pattern is observed in the number of products the buyer supplies: except for
the new-comers mentioned above, the buyers purchase a very similar basket of products
over the period under analysis. However, with the exception of GAP, Levis and Tesco,
the size of the median and average orders placed by the buyers grow over the years on
average, as well as the total number of orders placed each year. This seems to describe a
sourcing strategy in which, once established, large buyers don’t expand the size of their
base of suppliers but they grow by intensifying their trade (volumes and / or counts of
orders) with existing suppliers, which might change over time.
In this context, we proceed to analyse general time trends within buyer - seller rela-
tionships. The (very) simple panel regressions below evaluate the existence of linear
and quadratic time trends -t and t2- in the evolution of relevant aspects of the relation-
ships, allowing for buyer - seller specific intercepts (αij), seasonal corrections (ιt) and,
importantly, introducing shifters of the trends for each type of large buyer (identified
by dummies dl with l = 1 . . . L and L = 4, making non-large buyers the base category).
For different outcome variables y:
yijt = α+ αij + (γat+ γbt
2)× (1 +
L∑
l=1
γldl) + ιt + ijt (C.3)
Table C.69 shows that, controlling for individual starting points, all relations grow over
time, showing a significant upward trend in the regression of traded volumes, with a
small negative significant squared effect (column (2)). Relative to relations with small
buyers, those that involve specialised retailers of any type (higher end, lower end or
brands) show a significantly steeper linear trend. Turning the attention to column
(3), while average prices in relations with small buyers exhibit a positive trend, those
with the large buyers - excluding brands - show slower or no upward trend at all when
transactions are aggregated at the quarter level. Altogether, except for the relations with
non specialised mass retailers, the growth in volumes seem to overcome the stagnation
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of prices and overall traded values grow significantly quicker over time in relations with
large buyers, relative to those with smaller players (column (1)).
An alternative specification presented in table C.48 in Appendix C introduces interac-
tions with dummies identifying ’new-comers’, defined as the set of large buyers that are
relatively small at the beginning of the panel and that exhibit rapid growth over the first
few years. It can be observe that the relations with these large buyers show a very small
positive trend and a highly significant positive quadratic trend in the series of traded
volumes, showing the acceleration picture described above.
In terms of diversification patterns, the share of the main product within the relationship
shows a small negative trend, while the number of traded products go up over time, for
all types of buyers. This pattern is more pronounced for both types (high end and low
end) of specialised mass retailers. It is known that high end brands (Levis, VF, etc.)
purchase a relatively stable basket of products while non-specialised mass retailers tend
to focus only in the subset of products that are relatively more commoditized, such as
cotton based basic items, with no fibre mixes. This behaviour restricts the diversification
patterns of these two groups of large buyers to what is observed in non-large retailers.
In Table C.70, we can see that the upward trend in volumes is accompanied by a positive
slope in the count of orders placed by the buyer to the seller, for all types of buyers
(column (1)). Notably, a steeper evolution is observed for all specialised large players
and a sharper negative quadratic effect is also detected in all cases but that of higher
end specialised mass retailers. Complementary regressions included in Appendix C show
that when averages over orders placed in each quarter are taken, within the relationship
the increase in volumes observed in C.69 doesn’t seem to be driven by larger orders but
by an increase in the number of allocated orders (C.60).
Columns (2) to (5) in this table focus on the evolution of input procurement within the
relation. Focusing first on the last column, we observe that the imports intensity, defined
here as the ratio between the volume of fabric imported to produce for the corresponding
buyer and the volume of garments (output) shipped to that buyer, doesn’t exhibit a
significant trend for small buyers, brands and non-specialised retailers 16. However, the
imports intensity in relations with specialised mass retailers exhibit a strong upward
trend. In the context of growing export volumes (column (2) table C.69 described
above), this implies that the volume of imported fabric needs to be growing ’quicker’
17. Column (3) in the table shows that the volume of imported fabric tends to increase
16Recall that buyer - seller intercepts are allowed for, so the lack of a trend in relations with large
buyers such as brands might be explained by an already above-average imports intensity at the beginning
of the relationship.
17Note that the observations on which C.70 runs add up to a subset of those in C.69, as (i) some
relations will use no imported inputs at all and (ii) we have discarded the relations for which we didn’t
manage to secure a trustworthy import - output matching, as explained in Appendix D.
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over time within the relationship with buyers of any size, but the time trend is steeper
in relations with large specialized retailers of any type. Opposite to the evolution in
volumes, the unit price of imported fabric (column (4)) present a flatter trend in the
case of large buyers, and this evidence in re-visited in the next subsection 18.
18The regressions commented here were also run splitting the sample according to the type of buyer
as shown in tables C.50 to C.59 in Appendix C. These were used to perform F-tests over the relevant
coefficients, supporting the characterisation offered here.
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Appendix D
Matching Inputs and Outputs
One of the most interesting aspects of our datasets is that they allow for the matching
of exports and imports at various levels of specificity. The most disaggregated one,
involves matching imports and exports for a given order, placed by one buyer to a given
manufacturer and this will be possible in a sub-sample of our data. At the other end of
the spectrum, imports and exports can be matched broadly for each firm (manufacturer)
in a given time period. Within these two extremes, we can perform different matching
protocols.
What follows is mainly concerned with the matching procedure at the order level. I first
explain the administrative device that allows for these matches and I then describe how
this is expressed in our datasets. Then, I explain the procedures we followed to clean the
relavant variables in the dataset to perform the matching. I finally compare alternative
matching procedures and explain a number of refinements that we have gone through.
D.1 The Utilisation Declaration Procedure
Broadly speaking, the Ready Made Garment sector in Bangladesh relies heavily on im-
ported inputs. This is even more the case for woven garments, where the local production
of suitable fabrics and input materials is still negligible. For this reason, imported inputs
for the production and exports of clothing are given preferential treatment by Customs
(for details, see Thomas’s section in (De Wulf and Sokol, 2005)). First, in order to help
reduce the lead time in export orders in the garment sector, the clearance of textiles
and other garment-relevant inputs is done within two days whenever possible, much
quicker than the up to seven days for other imports. Second, manufacturers can estab-
lish bonded warehouses to facilitate the import, storage during clearance and transit of
inputs, including fabrics, accessories, dyes and chemicals and yarn.
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The most commonly used Customs Procedure in garment exploits what is called the
Special bonded warehouse (SBW) facility. In practice, raw materials used in the pro-
duction of RMG export orders are imported duty-free into SBWs, manufactured into
finished articles of clothing, and exported.
In the data we obtained from the Bond Commission, we identify 5,811 Bond Licences1,
out of which almost 5,000 were active in 2012, with the rest having been suspended,
canceled or closed. The universe of licences we observe are matched to 5,377 firms in
our dataset, identified by BINs2. Of the licences that correspond to garment exporters
or related importers of raw materials (more on this later), 64% are associated to SBWs,
18% to Private Bonded Warehouses (PBW), 2% to EPZ Warehousing and the remainder
has no specified type, as far as we could classify. These correspond to older licences (some
of which are no longer active), opened during the nineties, when the Licence Number
included no code identifying the type of facility. Restricting the attention to those
GBO codes that correspond to garment firms, 80% of the licences are SBWs. The vast
majority of the SBWs are located in the Chittagong port area, with Dhaka being the
second location in importance.
In simple terms, to take advantage of the tax exemption, a firm holding a Bond Licence,
after receiving an order from a buyer, opens - if needed - a Letter of Credit in the man-
ufacturer’s bank (in occasions, this will be a back-to-back Letter of Credit). To produce
for that order, the manufacturer is allowed to import raw materials duty-free for a value
equivalent to up-to 75% of the value of the export order. In every import shipment
under the umbrella of that order, the manufacturers declares a Utilization Declaration
(UD) number, issued by the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturing and Export Associa-
tion (BGMEA) or corresponding alternative association and the specifics of the import
transaction are recorded in the bonder’s and customs’ passbooks, which act as a record
of stock going into the SBW. This procedure takes place with every import shipment
within the relevant order or UD. Likewise, every export shipment that corresponds to
the UD, is recorded under the same UD number for clearance. The customs moderniza-
tion project that started in 1999, introduced an electronic tracking system of the goods
in the SBWs facility, enabling both bonders and Custom Stations to retrieve accounts
on flows into any individual SBW to reconcile this with physical movements of inputs
and outputs, without relying on passbooks.
1This document is required for the access to any type of Bonded warehouse. Moreover, each licence
includes the specific codes the licence holder is allowed to import and any additions follow a specific
request of permission from Bond, with support from the relevant Industry Association.
2The almost 500 licenses we don’t match with our data can correspond to EPZ firms in other sectors
or textile companies that are not exporting garment. A quick exploration of the firms names, show
textiles and packaging as the most common activities of the licence holders that are not in garment.
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The evaluation of the suitability of the exception is almost entirely down to the industry
Association, after the Duty Drawback Authority outsourced this activity. The key role
of the Association is to control that the input-output coefficients implied in the proposed
Utilisation Declaration is adequate, to restrict abuses to the system. It is expected that
the ASYCUDA++ system internalises in the future the UD formula for calculating the
coefficients of utilization of raw materials to finished articles, to automatically track the
goods flow. At the moment, the ex-post control is done in the clearance stage.
The UD document contains all the information needed for calculating the input-output
coefficients and for their evaluation in the Association. The main body of the UD
specifies the characteristics of each item in the order (size, style, etc.), the destination
country, the quantity and the unit value. For each of these items, there is a chart that
specifies the inputs (fabrics and accessories) required, whether imported or domestically
supplied, including its value and characteristics and, in most of the cases, the firms that
are going to supply these inputs. Based on this, the BGMEA experts assess the output-
input consistency and approve the order or recommends amendments. The second part
of the UD contains information on the LCs and local inputs. First the number and
date of the Export LC opened against the corresponding order is shown, with its value
and the estimated shipping date. Second, the LCs for imported inputs are described,
showing the country, LC number, date and value, per LC. Third the LC for local inputs
are listed. The third part of the UD contains a detailed description of the items in the
order: description of the garment, quantity, measures per size for the whole size chart.
Then, a table presented all the required inputs, shows the imported inputs separated
from domestically sourced items and each of these are divided into fabrics and yarn on
one hand and accessories on the other. Within each of these categories (for example,
imported fabrics or domestic yarn), per item in the order of the UD, there is a description
of the input required, the total quantity and the input requirement per unit-piece of
garment in that item (fabrics only), together with the supplier’s name, address and
country (if appropriate).
UDs constitute the main document that allows firms to claim for the duty exception,
and are issued at the discretion of the Association. BGMEA gathers the majority of
the garment exporters. Exporters of knitwear only, can alternatively obtain their UDs
through the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA).
Garment manufacturers based in Export Processing Zones follow a similar procedure
under the EPZ Association (BEPZA), to access EPZ Warehouses. A manufacturer can
submit a UD application only if it is a regular member of the Association and non-
members need to register before applying. BGMEA members pay a fee of 450 to 650
BDTk (slow or fast track) per application they submit. This Association receives around
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500 UDs a day (plus 300 amendments), and takes from hours to a couple of days to have
the process finished.
To the UD application, the manufacturer needs to attach a number of documents col-
lected in a Scrutiny Sheet. This contains the date of submission and corresponding port,
the name of the firm, the BIcode (unique identifier for the firm given by BGMEA or
BKMEA), the Bond licence number, the associated UD number and the name of the
buyer that placed the original order. The UD number will in general follow the struc-
ture BGMEA / DHK / YY / XXXX / ZZ. BGMEA corresponds to the Association
issuing the UD. Alternatively, it can read BKMEA. The second part, DHK, corresponds
to Dhaka, and can alternatively be CH for the Chittagong Office. YY corresponds to
the year of submission (and must coincide with the date of submission in the header).
XXXX is the BIcode that BGMEA assigns. BKMEA has its own system of codes and
the two institutions have completely separated numbering systems. For this reason,
the same XXXX in two UDs can be identifying two different firms, one registered with
BKMEA and the other one with BGMEA. ZZ corresponds to the number of UDs the
firm has placed in year YY. The first UD that the firm submits in the year will take ZZ
= 01, the next one will be 02, and so on.
Given the above, a given UD number to be quoted in imports and exports under an order
uniquely identifies all the transactions associated to that specific order. Then, all the
export shipments and imports of inputs that correspond to an order placed from a buyer
to a manufacturer are (in principle) recorded in the corresponding Customs Station with
its UD number and this is the administrative device that allows for matching imported
inputs to outputs, at the order level.
D.2 The Records in our Dataset and the Cleaning Proce-
dure
The UD number that would allow for the input-to-output matchings at the order level
as described above, is recorded in every custom office with various levels of detail and
coding problems. In general, the issuing association is not recorded and only the numeric
components of the UD number are present. This was potentially problematic in two
ways. First, due to the fact that BKMEA and BGMEA do not coordinate the assignment
of codes to firms, the first concern was that a given code could refer to two different
firms, as explained above. Second, firms in Export Processing Zones, exporting through
custom stations 101/1073 (DEPZ) and 303 (CHEPZ), have their UDs issued by BEPZA.
Although the BEPZA numbers have a slightly different structure from that of the UDs,
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coding mistakes in the Export Procedure in non-EPZ-dedicated Offices could induce
incorrect extractions of the UD numbers.
Issuing institution aside, we detected a lot of variation across Custom Offices on what
they record in the UD field. In many cases not all the numeric components of the UD
are included. An additional complication was that the order in which these components
show might differed across records, making any simple extraction routine unsuitable.
Other problems we encountered were associated with relevant numbers different from
the UD number, but with similar structures (like dates, Bond Licence Numbers, Export /
Import Permission Numbers) being coded by mistake in the UD field. Because in theory
a UD can cross over different Custom Stations, differences in data entry protocols across
Offices can also induce problems in the matching. We recognise that across-offices UDs
are not very common, but this was still one of the concerns when writing our matching
routine.
Finally, the field recording the UD number being a very flexible string space, various
sorts of data-entry typos and mistakes were found.
In this context, the first challenge to merge the datasets was to extract the components
from the string that identify a UD. These are: the year in which the UD is issued,
the code for the exporter given by the issuing Association and the order number. After
clearing the main string from strange characters, the transactions were split into Custom
Offices and Extended Procedures combinations, to identify common patterns of record-
ing the information. In occasions, breakdowns over time (years) were also necessary.
For each sub-group, the main string was split into components using the most common
parsing characters (”/” or space). This gave 1 to 10 components for each string. Then
according to the observed patterns, the three components of the UD number were ex-
tracted following a protocol that was in most cases specific to the year, Procedure and
Custom Office combination. The code implementing these extractions on the Imports
Data and the Exports Data is extense and available upon request.
The result of that initial procedure was a first version of the cleaned UD numbers. A
number of robustness checks, imputations and corrections were performed both on the
imports and exports sides of the data. For the purpose of the description of these steps,
we focus below on the exports side, which for various reasons was more complicated
than the imports side.
Of all the observations in the exports dataset from 2005 onwards (3, 059, 844), 13%
contain a missing value in the field collecting the UD number. Out of the non-missing
lines of the whole of the data) we managed to recover a proper UD number for the vast
majority of the observations (86%). The cleaned UD numbers are correctly distributed
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over Custom Offices, with 92.7% of these falling in the non-EPZ Chittagong Offices,
7% in Dhaka under non-EPZ Procedures and the remaining lines (6 cases) found in
EPZ Stations. Similarly, over Ectended Procedures, we corroborated that 97.7% of the
cleaned lines fall under the code that corresponds to the use of SBW, and the rest were
distributed over Procedures associated to re-exports or direct exports.
The second stage of the cleaning procedure involved the following amendments and
robustness checks3.
Items within the same transaction: Two different products within the same
transaction should belong to the same UD. As items in the same transaction record are
associated to one invoice (pro-forma and final) they need to correspond to the same
UD. Therefore, we first explore the lines in the export dataset whose UD information is
missing but that belong to a shipment where at least one item has a proper record for
the UD number. There are 27, 858 cases under this category. In these cases, we impute
the UD number of the line with UD record to all the lines in the shipment with missing
information. This is one of the imputations that was not carried out on the imports side
of the data, as the unique UD per transaction does not necessarily hold.
Different UD numbers within the same transaction: Similarly, it cannot be the
case that within the same transaction, two different UD numbers are quoted. We have
only 52 cases in which this happens and the discrepancy between UD numbers can be
in one or many of the components of the UD identifier, i.e. the exporter code, the order
number or the year. Discrepancies in the exporter code are solved in the following steps.
Discrepancies in the year are often due to coding errors and were manually corrected.
As a general rule, we make the decision of keeping, for the whole transaction, the earliest
recorded year as the year of the UD. When this is not possible, we keep the year closes
to that in which the transaction takes place.
Exporter Codes for BGMEA firms: Approximately 62% of the firms for which we
managed to obtain at least one ’clean’ UD record are present also in our complementary
BGMEA dataset. The rest of the firms with UDs could be under the BKMEA orbit
or might be exporting with a BIN code different to the one used to register with the
Association. In fact, the vast majority of the export trasactions that didn’t produce a
match with the BGMEA data are classified into HS codes that fall in knitwear categories.
We use the list of firm identifiers and BGMEA internal codes to check the exporter
code component of the UD numbers. For more than 92% of the sellers present in both
3Again, all .do files are available upon request.
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datasets, the exporter code recovered in our routine coincides with the internal code that
BGMEA provided us with. This, in turn, implies that less than 9% of the transactions
have an exporter code in the UD that doesn’t coincide with the BGMEA internal code.
The majority of these cases were connected to data entry problems (lack of parsing
characters separating the components of the UD numbers, miscoding, etc.) and they
were amended appropriately. In the case of a handful of sellers, the same BIN code seems
to be exporting using a firm identifier in the UD coinciding with the BGMEA code and
one or more additional codes that are observed systematically. Four of these companies
were found to have two different codes assigned within BGMEA, corresponding, probably
to two different business units. These were left unchanged.
In all the remaining cases in which the BGMEA internal code didn’t coincide with the
firm identifier in the UD that were not solved as explained above, were evaluated case
by case. If no data coding problems were observed, the UD number was left unchanged,
despite the incongruence with the BGMEA record. The exports transactions associated
to these cases were mainly in knitwear categories, suggesting that these were likely to
be BKMEA firms as well. All changes were done preserving the UDs that, unchanged
would generate a match on the imports dataset.
Different Exporter Codes for the same seller: As mentioned above, because
a manufacturer can very often use a sister company (or a specific division within the
company) to open the UD process within BGMEA, many sellers, as identified by their
BIN code, can have different exporter codes in the UDs. Therefore, it is not problematic
to observe the firm-specific component of the UD varying for the same seller. However,
around 5% of the sellers (not only associated with BGMEA now) show multiple exporter
codes in their UDs that vary in a ’suspicious’ way (consecutive numbers over time, is
the most common pattern or codes that seem to relate to different containers in the
shipment). Those cases, are corrected using the BGMEA codes as described above
when appropriate and using the codes on the import dataset, whenever possible. If none
of these produce a set of UD numbers consistent for the seller, the information in the
UD field is discarded.
Different buyers within the same UD: As each UD is opened against a buyer’s
order, theoretically it cannot be the case that a given UD has two different buyers.
There were a number of UDs under the names of more than one buyer (19% of all
transactions with identified UDs). The vast majority of these, corresponded to orders in
which both a retailer and a trader or a logistic company showed as the buying company.
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Those cases were corrected substituting the identity of the trader for that of the retailer
(for the purpose of the matching only). The main exception to this imputation was in
the case where the trade shows in more than 50% of the transactions within the UD.
After these corrections, almost 97% of the UDs have a unique buyer. The rest of the
UDs, then involving more than one buyer were removed from the analysis (flagged as
non-valid UDs), as it was hard to distinguish cases of data entry error in the name of
the buyer of cases of data entry error in the UD number.
Non licensed firms: Using the Bond Licences data, we explored whether lines for
which we had cleaned UDs corresponded to firms (BINs) that had a valid Bond Licence.
The type of mistakes we wanted to rule out was the cleaning of UD numbers for the
original string for cases in which the procedure was miss-coded and the firm was not
bonded. Fortunately, we found no cases of this type.
Cases where a date is available: In occasions, the original string would include
a date, that is presumably related to the date in which the UD procedure was opened
or the date of approval of the last amendment. Whenever possible, the year extracted
as part of the UD number was checked against the recorded date. A handful of year
mis-imputations were corrected.
Two-components matchings: There were cases in which the only two components
were extractable from the original string. In most of the cases, the missing component
was the order number. Some of these missings were originated in cases the information
was not present in the original string and some others corresponded to lines in which
many of the extracted substrings could constitute the order number (often, when amend-
ment numbers or dates were attached to the UD number). These cases were merged
using only the two available components with the imports dataset to evaluate whether
any of the orders on the imports side, for the same year and exporter, could inform the
third component of the UD number. Where the matches were unique, this is the year
and exporter on the imports side had only one order to match with on the export side,
the order number was imputed if three conditions were satisfied: (i) the weight ratio
of input to output was within product-specific reasonable bounds; (ii) the material of
the inputs was not at odds with the output (i.e. synthetic fabric is not imported to
produce pure cotton shirts) and (iii) the time window of the exports and imports fall
within a quarter. In the cases where more than one match was produced and there were
candidate substrings extracted from the original string on the exports side, scanning
the candidate substring with the potential orders rendered a unique choice of number
to impute as order.
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These amendments had little impact in the overall matching but helped guarantee that
there are no major omissions in the the datasets that we used for work on matched data,
due to failing to march export lines4.
Consistency at the Buyer-Seller-Product level: Due to the initial condition of
the variable that records the UD number and the various cleaning routines we performed
to recover the codes we need for the matching, one of our concerns was to have isolated
lines - an item in a transaction - associated to a UD that we were not able to recover from
the original variable. If that was the case, when computing statistics at the level of the
order from a buyer to a seller, we would not be accounting for some of the transactions
within that order.
For this reason, we explored the set of transactions for which we were not able to recover
the UD number. We first assumed that whenever the original variable collecting UD
numbers was missing, the transaction was not associated to any UD at all. This is
consistent with what we observe in the data (missings in the relevant variable coincide
with Custom Offices were no UDs are used or with -almost- one off transactions in a
buyer-seller pair) and with the conversations we had with the technicians at the National
Board of Revenue. Then, the lines subject to the risk we refer to above were those for
which there was non-missing information in the relevant variable, but for which we still
didn’t manage to clean a UD number.
Aggregating the transactions at the buyer-seller-product level, we first explored the
proportion of transactions that having non-missing information in the UD field didn’t
have a proper UD number. The ratio of transactions with uncleaned UDs to all the
4In the whole of the exports dataset, there were 1.2 lines that didn’t produce any match via UD
numbers with imports. For these lines, a two-part matching was attempted, just using coincidences
in the year and firm ID components of the UD number. From this matching procedure, 65% of the
unmatched lines remained unmatched, meaning that the firm ID and year combination didn’t have a
match on the imports. Of these unmatched lines, we found that: (i) the vast majority of the unmatched
lines have either of the two components of the UD number missing, and of these, 20% fall outside of the
selected product categories, another 10% corresponds to lines that either belong to unsuitable sellers
as defined belong or belong to Dhaka and the rest of the unmatched UDs with at least one component
missing, are 99% of the time in the group of lines in which the original string for UD extraction is fully
missing or the data in it has a format that suggests a document that is NOT a UD. (ii) 13% corresponds
to cases in which none of the year and ID component of the UD are missing and still, a match was not
found; of these, 95.5% of the cases fall into cases of: Dhaka custom offices, UD outside the set of selected
categories, seller is unsuitable, no information present in the original string or the information the string
is likely correspond to a procedure different from the UD. This implied that little improvement is possible
over the lines that were not matched two-piece-wise. Therefore, we focussed only on the 35% of the
lines that didn’t have three-piece matches but that formed at least one match in the two-piece procedure
(with no missings in any of the two matching components). Out of these, 20% of the lines correspond
to selected product categories (88 thousand approximately), of which only 78,317 were outside Dhaka.
Out of these, 68,139 corresponded to “suitable” sellers and finally, only 46,919 were uncensored. As a
result, only 3.6% of the overall unmatched exports was material we could work with to improve upon
the matching.
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transactions with non-missing data is zero almost everywhere for all the buyer-seller-
product triplets. Less than 12% of these triplets have a non-zero ratio and the vast
majority of these, have a ratio equal to 1, meaning that for that specific buyer-seller-
product triplet no information (on any transaction) was recovered at all from the UD
fields. These are largely explained by the firms that operate in Export Processing Zones
and export through normal custom offices (under the EPZ procedure), and that record
a BEPZA number in the UD field.
For robustness, all the ratios that were strictly greater than zero and strictly smaller
than one, led to the following robustness check. For each buyer-seller pair we ordered
all the exports in each product, chronologically. For every transaction with no UD we
explored whether the buyer-seller pair had a valid UD featuring the same product, active
in a reasonable time-window with respect to the transaction with no UD. We studied
this using five different time windows: a) a fixed window of 30 days; b) a window equal to
the average gap between transactions in the candidate UD; c) same as b but allowing for
one standard deviation from the mean; d) a window equal to the average gap taken over
all the transactions between the buyer and the seller on that product; e) same as d but
allowing from one standard deviation from the mean. Although this procedure would
have induced some imputations of isolated transactions into clean UDs, we decided not
to perform these corrections as miss-imputation carried the potential risk of introducing
noise in genuinely clean and complete orders. The 4% of the buyer-seller-products for
which the ratio of uncleaned UDs to all UDs is left unchanged.
D.3 The Matching Procedure
After having performed the cleaning procedures detailed above, using the three com-
ponents of the UD numbers on one and other side of the data, the matching can be
performed with different levels of conservativeness: (i) attempting matches using every
UD that was extracted and cleaned; (ii) using the UDs that fall in the ’right’ Extended
Procedures and Custom Offices; (iii) using the UDs that were cleaned without any ’for-
mat challenges’, meaning that little or no manipulation in the order of the string and
with missing components were needed 5.
5In practice, on the imports side, this implies imposing a cutoff on the proportion of lines that were
cleaned with manipulations.
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Table D.1: Performance of Different Matching Combinations
6 Export Side Import Side Number of UDs
(Exports)
Number of
matched UDs
%
A (i) (i) 256,945 131,172 51.05%
B (ii) (ii) 254,867 130,777 51.31%
C (iii) (iii) 222,366 47,506 21.36%
D (ii)+(iii) (ii)+(iii) 220,430 47,361 21.49%7
E (ii)+(iii) (i) 220,430 124,656 56.55%
Table D.2: Matching Performance in terms of Volume of Exports
Standard Volume of Exports Matched8
A 61.5%
B 61.1%
C 16.5%
D 16.0%
E 56.2%
As a robustness check, we computed the ratio between the weight of the imported fabric
and the weight of the exported garment, within the UD. Excluding the ratios that are
below 0.01 and winsorizing the ratios at 3.5, the histograms of ratios for the different
matching alternatives look as follows:
Figure D.1: Fabric to Output Ratios, Matching Comparisons
Note: UDs with ratios below 0.01 are not included. Ratios are winsorized at 3.5. A point in the histogram represents
a UD.
For completeness, the table below shows the distribution of the weight of imports over
input categories9 for all the UDs that have information on the imports side and those
that are matched under criterion A.
9See corresponding Appendix for a mapping from HS nomenclature to this classification.
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Table D.3: Imports of different inputs, as percentages of all imports in UDs
Percentages
Type of Input All UDs Matched UDs
Fabric 61.57 63.10
Yarn 26.75 25.71
Accessories 5.94 6.05
Unclassified 4.16 3.64
Other Raw Materials 0.52 0.49
Parts 0.30 0.31
Packaging 0.24 0.23
Office Resources 0.18 0.17
Fibres 0.14 0.13
Thread 0.12 0.12
Waste 0.07 0.06
Garment 0.00 0.00
100 100
The distribution of ratios and the success of the matching can be partly attributed
to specificities of the production process in different product categories. The following
graphs show the performance of the matching, in terms of share of the exports matched
under criterion A, within each product at the 4th digit of aggregation. The graphs also
include the share of each product in the relevant subcategory (knitwear or woven).
Figure D.2: Matching Performance over Different Product Categories
Note: Criterion A for the matching was used.
The above graphs suggest looking at the distribution of weights by product category more
in detail. As orders can involve more than one product category, for the descriptives
below I use only single-product UDs. Given that in terms of weight ratios and margins,
the histograms above don’t show significant differences across matching standards, what
follows uses only alternative E. Ratio distributions correspond to fabric to output ratios
and are censored at 4. If the production of a given category does not usually require
imported inputs, low weight ratios (or zero) weight ratios are observed. This is likely to
be the case with most of the knitwear categories were domestic provision of basic inputs
(wool, cotton knitted fabrics, etc.) has developed to a reasonable standard upstream in
the textile subsector.
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Table D.4: Distribution of fabric-to-output weight ratios, per product category
Knitwear Product Categories
HS4 N Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
6101 20 0.66 0 0 0.81 1.1 1.27
6102 23 0.37 0 0 0 0.85 1.09
6103 829 0.65 0 0 0.65 1.04 1.33
6104 615 0.65 0 0 0.68 1.09 1.34
6105 1417 0.52 0 0 0.08 1 1.27
6106 541 0.77 0 0 0.78 1.24 1.63
6107 639 0.49 0 0 0.28 0.85 1.17
6108 1507 0.47 0 0 0.16 0.84 1.22
6109 6494 0.23 0 0 0 0.01 1.04
6110 17512 0.04 0 0 0 0 0
6111 190 0.63 0 0.09 0.6 0.99 1.18
6112 134 0.73 0 0.34 0.68 0.99 1.35
6113 9 1.01 0 0.96 1.09 1.3 1.91
6114 22 0.45 0 0 0.23 0.76 1.12
6115 100 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.13
6116 2 0.65 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.77 0.77
6117 3 0.84 0 0 0.56 1.95 1.95
Knitwear Product Categories
HS4 N Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
6201 241 0.74 0 0 0.51 1.11 2.02
6202 70 0.62 0 0 0.36 0.99 1.51
6203 19562 0.7 0 0.14 0.72 1.03 1.3
6204 7247 0.85 0 0.43 0.87 1.14 1.47
6205 15163 0.82 0.14 0.55 0.83 1.04 1.29
6206 2594 1.01 0.21 0.69 1 1.25 1.61
6207 320 0.86 0 0.53 0.88 1.13 1.41
6208 292 0.93 0 0.6 0.98 1.19 1.48
6209 309 0.75 0 0.47 0.81 1.04 1.2
6210 31 0.85 0 0.5 0.72 1.18 1.45
6211 378 0.79 0.15 0.5 0.76 1 1.33
6212 202 0.44 0 0 0.19 0.8 1.03
6213 1 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22
6214 2 0.54 0 0 0.54 1.08 1.08
6215 23 0.83 0.37 0.61 0.8 1.02 1.12
6216 21 0.81 0 0 0.51 1.14 2.4
Note: Only single product UDs were used. UDs matched with criterion A.
The ratios above confirm that knitwear categories tend to rely less on imported inputs.
In particular, the largest knitwear categories have median (and P75) weight ratios close
to zero. Excluding the cases for which there are only a few single-item UDs (corre-
sponding to the categories of handkerchiefs, ties, etc.), all the categories in woven seem
to have relatively high median ratios. This is markedly true for the largest categories,
which account for around 90% of all the woven exports (and around 48% of all garment
exports). The only woven sector that is of medium size and still exhibits low/disperse
ratios is 6212, which corresponds to brassieres, suspenders and other corsetieres, which
use, in general, little fabric and a lot of accessories (elastics, embroidered laces, etc.).
Keeping only the single-item UDs in the woven product categories between 6203 and
6211 and re-plotting the histograms for fabric to output weight ratios gives a distribution
with a much smaller spike in the lower tail:
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Figure D.3: Fabric to Output Weight Ratios, Single-Product UDs, Selected Cate-
gories
Note: UDs with ratios below 0.01 are not included. Ratios are winsorized at 3.5. A point in the histogram represents
a UD. Single-Product UDs are defined as those whoe output is classified within a unique HS category, at the 4th digit
if aggregation. Selected Categories refer to codes 6203, 6204, 6205, 6206, 6207, 6208, 6209, 6210, 6211.
Besides the product-specificities, other potential sources for low ratios (little imports)
and large margins could be connected to the characteristics of the manufacturer. It
has been corroborated in the data, that there are sellers that operate in EPZs using
alternative procedures, inducing outliers in the distribution of ratios for some of the
criteria we are evaluating. It was also found that even outside EP Zones, there are
manufacturers that never or almost never use the facility, and when they do so, the
intensity of imports is still very low, inducing a ticker low tail in the distribution of
ratios. Similarly, extreme ratios can be observed in UDs that are censored in our data
or that are likely to be missing information due to the restrictions in our raw databases.
For sample selection purposes, using BIN codes as firm identifiers, these manufacturers
are identified using the following cutoffs:
• EPZ manufacturers: manufacturers that have at least 75% of their exported values
channeled through EPZ Custom Offices or Procedures.
• Manufacturers not using the Facility: manufacturers that have at least 85% of their
exported values in transactions flagged as ’non-UD’ irrespective of the Custom
Office 10.
10Even within the relevant custom offices and procedures, there are cases in which the original string
from which the UD number was extracted contains information signalling no use of the facility. These
include, for instance, abbreviations referring to alternative procedures or Associations, exclusions of
specific lines within larger transactions associated with UDs, etc.
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• Manufacturers that don’t Import: manufacturers that have at least 70% of their
exporter values unmatched with any form of import.
Similar selection dummies were generated at the UD level:
• UDs in non-selected product categories: whenever less than 70% of the value of a
UD falls within the selected product categories 11.
• UDs belonging to unsuitable sellers: whenever the UD shows a unique BIN and
this corresponds to a firm that is either in the EPZ, is not using the facility or is
not an importer, all of these defined as above.
• UDs in Dhaka: due to the restrictions we have in our data, we want to identify
out those UDs that involve at least one transaction flowing via any of the Dhaka
custom offices.
• Potentially censored UD: we consider a UD potentially censored if the first trans-
action associated with it occurred within the last year of our panel.
• Early UD: do to the restrictions in our data, any UD that was open before 2005
could potentially be incomplete in our data.
The interaction of these criteria produce subsamples that will exhibit different matching
patterns. Different sets of selectors will be used for different purposes in this project.
D.4 Considerations around Coverage
The tables below show descriptives around coverage indicators for combinations of the
filters defined in the previous section and the of the main matching criteria discussed
above.
11Selected Categories refer to codes 6203, 6204, 6205, 6206, 6207, 6208, 6209, 6210, 6211.
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Table D.5: Coverage of UDs in the exported values in Woven subsector, proportions
Matching Criterion12
UD Filtering Matched
and Un-
matched
Matched
under A
Matched
under B
Matched
under E
1 All UDs 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.71
2 UDs with suitable sellers 0.98 0.69 0.69 0.69
3 UDs that are not censored 0.90 0.62 0.62 0.61
4 UDs that don’t belong to Dhaka 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.52
5 UDs in the selected products 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67
6 UDs that satisfy criteria 2 to 5 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.40
Table D.6: Coverage of UDs in the exported values in Garment sector, proportions
Matching Criterion
UD Filtering Matched
and Un-
matched
Matched
under A
Matched
under B
Matched
under E
1 All UDs 1.00 0.62 0.61 0.56
2 UDs with suitable sellers 0.94 0.56 0.56 0.55
3 UDs that are not censored 0.89 0.53 0.53 0.49
4 UDs that don’t belong to Dhaka 0.60 0.46 0.46 0.42
5 UDs in the selected products 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33
6 UDs that satisfy criteria 2 to 5 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20
Table D.7: Count of UDs
Matching Criterion13
UD Filtering Matched
and Un-
matched
Matched
under A
Matched
under B
Matched
under E
1 All UDs 256,945 131,172 130,777 124,656
2 UDs with suitable sellers 248,150 122,377 122,096 121,215
3 UDs that are not censored 216,904 110,720 110,406 105,517
4 UDs that don’t belong to Dhaka 215,525 105,260 105,069 99,560
5 UDs in the selected products 96,713 72,923 72,841 72,696
6 UDs that satisfy criteria 2 to 5 63,349 46,697 46,682 46,665
Table D.8: Count of Exporters Involved
Matching Criterion14
UD Filtering Matched
and Un-
matched
Matched
under A
Matched
under B
Matched
under E
1 All UDs 3,315 1,572 1,568 1,513
2 UDs with suitable sellers 3,311 1,427 1,422 1,420
3 UDs that are not censored 3,283 1,473 1,469 1,420
4 UDs that don’t belong to Dhaka 1,772 1,521 1,521 1,464
5 UDs in the selected products 1,401 1,221 1,220 1,175
6 UDs that satisfy criteria 2 to 5 1,259 1,051 1,051 1,046
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Table D.9: Count of Buyer-Seller Relations
Matching Criterion15
UD Filtering Matched
and Un-
matched
Matched
under A
Matched
under B
Matched
under E
1 All UDs 113,916 49,344 48,995 44,757
2 UDs with suitable sellers 111,914 44,107 43,809 43,247
3 UDs that are not censored 104,642 43,673 43,334 39,650
4 UDs that don’t belong to Dhaka 74,112 40,760 40,714 36,891
5 UDs in the selected products 33,273 25,869 25,754 24,904
6 UDs that satisfy criteria 2 to 5 23,249 17,448 17,444 17,369
Appendix E
The Sector, Institutions and
Relevant Policies
E.1 A Brief History of the Sector (before the start of our
panel)
The garment sector constitutes by far the largest manufacturing activity in Bangladesh.
For every year in our period of interest, garment has accounted for an average of 82% of
all the exports earnings of the country. By 2013, manufacturers in the sector (domesti-
cally owned, with less that 5% of foreign ownership) employed almost 5 million people,
mostly unskilled women. Overall, this accounted for more than 45% of the industrial
employment in the country, whose total population sums to 156 million people. With
main destinations in Europe and the United States, Bangladesh is the second largest
exporter in the world -only after China- of Ready Made Garment (RMG).
The origins of the sector go back to the Pakistani ruling over Bangladesh. Most of the
textile and related plants in East Pakistan were owned by investors in West Pakistan,
whose industrialisation was mainly based on imports substitution. After the indepen-
dence of Bangladesh in 1971, garment grew as the basis of an exports oriented indus-
trialisation, soon overtaking jute and tea in the country’s trade balance. In 1972, the
Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalization) Order (BIENO) took over most of
the privately owned firms to form the state-owned Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation
(BTMC). For the subsequent years, the majority of the spinning mills were controlled
by the government, although output declined slowly. After the big famine of 1974, the
industrialization model started shifting from its initial state-sponsored style to a private
sector led process. The first move in this direction was the New Industrial Policy (NPI),
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which restituted a large number of those assets (including textile mills) to their original
owners.
Starting in 1974, the Multi-fiber Agreement (MFA) in the North American markets
set quotas on garment trade for the industrializing Asian countries. Firms in quota-
restricted countries like South Korea, started restructuring seeking for partners or green-
field investments in quota-free countries. The most salient of the examples of these
practices in the early development of the RMG sector in Bangladesh was the joint ven-
ture established between the South Korean giant Daewoo with the local Desh Garments
Ltd., in December 1977. Only a year later 115 out of the 130 supervisors and managers
in Daewoo-Desh had set up their own garment export firms or joined newly formed
companies. From the early 1980s onwards, a number of economic reforms deepened
the exports-oriented nature of the sector, with direct incentives to exports and the de-
velopment of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in Dhaka and Chittagong (Rashid, 2000
CITE). The early nineties continued to stimulate RMG exports (Bhattacharya and Rah-
man, 2000; Khundker, 2002), and the garment sector grew at a compound rate of 15%
per year in this decade.
E.2 Relevant Policies in the Observed Period
The sources of information and further details for the table below are available on
request. In the interest of space, the columns are omitted from the table.
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it
e
m
s
to
In
d
ia
(s
e
e
n
o
te
s
fo
r
th
e
4
6
R
M
G
e
x
p
o
rt
it
e
m
s)
B
il
a
te
ra
l
In
d
ia
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
B
a
r-
ri
e
rs
to
T
ra
d
e
(T
B
T
)
U
k
ra
in
e
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
In
-
d
u
st
ri
a
l
P
o
li
c
y
o
f
U
k
ra
in
e
,
S
ta
te
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
o
f
U
k
ra
in
e
fo
r
In
d
u
st
ri
a
l
S
a
fe
ty
,
L
a
b
o
u
r
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
M
in
in
g
S
u
p
e
rv
is
io
n
,
S
ta
te
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
fo
r
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
R
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
a
n
d
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
o
li
c
y
(D
S
S
U
)
1
/
1
/
2
0
1
1
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
o
n
in
-
d
iv
id
u
a
l
m
e
a
n
s
T
B
T
o
n
H
S
6
1
0
1
,
6
1
0
2
,
6
1
1
6
,
6
2
0
1
-6
2
0
4
,
6
2
1
0
,
6
2
1
1
,
6
2
1
6
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
W
T
O
M
e
m
b
e
rs
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T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
B
a
r-
ri
e
rs
to
T
ra
d
e
(T
B
T
)
C
h
in
e
se
T
a
ip
e
i,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
A
ff
a
ir
s
8
/
1
/
2
0
1
0
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
is
o
n
1
st
o
f
A
u
-
g
u
st
2
0
1
0
.
T
h
e
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
is
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
h
e
a
lt
h
T
B
T
o
n
H
S
6
1
1
1
2
0
,
6
1
1
1
3
0
,
6
1
1
1
9
0
,
6
2
0
9
2
0
,
6
2
0
9
3
0
,
6
2
0
9
9
0
;
(B
)
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
o
f
h
e
a
lt
h
a
n
d
sa
fe
ty
o
f
b
a
b
ie
s
fr
o
m
b
a
b
ie
s
g
a
rm
e
n
ts
a
n
d
c
lo
th
in
g
a
c
c
e
ss
o
ri
e
s;
(C
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
c
o
n
su
m
e
r
p
ro
-
te
c
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
H
S
5
8
,
6
1
-6
3
,
a
n
d
9
4
(t
e
x
ti
le
s
to
w
e
ls
,
sw
e
a
te
rs
g
a
rm
e
n
ts
,
sw
im
w
e
a
r,
u
n
d
e
r-
w
e
a
r,
h
o
si
e
ry
,
b
e
d
d
in
g
);
(D
)
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
h
a
z
a
rd
o
u
s
su
b
st
a
n
c
e
s
in
te
x
ti
le
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
W
T
O
M
e
m
b
e
rs
C
h
in
a
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
C
h
in
a
7
/
1
/
2
0
1
0
O
n
g
o
in
g
C
h
in
a
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
t-
m
e
n
t
w
a
s
e
n
te
re
d
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
n
1
st
J
u
ly
2
0
1
0
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
4
0
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
D
u
ty
-f
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
fr
e
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
to
9
8
.7
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
a
ll
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
P
ro
-
m
o
ti
o
n
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
in
g
F
a
c
il
-
it
y
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
B
a
n
k
5
/
4
/
2
0
1
0
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
4
th
M
a
y
2
0
1
0
.
(A
)
E
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
fi
n
a
n
c
in
g
fo
r
in
-
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
su
c
h
a
s:
p
o
w
e
r
su
p
p
ly
,
b
ri
d
g
e
s,
p
o
rt
s,
c
o
n
ta
in
e
r
te
rm
in
a
ls
,
e
tc
.;
(B
)
D
e
m
o
n
-
st
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
n
d
b
u
si
n
e
ss
c
a
se
fo
r
P
u
b
li
c
-P
ri
v
a
te
P
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
,
a
n
d
b
u
il
d
in
g
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
o
f
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
a
g
e
n
c
ie
s
a
n
d
o
th
e
r
st
a
k
e
h
o
ld
e
rs
o
n
P
u
b
li
c
-P
ri
v
a
te
P
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
;
(C
)
S
u
p
p
o
rt
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
B
a
n
k
(B
B
)
in
e
x
-
p
a
n
si
o
n
o
f
sc
o
p
e
fu
n
d
in
g
to
c
re
a
te
jo
b
s
a
n
d
re
m
o
v
e
b
o
tt
le
n
e
c
k
s
in
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
g
ro
w
th
;
(D
)
L
e
n
d
in
g
o
f
U
S
D
4
7
.5
0
M
il
li
o
n
to
th
e
p
ro
je
c
t
to
a
d
d
1
7
8
M
W
o
f
e
le
c
tr
ic
it
y
g
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
c
a
-
p
a
c
it
y
to
th
e
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l
g
ri
d
o
f
D
h
a
k
a
E
x
-
p
o
rt
P
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
Z
o
n
e
a
n
d
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
E
x
p
o
rt
P
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
Z
o
n
e
,
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
fo
r
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l
e
le
c
tr
ic
it
y
g
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
;
(E
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
to
p
u
b
-
li
c
a
n
d
p
ri
v
a
te
fi
n
a
n
c
ie
rs
a
n
d
e
n
tr
e
p
re
n
e
u
rs
th
ro
u
g
h
P
P
P
tr
a
in
in
g
s
a
n
d
w
o
rk
sh
o
p
s
a
s
w
e
ll
a
s
in
it
ia
ti
v
e
s
fo
r
c
re
a
ti
o
n
o
f
in
fr
a
st
ru
c
-
tu
re
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
fu
n
d
s
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
B
a
r-
ri
e
rs
to
T
ra
d
e
(T
B
T
)
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
K
o
re
a
,
K
o
re
a
n
A
g
e
n
c
y
fo
r
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
a
n
d
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
s
(K
A
T
S
)
7
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
9
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
is
o
n
1
st
o
f
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
0
(A
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
h
e
a
lt
h
T
B
T
o
n
H
S
6
1
0
1
a
n
d
6
1
0
2
(p
e
rs
o
n
a
l
fl
o
ta
ti
o
n
d
e
v
ic
e
s)
;
(B
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
c
o
n
su
m
e
r
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
te
x
ti
le
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
fo
r
in
fa
n
ts
;
(C
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
sa
fe
ty
a
n
d
q
u
a
li
ty
la
b
e
li
n
g
o
f
te
x
ti
le
s
a
n
d
le
a
th
e
r
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
W
T
O
M
e
m
b
e
rs
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T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
B
a
r-
ri
e
rs
to
T
ra
d
e
(T
B
T
)
U
n
it
e
d
S
ta
te
s
o
f
A
m
e
ri
c
a
,
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ro
d
u
c
t
S
a
fe
ty
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
(C
P
S
C
)
5
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
7
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
fi
n
a
l
d
a
te
fo
r
c
o
m
-
m
e
n
ts
is
o
n
1
4
th
M
a
y
2
0
0
7
.
T
h
e
re
is
n
o
p
ro
p
o
se
d
d
a
te
o
f
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
n
o
r
d
a
te
o
f
e
n
-
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
.
(A
)
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
li
fe
a
n
d
h
e
a
lt
h
T
B
T
o
n
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
;
(B
)
Im
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
sa
fe
ty
o
n
c
lo
th
in
g
te
x
ti
le
s;
(C
)
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
li
fe
a
n
d
h
e
a
lt
h
T
B
T
o
n
H
S
6
2
0
8
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
W
T
O
M
e
m
b
e
rs
A
si
a
-P
a
c
ifi
c
T
ra
d
e
A
g
re
e
-
m
e
n
t
(f
o
rm
e
rl
y
B
a
n
g
k
o
k
A
g
re
e
-
m
e
n
t)
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
;
C
h
in
a
;
In
d
ia
;
K
o
re
a
,
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f;
L
a
o
P
e
o
p
le
’s
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ti
c
R
e
-
p
u
b
li
c
;
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
9
/
1
/
2
0
0
6
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
is
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
w
a
s
fo
r-
m
e
rl
y
k
n
o
w
n
a
s
”
B
a
n
g
k
o
k
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t,
”
th
e
d
a
te
o
f
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
f
w
h
ic
h
w
a
s
1
7
th
J
u
n
e
1
9
7
6
.
T
h
e
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
f
th
e
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
is
o
n
1
st
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
6
.
(A
)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
E
S
C
A
P
,
th
e
se
c
re
-
ta
ri
a
t
o
f
A
P
T
A
,
in
th
e
n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
o
f
a
g
re
e
-
m
e
n
ts
th
a
t
p
ro
m
o
te
in
c
lu
si
v
e
g
ro
w
th
a
n
d
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t;
(B
)
A
c
h
ie
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
a
v
e
ra
g
e
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
ta
ri
ff
o
n
so
m
e
w
o
v
e
n
g
a
rm
e
n
ts
(2
4
.3
8
%
)
a
n
d
fa
b
ri
c
H
S
5
1
0
8
1
0
(4
.2
5
%
)
a
s
p
e
r
W
T
O
ta
ri
ff
d
a
ta
b
a
se
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(R
e
-
g
io
n
a
l)
C
h
in
a
;
In
d
ia
;
K
o
re
a
,
R
e
-
p
u
b
li
c
o
f;
L
a
o
P
e
o
p
le
’s
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ti
c
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
;
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
K
y
rg
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
t-
m
e
n
t
K
y
rg
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
3
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
6
O
n
g
o
in
g
In
it
ia
l
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
is
o
n
2
9
th
M
a
rc
h
2
0
0
6
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
a
ll
L
D
C
(d
e
si
g
n
a
te
d
b
y
U
n
it
e
d
N
a
ti
o
n
s)
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
D
u
ty
-f
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
z
e
ro
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
(d
u
ty
-f
re
e
)
o
n
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
fr
o
m
a
ll
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
o
n
S
o
u
th
A
si
a
n
F
re
e
T
ra
d
e
A
re
a
(S
A
F
T
A
)
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
K
in
g
d
o
m
o
f
B
h
u
ta
n
,
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
In
d
ia
,
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
M
a
ld
iv
e
s,
K
in
g
d
o
m
o
f
N
e
p
a
l,
Is
la
m
ic
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
P
a
k
is
ta
n
,
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ti
c
S
o
c
ia
li
st
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
6
O
n
g
o
in
g
It
su
p
e
rs
e
d
e
d
S
A
P
T
A
e
f-
fe
c
ti
v
e
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
6
.
”
(A
)
E
li
m
in
a
ti
o
n
o
f
b
a
rr
ie
rs
to
tr
a
d
e
;
(B
)
F
a
c
il
it
a
ti
o
n
th
e
c
ro
ss
-b
o
rd
e
r
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
g
o
o
d
s
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
te
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
o
f
th
e
C
o
n
-
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
S
ta
te
s;
(C
)
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
o
f
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
o
f
fa
ir
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
o
n
in
th
e
fr
e
e
tr
a
d
e
a
re
a
;
(D
)
T
a
ri
ff
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
b
y
th
e
C
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
S
ta
te
s,
n
o
n
-L
D
C
S
a
n
d
L
D
C
S
a
li
k
e
,
fr
o
m
e
x
is
ti
n
g
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
s
w
it
h
in
th
e
ti
m
e
fr
a
m
e
o
f
2
y
e
a
rs
fr
o
m
th
e
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
(A
rt
ic
le
7
);
(E
)
S
p
e
c
ia
l
a
n
d
d
iff
e
re
n
ti
a
l
tr
e
a
t-
m
e
n
t
fo
r
L
D
C
S
,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
(A
rt
i-
c
le
1
1
)
”
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(R
e
-
g
io
n
a
l)
In
d
ia
,
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
,
P
a
k
is
ta
n
,
B
h
u
ta
n
,
M
a
ld
iv
e
s,
N
e
p
a
l
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
a
n
d
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
P
o
li
c
y
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
4
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
4
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
a
n
d
T
ra
n
s-
p
o
rt
P
o
li
c
y
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
b
y
th
e
C
a
b
in
e
t
o
n
2
6
th
A
p
ri
l
2
0
0
4
.
(A
)
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
p
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
sa
fe
a
n
d
d
e
-
p
e
n
d
a
b
le
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
se
rv
ic
e
b
y
m
a
k
in
g
a
p
-
p
ro
p
ri
a
te
la
w
s
a
n
d
e
n
su
ri
n
g
a
c
c
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
;
(B
)
S
e
tt
in
g
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l
sa
fe
ty
a
n
d
te
c
h
-
n
ic
a
l
st
a
n
d
a
rd
s
fo
r
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
in
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
s,
su
c
h
a
s
ra
il
a
n
d
la
n
d
a
n
d
w
a
te
r
in
fr
a
st
ru
c
-
tu
re
s;
(C
)
R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
c
o
st
o
f
g
o
o
d
s
to
w
a
rd
s
a
g
lo
b
a
ll
y
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
tr
a
d
e
o
f
g
o
o
d
s;
(D
)
F
o
rm
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
sy
s-
te
m
to
a
c
c
o
m
m
o
d
a
te
h
ig
h
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
v
e
h
ic
le
s
v
ia
fl
y
-o
v
e
rs
,
e
le
v
a
te
d
e
x
p
re
ss
w
a
y
s
e
tc
.
in
th
e
g
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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C
h
in
e
se
T
a
ip
e
i
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
t-
m
e
n
t
C
h
in
e
se
T
a
ip
e
i
1
2
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
3
O
n
g
o
in
g
C
h
in
e
se
T
a
ip
e
i
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
w
a
s
e
n
te
re
d
in
to
fo
rc
e
a
n
d
re
n
e
w
e
d
o
n
1
7
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
3
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
a
ll
L
D
C
(d
e
si
g
n
a
te
d
b
y
U
n
it
e
d
N
a
ti
o
n
s)
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
D
u
ty
-f
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
z
e
ro
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
(d
u
ty
-f
re
e
)
o
n
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
fr
o
m
a
ll
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
Ic
e
la
n
d
G
e
n
e
ra
l-
iz
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
Ic
e
la
n
d
1
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
2
O
n
g
o
in
g
In
it
ia
l
e
n
tr
y
in
to
fo
rc
e
is
o
n
2
9
th
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
2
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
o
r
re
-
d
u
c
e
d
ta
ri
ff
m
a
rk
e
t
a
c
c
e
ss
to
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
-
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
T
u
rk
e
y
G
e
n
e
ra
l-
iz
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
T
u
rk
e
y
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
2
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
u
rk
e
y
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
s-
te
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
la
st
d
a
te
o
f
re
n
e
w
a
l
w
a
s
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
2
a
n
d
h
a
s
n
o
e
x
p
ir
a
ti
o
n
d
a
te
,
b
u
t
T
u
rk
e
y
p
e
rf
o
rm
s
it
s
G
S
P
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
re
v
ie
w
a
n
n
u
-
a
ll
y
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
o
r
re
-
d
u
c
e
d
ta
ri
ff
m
a
rk
e
t
a
c
c
e
ss
to
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
-
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
K
o
re
a
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
t-
m
e
n
t
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
K
o
re
a
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
0
O
n
g
o
in
g
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
K
o
re
a
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
w
a
s
e
n
-
te
re
d
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
-
u
a
ry
2
0
0
0
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
a
ll
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
D
u
ty
-f
re
e
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
o
n
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
fr
o
m
a
ll
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
S
p
e
c
ia
l
B
o
n
d
e
d
W
a
re
h
o
u
se
F
a
c
il
i-
ti
e
s
C
u
st
o
m
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
m
m
is
-
si
o
n
e
ra
te
;
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
G
a
rm
e
n
ts
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
a
n
d
E
x
p
o
rt
A
ss
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
1
9
9
9
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
c
u
st
o
m
s
m
o
d
e
rn
iz
a
-
ti
o
n
p
ro
je
c
t
st
a
rt
e
d
in
1
9
9
9
in
c
lu
d
in
g
th
e
A
S
Y
-
C
U
D
A
+
+
c
o
m
p
u
te
r
sy
s-
te
m
.
(A
)
D
u
ty
-f
re
e
a
c
c
e
ss
to
im
p
o
rt
e
d
ra
w
m
a
te
-
ri
a
ls
u
se
d
fo
r
m
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
p
ro
d
-
u
c
ts
su
c
h
a
s
R
M
G
;
(B
)
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
ri
sk
m
it
i-
g
a
te
d
th
ro
u
g
h
th
e
a
id
o
f
th
e
A
S
Y
C
U
D
A
+
+
c
o
m
p
u
te
r
sy
st
e
m
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
R
u
ss
ia
n
F
e
d
e
ra
-
ti
o
n
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
r-
e
n
c
e
s
R
u
ss
ia
n
F
e
d
e
ra
ti
o
n
1
/
1
/
1
9
9
2
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
G
D
P
o
f
R
u
ss
ia
w
a
s
re
n
e
w
e
d
a
n
d
e
x
p
a
n
d
e
d
in
2
0
0
0
.
T
h
e
p
o
li
c
y
c
u
rr
e
n
tl
y
in
fo
rc
e
a
s
o
f
A
p
ri
l
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
ta
ri
ff
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
u
n
-
d
e
r
th
e
G
S
P
sc
h
e
m
e
to
1
0
3
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
-
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
4
9
L
D
C
s
(i
n
c
lu
d
in
g
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
);
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
to
L
D
C
s
(t
h
e
li
st
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
in
-
c
lu
d
e
s
so
m
e
fa
b
ri
c
s
b
u
t
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
in
c
lu
d
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
in
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
)
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
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G
lo
b
a
l
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
T
ra
d
e
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
(G
S
T
P
)
A
lg
e
ri
a
;
A
rg
e
n
ti
n
a
;
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
;
B
e
n
in
;
B
o
-
li
v
ia
,
P
lu
ri
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
ta
te
o
f;
B
ra
z
il
;
C
a
m
e
ro
o
n
;
C
h
il
e
;
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
;
C
u
b
a
;
E
c
u
a
d
o
r;
E
g
y
p
t;
G
h
a
n
a
;
G
u
in
e
a
;
G
u
y
a
n
a
;
In
-
d
ia
;
In
d
o
n
e
si
a
;
Ir
a
n
;
Ir
a
q
;
K
o
re
a
,
D
e
m
o
-
c
ra
ti
c
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f;
K
o
re
a
,
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f;
L
ib
y
a
;
M
a
la
y
si
a
;
M
e
x
ic
o
;
M
o
ro
c
c
o
;
M
o
z
a
m
b
iq
u
e
;
M
y
a
n
m
a
r;
N
ic
a
ra
g
u
a
;
N
ig
e
ri
a
;
P
a
k
is
ta
n
;
P
e
ru
;
P
h
il
ip
p
in
e
s;
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
;
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
;
S
u
d
a
n
;
T
a
n
-
z
a
n
ia
;
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
;
T
h
e
fo
rm
e
r
Y
u
g
o
sl
a
v
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
;
T
ri
n
id
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
;
T
u
n
is
ia
;
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
la
,
B
o
li
v
a
ri
a
n
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f;
V
ie
t
N
a
m
;
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
4
/
1
9
/
1
9
8
9
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
w
a
s
si
g
n
e
d
o
n
1
3
th
A
p
ri
l
1
9
8
8
.
(A
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
a
c
c
e
ss
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
rl
y
p
ro
c
e
ss
e
d
a
n
d
se
m
i-
p
ro
c
e
ss
e
d
g
o
o
d
s;
(B
)
R
e
-
m
o
v
a
l
o
f
n
o
n
-t
a
ri
ff
a
n
d
p
a
ra
-t
a
ri
ff
b
a
rr
ie
rs
;
(C
)
A
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
to
L
D
C
s
to
a
c
h
ie
v
e
re
a
so
n
-
a
b
le
le
v
e
ls
o
f
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
e
x
p
o
rt
s
o
f
th
e
ir
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
D
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
G
e
n
-
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
3
/
1
/
1
9
7
2
O
n
g
o
in
g
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
e
x
-
te
n
d
e
d
it
s
sc
h
e
m
e
b
y
T
h
e
S
w
is
s
P
a
rl
ia
m
e
n
t
a
p
p
ro
v
a
l
a
n
d
h
a
s
n
o
e
x
p
ir
a
ti
o
n
d
a
te
y
e
t.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
1
3
3
d
e
-
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
5
0
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
o
r
re
d
u
c
e
d
ta
ri
ff
m
a
rk
e
t
a
c
c
e
ss
to
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
N
e
w
Z
e
a
la
n
d
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
r-
e
n
c
e
s
N
e
w
Z
e
a
la
n
d
1
/
1
/
1
9
7
2
O
n
g
o
in
g
N
e
w
Z
e
a
la
n
d
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
e
n
-
te
re
d
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
-
u
a
ry
1
9
7
2
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
9
1
d
e
v
e
l-
o
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
5
0
L
D
C
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
a
c
c
e
ss
to
L
D
C
s
o
n
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
in
c
lu
d
-
in
g
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
,
b
u
t
w
il
l
n
o
lo
n
g
e
r
b
e
a
p
p
li
-
c
a
b
le
o
n
c
e
th
e
y
m
e
e
t
a
c
e
rt
a
in
c
ri
te
ri
a
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
G
N
I
o
f
n
o
m
o
re
th
a
n
U
S
D
4
0
0
)
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(m
o
st
ly
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
N
o
rw
a
y
G
e
n
e
r-
a
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
N
o
rw
a
y
1
0
/
1
/
1
9
7
1
O
n
g
o
in
g
N
o
rw
a
y
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
s-
te
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
e
n
te
re
d
in
to
fo
rc
e
o
n
1
st
O
c
to
b
e
r
1
9
7
1
a
n
d
h
a
s
n
o
d
e
c
is
io
n
fo
r
th
e
e
n
d
d
a
te
y
e
t.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
9
0
c
o
u
n
-
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
te
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
a
n
d
o
f
w
h
ic
h
3
5
a
re
ra
n
k
e
d
a
m
o
n
g
th
e
L
D
C
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
sp
e
c
ia
l
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
(G
S
P
+
d
u
ty
fr
e
e
a
c
c
e
ss
o
f
g
o
o
d
s)
to
a
ll
L
D
C
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
-
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
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A
u
st
ra
li
a
G
e
n
e
r-
a
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
A
u
st
ra
li
a
1
/
1
/
1
9
6
6
O
n
g
o
in
g
T
h
e
A
u
st
ra
li
a
n
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
T
a
ri
ff
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
u
n
d
e
r-
g
o
n
e
a
m
a
jo
r
re
v
ie
w
in
1
9
8
5
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
:
A
S
T
P
ra
te
is
5
%
le
ss
th
a
n
g
e
n
e
ra
l
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
z
e
ro
A
S
T
P
ra
te
fo
r
g
e
n
e
ra
l
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
th
a
t
is
b
e
lo
w
5
%
;
(C
)
A
p
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
o
f
p
o
li
c
y
to
a
ll
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
:
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
is
o
n
e
o
f
th
e
A
S
T
P
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s;
(D
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
z
e
ro
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
fo
r
g
o
o
d
s
u
n
d
e
r
th
e
h
a
n
d
ic
ra
ft
b
y
-l
a
w
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
J
a
p
a
n
G
e
n
e
ra
l-
iz
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
J
a
p
a
n
8
/
1
/
1
9
7
1
3
/
3
1
/
2
0
2
1
J
a
p
a
n
G
e
n
e
ra
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
1
st
A
u
g
u
st
1
9
7
1
u
n
ti
l
3
1
st
M
a
rc
h
2
0
1
2
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
1
3
7
c
o
u
n
-
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
1
4
te
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
sp
e
c
ia
l
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
d
u
ty
a
n
d
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
to
a
ll
L
D
C
s,
in
-
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
G
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
U
rb
a
n
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
4
/
1
7
/
2
0
1
2
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
o
m
1
7
th
A
p
ri
l
2
0
1
2
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
7
.
(A
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
a
b
e
tt
e
r
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
m
a
ss
iv
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
w
o
rk
e
rs
in
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
th
ro
u
g
h
a
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
b
u
s
ra
p
id
tr
a
n
si
t
(B
R
T
)
c
o
rr
id
o
r;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
b
e
t-
te
r
a
n
d
sa
fe
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
w
o
rk
e
rs
m
a
-
jo
ri
ty
o
f
w
h
ic
h
a
re
w
o
m
e
n
w
h
o
c
o
m
m
u
te
o
n
fo
o
t
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
G
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
U
r-
b
a
n
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
P
ro
je
c
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
4
/
1
7
/
2
0
1
2
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fo
rm
1
7
th
A
p
ri
l
2
0
1
2
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
7
.
(A
)
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
u
rb
a
n
m
o
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
d
e
v
e
l-
o
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
u
rb
a
n
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
sy
s-
te
m
in
n
o
rt
h
o
f
G
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
b
e
tt
e
r
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
p
e
o
p
le
li
v
in
g
a
n
d
w
o
rk
in
g
in
th
e
a
re
a
w
h
ic
h
is
a
g
a
rm
e
n
t
h
u
b
w
it
h
2
7
2
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
e
m
p
lo
y
in
g
a
b
o
u
t
1
m
il
li
o
n
w
o
rk
e
rs
;
(C
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
a
b
e
tt
e
r
a
n
d
m
u
c
h
sa
fe
r
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
w
o
rk
e
rs
in
th
e
v
ic
in
-
it
y
,
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
rl
y
w
o
m
e
n
w
o
rk
in
g
in
th
e
g
a
r-
m
e
n
t
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
in
th
e
a
re
a
(m
a
jo
ri
ty
o
f
th
e
w
o
rk
e
rs
in
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
se
c
to
r
is
w
o
m
e
n
)
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
A
re
a
s
R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
-o
f-
P
o
v
e
rt
y
In
it
ia
-
ti
v
e
P
ro
je
c
t
–
W
o
m
e
n
’s
E
c
o
-
n
o
m
ic
E
m
p
o
w
e
r-
m
e
n
t
P
ro
je
c
t
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
M
in
-
is
tr
y
o
f
L
o
c
a
l
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t,
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
0
/
2
7
/
2
0
1
1
1
0
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
o
m
2
7
th
O
c
to
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
to
3
1
st
O
c
to
b
e
r
2
0
1
7
.
(A
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
,
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l
a
n
d
li
fe
sk
il
ls
tr
a
in
in
g
,
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
a
l
h
o
u
si
n
g
,
a
n
d
o
th
e
r
su
p
p
o
rt
to
fa
c
il
it
a
te
a
c
c
e
ss
to
e
m
-
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
in
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
se
c
-
to
r
a
n
d
to
a
d
ju
st
to
u
rb
a
n
li
fe
a
n
d
fo
r-
m
a
l
se
c
to
r
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
sp
e
c
ifi
c
a
ll
y
fo
r
p
o
o
r
a
n
d
v
u
ln
e
ra
b
le
w
o
m
e
n
fr
o
m
la
g
g
in
g
a
re
a
s
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
;
(B
)
R
a
is
in
g
a
w
a
re
n
e
ss
a
n
d
se
-
le
c
ti
n
g
c
a
n
d
id
a
te
s
in
th
e
M
o
n
g
a
-p
ro
n
e
d
is
-
tr
ic
ts
o
f
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
;
(C
)
E
st
a
b
-
li
sh
m
e
n
t
o
f
tr
a
in
in
g
C
e
n
tr
e
w
it
h
d
o
rm
it
o
ry
;
(D
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
in
it
ia
l
tr
a
in
in
g
a
n
d
o
n
g
o
in
g
su
p
p
o
rt
;
(E
)
S
u
p
p
o
rt
in
g
c
o
o
rd
in
a
ti
o
n
,
M
o
n
-
it
o
ri
n
g
a
n
d
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
(M
a
n
d
E
),
a
n
d
p
ro
-
g
ra
m
fo
r
fu
tu
re
e
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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D
h
a
k
a
-
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
E
x
p
re
ss
w
a
y
P
u
b
li
c
-P
ri
v
a
te
P
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
D
e
si
g
n
P
ro
je
c
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
3
/
3
0
/
2
0
1
2
3
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
6
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fo
rm
3
rd
M
a
rc
h
2
0
1
2
to
3
1
st
m
a
rc
h
2
0
1
6
(A
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
o
rt
to
th
e
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
to
c
o
m
e
u
p
w
it
h
d
e
si
g
n
a
n
d
fe
a
-
si
b
il
it
y
st
u
d
y
fo
r
th
e
e
x
p
re
ss
w
a
y
c
o
n
n
e
c
t-
in
g
D
h
a
k
a
a
n
d
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
u
n
d
e
r
a
p
u
b
li
c
-
p
ri
v
a
te
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
o
rt
fo
r
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
lo
c
a
te
d
in
th
e
se
m
e
tr
o
p
o
li
ta
n
c
it
ie
s,
D
h
a
k
a
a
s
th
e
c
e
n
te
r
a
n
d
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
c
a
p
it
a
l
o
f
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
a
n
d
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
a
s
th
e
p
ri
m
a
ry
se
a
p
o
rt
th
a
t
fa
c
il
-
it
a
te
s
a
b
o
u
t
9
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
th
e
fo
re
ig
n
tr
a
d
e
,
c
o
n
si
d
e
ri
n
g
th
a
t
th
e
re
is
a
la
c
k
o
f
tr
a
ffi
c
c
a
-
p
a
c
it
y
o
f
th
e
e
x
is
ti
n
g
m
o
d
e
s
o
f
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
-
ti
o
n
(e
.g
.
2
5
0
-k
m
h
ig
h
w
a
y
a
n
d
lo
a
d
re
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s
in
b
ri
d
g
e
s)
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
S
tr
a
te
g
ic
M
a
s-
te
r
P
la
n
fo
r
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
1
4
/
2
0
1
1
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
5
S
tr
a
te
g
ic
M
a
st
e
r
P
la
n
fo
r
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
is
fr
o
m
1
4
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
5
.
(A
)
P
re
p
a
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
a
m
a
st
e
r
p
la
n
fo
r
th
e
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
a
n
d
p
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
o
rt
fo
r
th
e
in
te
g
ra
te
d
in
te
rm
o
d
a
l
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t;
(B
)
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
p
o
rt
w
il
l
p
ro
v
id
e
b
e
t-
te
r
lo
g
is
ti
c
s
a
n
d
in
te
rm
o
d
a
l
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
sy
st
e
m
a
n
d
m
a
y
im
p
ro
v
e
re
g
io
n
a
l
tr
a
d
e
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
o
f
S
o
-
c
ia
l
a
n
d
E
n
v
ir
o
n
-
m
e
n
ta
l
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
s
in
In
d
u
st
ry
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
U
n
io
n
,
G
e
rm
a
n
F
e
d
e
ra
l
M
in
is
tr
y
fo
r
E
c
o
-
n
o
m
ic
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t,
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
C
o
m
m
e
rc
e
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
5
T
h
e
o
v
e
ra
ll
te
rm
is
fr
o
m
2
0
1
0
to
2
0
1
5
.
(A
)
C
o
ll
a
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
w
it
h
m
in
is
tr
ie
s,
a
u
th
o
r-
it
ie
s,
b
u
si
n
e
ss
a
ss
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
s,
lo
c
a
l
su
p
p
li
e
rs
a
n
d
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
b
u
y
e
rs
,
a
s
w
e
ll
a
s
n
o
n
-
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
ta
l
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
tr
a
d
e
u
n
io
n
s
to
im
p
ro
v
e
th
e
so
c
ia
l
a
n
d
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l
st
a
n
d
a
rd
s
o
f
te
x
ti
le
s
fa
c
to
ri
e
s;
(B
)
P
ro
-
v
is
io
n
o
f
tr
a
in
in
g
c
o
u
rs
e
s
g
iv
e
n
to
p
u
b
li
c
la
b
o
u
r
in
sp
e
c
to
rs
a
n
d
a
d
v
is
o
rs
to
st
a
k
e
h
o
ld
-
e
rs
in
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
in
d
u
st
ry
;
(C
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
c
o
u
rs
e
s
o
n
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
w
a
te
r
a
n
d
c
h
e
m
ic
a
ls
h
a
n
d
li
n
g
to
a
d
v
is
o
rs
w
h
o
th
e
n
h
e
lp
te
x
ti
le
s
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
to
m
e
e
t
in
-
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
st
a
n
d
a
rd
s
su
c
h
a
s
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
,
e
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
,
a
u
th
o
ri
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
o
f
c
h
e
m
ic
a
ls
(R
E
A
C
H
);
(D
)
C
o
ll
a
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
w
it
h
d
y
e
in
g
a
n
d
w
a
sh
in
g
p
la
n
ts
a
s
w
e
ll
a
s
p
u
b
-
li
c
a
n
d
p
ri
v
a
te
u
n
iv
e
rs
it
ie
s
a
n
d
c
o
ll
e
g
e
s
to
a
d
v
ic
e
te
x
ti
le
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
o
n
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l-
fr
ie
n
d
ly
p
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
o
f
in
d
u
st
ri
a
l
w
a
st
e
a
n
d
d
is
p
o
sa
l
o
f
c
h
e
m
ic
a
l
re
si
d
u
e
s;
(E
)
T
ra
in
in
g
o
f
e
n
e
rg
y
a
u
d
it
o
rs
a
n
d
a
d
v
is
in
g
te
x
ti
le
fa
c
-
to
ri
e
s
a
b
o
u
t
e
n
e
rg
y
e
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
;
(F
)
S
u
p
p
o
rt
-
in
g
n
o
n
-g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
ta
l
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
s
su
c
h
a
s
th
e
A
w
a
j
F
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
,
D
h
a
k
a
a
n
d
A
g
ra
ja
tr
a
,
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
in
u
p
h
o
ld
in
g
w
o
rk
e
rs
’
ri
g
h
ts
;
(G
)
A
ss
is
ti
n
g
v
ic
ti
m
s
o
f
th
e
fi
re
a
n
d
c
o
ll
a
p
se
a
c
-
c
id
e
n
ts
o
c
c
u
rr
e
d
in
2
0
1
2
a
n
d
2
0
1
3
,
re
sp
e
c
-
ti
v
e
ly
,
b
y
p
ro
v
id
in
g
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l
su
p
p
o
rt
,
v
o
c
a
-
ti
o
n
a
l
tr
a
in
in
g
,
a
n
d
d
is
a
b
il
it
y
st
ru
c
tu
re
s
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
si
v
e
D
is
a
st
e
r
M
a
n
a
g
e
-
m
e
n
t
P
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
(C
D
M
P
)
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
U
n
io
n
,
U
n
it
e
d
N
a
ti
o
n
s
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
P
ro
-
g
ra
m
m
e
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
-
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
/
1
/
2
0
1
0
1
2
/
1
/
2
0
1
4
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
-
u
a
ry
2
0
1
0
to
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
3
.
(A
)
A
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
in
re
d
u
c
in
g
th
e
im
p
a
c
t
o
f
n
a
t-
u
ra
l
d
is
a
st
e
rs
a
n
d
o
th
e
r
h
u
m
a
n
-i
n
d
u
c
e
d
h
a
z
-
a
rd
s
b
y
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
d
is
a
st
e
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
e
q
u
ip
m
e
n
ts
a
n
d
tr
a
in
in
g
fo
r
th
e
im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
th
e
fi
re
-fi
g
h
ti
n
g
c
a
p
a
b
il
i-
ti
e
s
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
F
ir
e
S
e
rv
ic
e
a
n
d
C
iv
il
D
e
-
fe
n
se
D
ir
e
c
to
ra
te
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
C
a
n
a
d
a
G
e
n
e
r-
a
li
z
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
C
a
n
a
d
a
7
/
1
/
1
9
7
4
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
1
4
G
e
n
e
ra
l
P
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
T
a
r-
iff
(G
P
T
)
a
n
d
T
h
e
L
e
a
st
D
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
C
o
u
n
tr
y
T
a
ri
ff
(L
D
C
T
)
w
a
s
g
ra
n
te
d
a
n
e
x
te
n
si
o
n
u
n
ti
l
3
0
J
u
n
e
2
0
1
4
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
to
1
7
4
b
e
n
e
fi
-
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
G
P
T
a
n
d
4
9
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ri
e
s
o
f
L
D
C
T
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
fr
e
e
-d
u
ty
o
r
lo
w
e
r
ra
te
s
su
b
-
je
c
t
to
c
e
rt
a
in
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
to
it
e
m
s
fo
r
y
a
rn
s,
se
w
in
g
th
re
a
d
s,
fa
b
ri
c
s,
a
p
p
a
re
l
a
n
d
m
a
d
e
-
u
p
te
x
ti
le
a
rt
ic
le
s
im
p
o
rt
e
d
fr
o
m
L
D
C
S
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
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In
d
u
st
ri
a
l
E
n
-
e
rg
y
E
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
F
in
a
n
c
e
P
ro
g
ra
m
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
1
4
/
2
0
1
1
4
/
3
0
/
2
0
1
3
In
d
u
st
ri
a
l
E
n
e
rg
y
E
ffi
-
c
ie
n
c
y
F
in
a
n
c
e
P
ro
g
ra
m
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
1
4
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
to
3
0
th
A
p
ri
l
2
0
1
3
.
(A
)
A
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
in
a
c
h
ie
v
in
g
e
n
e
rg
y
e
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
in
in
d
u
st
ri
e
s
th
a
t
m
a
y
h
e
lp
so
lv
e
th
e
su
p
-
p
ly
g
a
p
e
n
e
rg
y
p
ro
b
le
m
a
n
d
c
o
n
tr
ib
u
te
in
re
d
u
c
in
g
c
a
rb
o
n
e
m
is
si
o
n
s
a
n
d
a
ir
p
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
a
n
d
im
p
ro
v
in
g
w
o
rk
e
rs
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
i-
si
o
n
o
f
a
p
ro
g
ra
m
th
a
t
w
il
l
fi
n
a
n
c
e
e
n
e
rg
y
e
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
ts
in
se
v
e
n
in
d
u
st
ri
e
s,
n
a
m
e
ly
b
ri
c
k
m
a
k
in
g
,
te
x
ti
le
s,
st
e
e
l,
c
e
m
e
n
t,
c
e
ra
m
ic
s,
c
h
e
m
ic
a
ls
,
a
n
d
a
g
ri
-i
n
d
u
st
ri
e
s;
(C
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
a
n
d
th
e
re
-
fo
re
jo
b
c
re
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
w
h
ic
h
w
il
l
b
e
n
e
fi
t
w
o
rk
e
rs
m
a
jo
ri
ty
o
f
w
h
ic
h
a
re
w
o
m
e
n
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
P
a
d
m
a
M
u
lt
ip
u
r-
p
o
se
B
ri
d
g
e
D
e
-
si
g
n
P
ro
je
c
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
1
/
2
5
/
2
0
1
0
8
/
7
/
2
0
1
3
P
a
d
m
a
M
u
lt
ip
u
rp
o
se
B
ri
d
g
e
D
e
si
g
n
P
ro
je
c
t
(S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
L
o
a
n
)
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
2
5
th
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
0
to
7
th
A
u
g
u
st
2
0
1
3
.
(A
)
B
u
il
d
in
g
o
f
th
e
fi
rs
t
c
ro
ss
in
g
a
c
ro
ss
th
e
P
a
d
m
a
B
ri
d
g
e
fo
r
ro
a
d
tr
a
ffi
c
;
(B
)
Id
e
n
-
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
o
f
c
o
st
-r
e
c
o
v
e
ry
m
e
c
h
a
n
is
m
s
e
n
-
su
ri
n
g
su
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
p
ro
je
c
t
th
ro
u
g
h
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
b
u
il
d
in
g
o
f
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t
m
a
n
-
a
g
e
th
e
b
ri
d
g
e
a
n
d
o
th
e
r
re
la
te
d
a
ss
e
ts
;
(C
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
a
b
e
tt
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
ti
v
it
y
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
d
iff
e
re
n
t
z
o
n
e
s
o
f
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
,
n
a
m
e
ly
n
o
rt
h
w
e
st
a
n
d
so
u
th
w
e
st
z
o
n
e
s
to
th
e
e
a
st
z
o
n
e
w
h
e
re
D
h
a
k
a
a
n
d
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
a
n
d
w
h
e
re
m
a
n
y
g
a
rm
e
n
t
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
a
re
si
tu
a
te
d
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
o
f
L
a
b
o
u
r
S
ta
n
-
d
a
rd
s
in
R
M
G
S
e
c
to
r
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
U
n
io
n
,
D
e
u
ts
c
h
e
G
e
se
ll
sc
h
a
ft
F
u
r
In
te
rn
a
-
ti
o
n
a
l
Z
u
sa
m
m
e
n
a
rb
e
it
7
/
1
/
2
0
1
0
6
/
1
/
2
0
1
3
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
3
y
e
a
rs
fr
o
m
J
u
ly
2
0
1
0
to
J
u
n
e
2
0
1
3
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
fa
c
to
ry
sa
fe
ty
in
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
o
rt
g
iv
e
n
to
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
L
a
b
o
u
r
a
n
d
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t,
B
G
-
M
E
A
,
a
n
d
B
K
M
E
A
in
o
rd
e
r
to
m
e
e
t
c
o
m
p
li
-
a
n
c
e
a
u
d
it
,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
fi
re
sa
fe
ty
;
(C
)
P
ro
v
i-
si
o
n
o
f
tr
a
in
in
g
g
iv
e
n
to
la
b
o
u
r
in
sp
e
c
to
rs
a
n
d
fa
c
to
ry
c
o
m
p
li
a
n
c
e
o
ffi
c
e
rs
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
a
r-
iff
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
(D
F
T
P
-L
D
C
)
S
c
h
e
m
e
o
f
In
d
ia
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
o
f
In
d
ia
8
/
1
/
2
0
0
8
8
/
1
/
2
0
1
3
D
u
ty
F
re
e
T
a
ri
ff
P
re
fe
r-
e
n
c
e
(D
F
T
P
-L
D
C
)
S
c
h
e
m
e
o
f
In
d
ia
la
st
e
d
fo
r
fi
v
e
y
e
a
rs
fr
o
m
A
u
g
u
st
2
0
0
8
.
(A
)
E
x
te
n
si
o
n
o
f
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
q
u
o
ta
-f
re
e
(D
F
Q
F
)
a
c
c
e
ss
to
L
D
C
m
e
m
b
e
rs
;
(B
)
G
ra
n
ts
o
f
ta
ri
ff
p
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
o
n
th
e
e
x
p
o
rt
s
(i
n
c
lu
d
in
g
so
m
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
u
n
d
e
r
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
)
fr
o
m
L
D
C
o
n
im
p
o
rt
s
to
In
d
ia
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
R
e
-
g
io
n
a
l
L
e
a
st
D
e
v
e
lo
p
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
T
ra
d
e
F
a
c
il
it
a
-
ti
o
n
P
ro
je
c
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
2
0
/
2
0
0
4
8
/
2
3
/
2
0
1
3
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
2
0
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
4
to
2
3
rd
A
u
g
u
st
2
0
1
3
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
in
th
e
e
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
o
f
C
h
it
-
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
in
te
rm
s
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
fo
r
c
o
n
ta
in
e
r
te
rm
in
a
l
to
b
e
tt
e
r
h
a
n
d
le
a
c
-
ti
v
it
ie
s
in
th
e
p
o
rt
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
b
e
tt
e
r
a
c
c
e
ss
to
D
h
a
k
a
-C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
c
o
rr
id
o
r
tr
a
n
s-
p
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fa
c
il
it
y
:
(C
)
H
a
rm
o
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
o
f
p
o
rt
a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
w
it
h
th
a
t
o
f
C
u
st
o
m
H
o
u
se
C
h
it
-
ta
g
o
n
g
to
im
p
ro
v
e
tr
a
ffi
c
o
f
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
fr
e
ig
h
t;
(D
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
a
n
d
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
b
u
il
d
in
g
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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U
S
G
e
n
e
ra
l-
iz
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
s
U
n
it
e
d
S
ta
te
s
o
f
A
m
e
ri
c
a
1
/
1
/
1
9
7
6
3
/
9
/
2
0
1
3
T
h
e
U
S
G
S
P
p
ro
g
ra
m
st
a
rt
e
d
o
n
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
7
6
.
T
h
e
G
S
P
e
li
g
ib
il
-
it
y
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
w
a
s
su
s-
p
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
rd
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
3
a
s
p
e
r
P
re
si
d
e
n
ti
a
l
P
ro
c
la
m
a
ti
o
n
8
9
9
7
.
(A
)
G
ra
n
t
o
f
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
a
l
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
e
n
tr
y
fo
r
u
p
to
5
,0
0
0
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
w
h
e
n
im
p
o
rt
e
d
fr
o
m
b
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
ro
d
u
c
ts
in
H
S
6
1
a
n
d
6
2
a
re
n
o
t
in
c
lu
d
e
d
in
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
li
st
);
(B
)
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
w
a
s
su
sp
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
rd
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
3
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
P
a
d
m
a
M
u
lt
i-
p
u
rp
o
se
B
ri
d
g
e
D
e
si
g
n
P
ro
je
c
t
(S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
L
o
a
n
)
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
1
/
6
/
2
0
1
2
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
o
m
2
n
d
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
9
to
6
th
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
2
.
(A
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
in
th
e
d
e
-
si
g
n
fo
r
th
e
P
a
d
m
a
B
ri
d
g
e
,
o
f
th
e
to
p
p
ri
o
ri
ty
p
ro
je
c
ts
o
f
th
e
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
P
ri
o
ri
ty
R
o
a
d
s
P
ro
je
c
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
1
/
2
3
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
1
P
ri
o
ri
ty
R
o
a
d
s
P
ro
je
c
t
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
2
3
rd
N
o
v
e
m
-
b
e
r
2
0
0
9
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
L
in
k
in
g
o
f
n
o
n
-u
rb
a
n
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
to
m
a
-
jo
r
ro
a
d
n
e
tw
o
rk
s,
in
c
lu
d
in
g
J
a
m
u
n
a
a
n
d
P
a
d
m
a
B
ri
d
g
e
s;
(B
)
S
tr
e
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
o
f
d
o
m
e
s-
ti
c
tr
a
d
e
a
n
d
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
d
e
v
e
lo
p
-
m
e
n
t
in
re
la
ti
v
e
ly
le
ss
d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
z
o
n
e
s
in
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
,
n
a
m
e
ly
th
e
n
o
rt
h
w
e
st
a
n
d
so
u
th
-
w
e
st
z
o
n
e
s
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
G
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
U
r-
b
a
n
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
C
o
rr
id
o
r
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
7
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
1
G
e
n
e
ra
l
D
h
a
k
a
S
u
st
a
in
-
a
b
le
U
rb
a
n
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
C
o
r-
ri
d
o
r
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
0
7
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
9
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
A
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
in
fe
a
si
b
il
it
y
st
u
d
y
,
d
e
si
g
n
,
a
n
d
in
it
ia
li
z
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
p
ro
je
c
t
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
im
p
ro
v
in
g
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
in
g
re
a
te
r
D
h
a
k
a
b
y
a
c
h
ie
v
in
g
a
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
u
r-
b
a
n
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
c
o
rr
id
o
r;
(B
)
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
a
b
e
tt
e
r
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
m
a
ss
iv
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
w
o
rk
e
rs
in
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
fa
c
to
ri
e
s
th
ro
u
g
h
a
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
b
u
s
ra
p
id
tr
a
n
si
t
(B
R
T
)
c
o
rr
id
o
r
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
E
U
G
e
n
e
ra
l-
iz
e
d
S
y
st
e
m
o
f
P
re
fe
re
n
c
e
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
U
n
io
n
,
D
e
le
-
g
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
U
n
io
n
to
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
9
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
1
F
ir
st
im
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
b
y
th
e
E
U
in
1
9
7
1
,
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
G
S
P
sc
h
e
m
e
a
p
p
li
e
s
fr
o
m
1
st
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
9
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
.
(A
)
R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
2
0
%
o
v
e
r
th
e
n
o
rm
a
l
c
u
s-
to
m
s
d
u
ty
fo
r
te
x
ti
le
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
,
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
fo
r
n
o
n
-s
e
n
si
ti
v
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
;
a
n
d
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
3
.5
%
fo
r
se
n
si
ti
v
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
;
(B
)
U
n
d
e
r
th
e
”
E
v
e
ry
th
in
g
b
u
t
A
rm
s,
”
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
a
n
d
a
ll
o
th
e
r
L
D
C
s
h
a
v
e
in
d
e
fi
n
it
e
d
u
ty
-f
re
e
,
q
u
o
ta
-
fr
e
e
a
c
c
e
ss
to
a
ll
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
M
u
lt
il
a
te
ra
l
(W
o
rl
d
)
B
e
n
e
fi
c
ia
ry
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(p
a
r-
ti
c
u
la
rl
y
le
a
st
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s)
P
o
rt
a
n
d
L
o
g
is
-
ti
c
s
E
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
1
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
9
9
/
3
0
/
2
0
1
0
P
o
rt
a
n
d
L
o
g
is
ti
c
s
E
ffi
-
c
ie
n
c
y
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
2
6
th
N
o
v
e
m
-
b
e
r
2
0
0
9
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
0
th
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
0
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
p
o
rt
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
e
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
in
in
te
rm
o
d
a
l
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
lo
g
is
ti
c
s
sy
st
e
m
s
u
n
d
e
r
th
e
In
te
g
ra
te
d
M
u
lt
im
o
d
a
l
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
P
o
li
c
y
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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E
n
te
rp
ri
se
G
ro
w
th
a
n
d
B
a
n
k
M
o
d
e
rn
iz
a
ti
o
n
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
6
/
8
/
2
0
0
4
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
0
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
o
m
8
th
J
u
n
e
to
2
0
0
4
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
0
.
(A
)
P
ri
v
a
ti
z
a
ti
o
n
o
r
c
lo
su
re
o
f
lo
ss
-m
a
k
in
g
S
O
E
s
to
a
v
o
id
fu
tu
re
lo
ss
e
s
a
n
d
m
a
in
ta
in
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t;
(B
)
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
b
a
n
k
-
in
g
se
c
to
r
re
fo
rm
p
ro
g
ra
m
s
to
a
c
h
ie
v
e
h
ig
h
ly
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
p
ri
v
a
te
b
a
n
k
in
g
sy
st
e
m
th
ro
u
g
h
st
a
g
e
d
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
o
f
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
in
st
a
te
-
o
w
n
e
d
b
a
n
k
s
a
n
d
th
ro
u
g
h
c
o
rp
o
ra
ti
z
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
d
iv
e
st
m
e
n
t
o
f
g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
sh
a
re
h
o
ld
in
g
in
R
u
p
a
li
B
a
n
k
,
A
g
ra
n
i
B
a
n
k
,
J
a
n
a
ta
B
a
n
k
,
a
n
d
S
o
n
a
li
B
a
n
k
;
(C
)
B
u
il
d
in
g
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
o
f
se
le
c
t
p
u
b
li
c
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
b
a
n
k
s,
in
c
lu
d
-
in
g
th
e
B
o
a
rd
o
f
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t,
P
ri
v
a
ti
z
a
ti
o
n
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
,
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
E
x
p
o
rt
P
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
Z
o
n
e
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
(B
E
P
Z
A
),
a
n
d
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
z
e
d
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l
B
a
n
k
s;
o
n
e
in
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
o
f
a
c
h
ie
v
-
in
g
th
e
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
o
f
th
e
p
ro
je
c
t
is
th
e
h
a
n
d
-
in
g
o
v
e
r
o
f
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
S
te
e
l
M
il
ls
to
B
E
P
Z
A
,
c
o
n
v
e
rt
in
g
th
e
fo
rm
e
r
in
to
a
n
E
x
p
o
rt
P
ro
-
c
e
ss
in
g
Z
o
n
e
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
D
h
a
k
a
P
o
w
e
r
S
y
s-
te
m
s
U
p
g
ra
d
e
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
2
1
/
1
9
9
9
4
/
2
6
/
2
0
1
0
D
h
a
k
a
P
o
w
e
r
S
y
st
e
m
s
U
p
-
g
ra
d
e
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
2
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
9
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
2
6
th
A
p
ri
l
2
0
1
0
.
(A
)
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
b
y
D
h
a
k
a
P
o
w
e
r
S
y
st
e
m
s
U
p
-
g
ra
d
e
o
f
th
e
p
a
p
e
r
P
o
w
e
r
S
e
c
to
r
R
e
fo
rm
s
in
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
w
h
ic
h
w
a
s
fo
rm
u
la
te
d
o
n
1
9
9
4
;
(B
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
r-
p
o
ra
te
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
;
(C
)
S
y
st
e
m
e
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
b
y
p
ro
v
id
in
g
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
fo
r
p
la
n
n
in
g
a
n
d
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
a
n
d
c
a
p
it
a
l;
(D
)
R
e
d
u
c
e
lo
ss
e
s
th
ro
u
g
h
im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
tr
a
n
sm
is
si
o
n
a
n
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
sy
st
e
m
in
th
e
D
h
a
k
a
a
re
a
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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T
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
a
l
S
u
p
-
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
6
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
8
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
9
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
1
7
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
8
u
n
ti
l
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
9
.
”
(A
)
S
u
p
p
o
rt
p
o
li
c
y
a
n
d
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
re
fo
rm
s
o
f
th
e
C
a
re
ta
k
e
r
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
h
a
d
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
7
to
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
8
;
(B
)
M
o
b
il
iz
a
ti
o
n
o
f
ta
x
re
v
e
n
u
e
s
b
y
im
p
ro
v
in
g
c
o
m
p
li
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
c
o
l-
le
c
ti
n
g
p
a
st
a
rr
e
a
rs
ra
th
e
r
th
a
n
in
tr
o
d
u
c
in
g
st
ru
c
tu
ra
l
re
fo
rm
s
in
th
e
ta
x
sy
st
e
m
;
(C
)
A
d
m
in
is
te
ri
n
g
p
ri
c
e
s
o
f
p
e
tr
o
le
u
m
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
,
u
re
a
fe
rt
il
iz
e
rs
,
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
re
ss
e
d
n
a
tu
ra
l
g
a
s
in
o
rd
e
r
to
re
d
u
c
e
lo
ss
e
s
in
th
e
S
O
E
s;
(D
)
L
ib
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
o
f
tr
a
d
e
v
ia
c
u
tt
in
g
n
o
m
in
a
l
im
p
o
rt
ta
ri
ff
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
si
m
-
p
li
fy
in
g
ta
ri
ff
st
ru
c
tu
re
,
a
n
d
e
n
h
a
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
b
y
im
p
ro
v
in
g
th
e
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
p
o
rt
a
n
d
e
x
te
n
d
in
g
th
e
B
o
n
d
e
d
W
a
re
h
o
u
se
F
a
c
il
it
ie
s
to
a
ll
e
x
p
o
rt
s
su
b
je
c
t
to
m
in
im
u
m
th
re
sh
o
ld
s
(W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
2
0
0
9
R
e
p
o
rt
IC
R
1
1
1
5
,
p
.
4
);
(E
)
O
th
e
r
p
ro
g
ra
m
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
a
re
im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t,
S
O
E
s,
a
n
d
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
o
f
a
c
c
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
th
e
b
u
si
n
e
ss
re
g
u
la
to
ry
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
”
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
P
o
w
e
r
S
e
c
to
r
D
e
-
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
P
o
li
c
y
C
re
d
it
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
P
o
w
e
r,
E
n
e
rg
y
,
a
n
d
M
in
-
e
ra
l
R
e
so
u
rc
e
s
6
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
8
3
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
9
T
h
e
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
P
o
w
e
r
S
e
c
to
r
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
P
o
li
c
y
C
re
d
it
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
1
7
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
8
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
1
st
M
a
rc
h
2
0
0
9
.
(A
)
M
a
k
in
g
th
e
p
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
o
f
c
o
n
tr
a
c
ts
in
th
e
p
o
w
e
r
se
c
to
r
m
o
re
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
v
ia
e
ffi
-
c
ie
n
c
y
a
n
d
tr
a
n
sp
a
re
n
c
y
;
(B
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
m
e
te
ri
n
g
,
b
il
li
n
g
,
a
n
d
c
o
ll
e
c
ti
o
n
sy
st
e
m
s
o
f
se
rv
ic
e
p
ro
v
id
e
rs
le
a
d
in
g
to
a
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
c
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l
lo
ss
e
s;
(C
)
A
c
c
e
le
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
re
g
u
la
to
ry
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
E
n
e
rg
y
R
e
g
u
la
to
ry
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
;
(D
)
In
c
re
a
si
n
g
a
n
d
im
p
ro
v
in
g
th
e
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
p
o
w
e
r
su
p
p
ly
(s
e
e
n
o
te
s
fo
r
th
e
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
im
-
p
a
c
t
o
f
p
o
w
e
r
sh
o
rt
a
g
e
to
th
e
g
a
rm
e
n
t
se
c
-
to
r)
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
E
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
Im
-
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
1
2
/
2
0
/
2
0
0
4
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
9
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
2
0
th
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
4
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
9
.
(A
)
R
e
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
o
f
C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
P
o
rt
A
u
-
th
o
ri
ty
;
(B
)
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
o
rt
M
a
st
e
r
P
la
n
a
n
d
m
u
lt
im
o
d
a
l
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
n
e
tw
o
rk
fo
r
th
e
D
h
a
k
a
-C
h
it
ta
g
o
n
g
C
o
rr
id
o
r;
(C
)
In
tr
o
-
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
re
fo
rm
s
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
rl
y
re
fo
rm
s
in
c
u
st
o
m
s
in
th
e
p
o
rt
th
a
t
h
a
n
d
le
s
a
b
o
u
t
9
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
th
e
fo
re
ig
n
tr
a
d
e
in
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
s
IV
-S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
F
in
a
n
c
in
g
II
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
1
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
8
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
8
S
e
c
o
n
d
S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
F
i-
n
a
n
c
in
g
to
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
1
0
th
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
8
u
n
ti
l
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
8
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
c
li
m
a
te
th
ro
u
g
h
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
m
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
st
a
b
il
-
it
y
,
tr
a
d
e
li
b
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
c
o
re
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
in
d
u
st
ry
a
ls
o
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
in
c
re
a
si
n
g
tr
a
d
e
-G
D
P
ra
ti
o
a
n
d
lo
w
e
r
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
s
m
e
a
su
re
d
b
y
n
o
m
-
in
a
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e
R
e
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s;
(B
)
R
e
m
o
v
e
s
a
ll
q
u
o
ta
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
sc
a
li
n
g
d
o
w
n
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
te
c
-
ti
o
n
s
g
ra
d
u
a
ll
y
;
(C
)
P
ro
d
u
c
in
g
sa
ti
sf
a
c
to
ry
o
u
tc
o
m
e
w
it
h
a
c
tu
a
l
d
is
b
u
rs
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
S
D
R
6
2
.9
M
w
it
h
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
e
x
-
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
-S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
F
in
a
n
c
in
g
II
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
1
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
8
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
8
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
-S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
F
in
a
n
c
in
g
II
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
1
0
th
J
a
n
u
a
ry
2
0
0
8
a
n
d
c
lo
se
d
o
n
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
8
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
c
li
m
a
te
th
ro
u
g
h
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
m
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
st
a
b
il
-
it
y
,
tr
a
d
e
li
b
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
c
o
re
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
in
d
u
st
ry
a
ls
o
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
in
c
re
a
si
n
g
tr
a
d
e
-G
D
P
ra
ti
o
a
n
d
lo
w
e
r
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
s
m
e
a
su
re
d
b
y
n
o
m
-
in
a
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e
R
e
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s;
(B
)
R
e
m
o
v
e
s
a
ll
q
u
o
ta
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
sc
a
li
n
g
d
o
w
n
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
te
c
-
ti
o
n
s
g
ra
d
u
a
ll
y
;
(C
)
P
ro
d
u
c
in
g
sa
ti
sf
a
c
to
ry
o
u
tc
o
m
e
w
it
h
a
c
tu
a
l
d
is
b
u
rs
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
S
D
R
6
2
.9
M
w
it
h
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
e
x
-
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
to
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
9
/
2
7
/
2
0
0
7
3
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
8
S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l
to
D
e
v
e
lo
p
-
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
2
7
th
S
e
p
te
m
-
b
e
r
2
0
0
7
u
n
ti
l
3
1
st
M
a
rc
h
2
0
0
8
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
c
li
m
a
te
th
ro
u
g
h
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
m
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
st
a
b
il
-
it
y
,
tr
a
d
e
li
b
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
c
o
re
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
in
d
u
st
ry
a
ls
o
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
in
c
re
a
si
n
g
tr
a
d
e
-G
D
P
ra
ti
o
a
n
d
lo
w
e
r
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
s
m
e
a
su
re
d
b
y
n
o
m
-
in
a
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e
R
e
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s;
(B
)
R
e
m
o
v
e
s
a
ll
q
u
o
ta
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
sc
a
li
n
g
d
o
w
n
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
te
c
-
ti
o
n
s
g
ra
d
u
a
ll
y
;
(C
)
P
ro
d
u
c
in
g
sa
ti
sf
a
c
to
ry
o
u
tc
o
m
e
w
it
h
a
c
tu
a
l
d
is
b
u
rs
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
S
D
R
4
9
M
w
it
h
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
/
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
P
o
li
c
y
L
e
n
d
in
g
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
5
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
7
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
8
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
IV
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
2
9
th
M
a
y
2
0
0
7
to
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
8
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
c
li
m
a
te
th
ro
u
g
h
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
m
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
st
a
b
il
-
it
y
,
tr
a
d
e
li
b
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
c
o
re
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
in
d
u
st
ry
a
ls
o
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
in
c
re
a
si
n
g
tr
a
d
e
-G
D
P
ra
ti
o
a
n
d
lo
w
e
r
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
s
m
e
a
su
re
d
b
y
n
o
m
-
in
a
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e
R
e
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s;
(B
)
R
e
m
o
v
e
s
a
ll
q
u
o
ta
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
sc
a
li
n
g
d
o
w
n
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
-
te
c
ti
o
n
s
g
ra
d
u
a
ll
y
;
(C
)
P
ro
d
u
c
in
g
h
ig
h
ly
sa
ti
sf
a
c
to
ry
o
u
tc
o
m
e
w
it
h
a
c
tu
a
l
d
is
b
u
rs
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
S
D
R
1
3
2
.2
M
w
it
h
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
ti
-
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
C
o
r-
ri
d
o
r
fo
r
T
ra
d
e
F
a
c
il
it
a
ti
o
n
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
7
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
6
5
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
2
6
th
J
u
ly
2
0
0
6
a
n
d
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
3
1
st
M
a
y
2
0
0
7
.
(A
)
P
re
p
a
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
p
ro
je
c
ts
fo
r
A
D
B
fu
n
d
-
in
g
o
n
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
li
n
k
s
a
n
d
a
n
c
il
la
ry
fa
c
il
it
ie
s
th
a
t
w
il
l
h
e
lp
fa
c
il
it
a
te
c
ro
ss
-b
o
rd
e
r
m
o
v
e
-
m
e
n
ts
o
f
g
o
o
d
s
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
”
P
a
d
m
a
M
u
lt
i-
p
u
rp
o
se
B
ri
d
g
e
P
ro
je
c
t
(f
o
rm
e
rl
y
S
u
p
p
o
rt
fo
r
P
u
b
li
c
-P
ri
v
a
te
P
a
rt
n
e
rs
h
ip
in
P
a
d
m
a
B
ri
d
g
e
)”
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
9
/
2
2
/
2
0
0
5
9
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
o
m
2
n
d
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
5
to
3
0
th
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
7
.
(A
)
A
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
in
fe
a
si
b
il
it
y
st
u
d
y
to
c
o
n
-
fi
rm
th
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
n
d
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l
v
ia
b
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
p
ro
je
c
t
e
n
su
ri
n
g
A
D
B
sa
fe
g
u
a
rd
re
q
u
ir
e
-
m
e
n
ts
su
c
h
a
s
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l,
so
c
ia
l,
a
n
d
re
-
se
tt
le
m
e
n
t
c
o
m
p
li
a
n
c
e
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
S
o
c
ia
l
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
o
f
P
o
o
r
F
e
m
a
le
W
o
rk
e
rs
in
th
e
G
a
rm
e
n
t
S
e
c
to
r
in
th
e
C
o
n
te
x
t
o
f
C
h
a
n
g
in
g
T
ra
d
e
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ts
”
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
W
o
m
e
n
a
n
d
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ff
a
ir
s”
3
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
4
1
2
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
7
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
p
e
ri
o
d
is
fr
o
m
1
6
th
M
a
rc
h
2
0
0
4
to
3
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
7
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
jo
b
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
a
n
d
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
o
f
p
o
v
e
rt
y
a
n
d
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
in
R
M
G
se
c
to
r
fo
r
fe
m
a
le
w
o
rk
e
rs
sp
e
c
ia
ll
y
th
o
se
w
h
o
a
re
a
ff
e
c
te
d
b
y
th
e
p
h
a
si
n
g
o
u
t
o
f
q
u
o
ta
u
n
d
e
r
M
F
A
;
(B
)
P
ro
v
is
io
n
o
f
tr
a
in
in
g
,
h
e
a
lt
h
c
a
re
,
li
v
e
li
h
o
o
d
c
o
u
n
se
li
n
g
a
n
d
so
c
ia
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
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T
h
ir
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
-
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
T
h
e
W
o
rl
d
B
a
n
k
,
G
o
v
e
rn
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
F
in
a
n
c
e
1
2
/
1
/
2
0
0
5
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
6
T
h
ir
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
u
p
-
p
o
rt
C
re
d
it
w
a
s
a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
o
n
1
st
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
5
a
n
d
c
lo
se
d
o
n
3
0
th
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
6
.
(A
)
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
c
li
m
a
te
th
ro
u
g
h
m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
m
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
st
a
b
il
-
it
y
,
tr
a
d
e
li
b
e
ra
li
z
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
st
re
n
g
th
e
n
in
g
c
o
re
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
o
f
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
in
d
u
st
ry
a
ls
o
w
it
h
th
e
o
b
-
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
in
c
re
a
si
n
g
tr
a
d
e
-G
D
P
ra
ti
o
a
n
d
lo
w
e
r
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
,
a
s
m
e
a
su
re
d
b
y
n
o
m
-
in
a
l
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
a
n
d
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e
R
e
st
ri
c
-
ti
o
n
s;
(B
)
R
e
m
o
v
e
s
a
ll
q
u
o
ta
re
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
sc
a
li
n
g
d
o
w
n
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
te
c
-
ti
o
n
s
g
ra
d
u
a
ll
y
;
(C
)
P
ro
d
u
c
in
g
sa
ti
sf
a
c
to
ry
o
u
tc
o
m
e
w
it
h
a
c
tu
a
l
d
is
b
u
rs
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
S
D
R
1
3
8
.1
M
w
it
h
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
o
f
e
x
-
p
o
rt
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
S
in
g
le
C
o
u
n
tr
y
N
o
n
e
S
o
c
ia
l
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
fo
r
D
is
a
d
v
a
n
-
ta
g
e
d
W
o
m
e
n
a
n
d
C
h
il
d
re
n
”
A
si
a
n
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
B
a
n
k
,
P
e
o
p
le
’s
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
,
G
o
v
-
e
rn
m
e
n
t
o
f
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
sh
M
in
is
tr
y
o
f
W
o
m
e
n
a
n
d
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ff
a
ir
s”
1
1
/
2
/
2
0
0
3
6
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
6
T
h
e
p
ro
je
c
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
is
fr
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Appendix F
Cycles and Seasonality
F.1 Cycles and Seasonality
Case studies describe a characterization of the seasonal patterns of procurement and
demand for ready made garment as follows.
The garment industry is characterized by short product life cycles, high differentiation
and product variety, a volatile demand and long supply processes. Products can be
divided roughly in three categories, according to their life cycle.
• Fashion products: 10 weeks product life, accounting for 35% of the market;
• Seasonal products: 20 weeks product life, accounting for 45% of the market;
• Basic products: sold throughout the year, accounting for 20% of the market.
Large specialised retailers (like J. C. Penney, H&M, GAP, etc.) tend to distinguish at
least five seasons:
• Fall 1: Delivery to retailers in July/August;
• Fall 2: Delivery to retailers in September/October;
• Holiday: Delivery to retailers in October/Mid November;
• Spring: Delivery to retailers in Late January / March;
• Summer: Delivery to retailers in March / Mid April.
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Retailers design process start around 40 weeks before the start of the season. High
turnaround companies, such as H&M and Zara design just 17 weeks before the season.
Production and transportation lead time adds up to an average of 3 months when
sourcing is done in developing countries. Manufacturers usually label the products with
the retailers’ price tags, place the garments on hangers and bags if necessary and ship
the product ready to be marketed.
F.2 Seasonality in our Dataset
The main products categories our empirical study looks at do not exhibit high seasonal-
ity, with volumes relatively constant over the year. There are only a few sub-categories
that exhibit a distinguishable seasonal patterns, when looking at the large buyers pur-
chases. The feature they all have in common is the material being wool, animal furs or
synthetic analogs, which are typically winter-specific. These are detailed below. In the
panel that we work with in chapter 2, these subcategories represent less than 0.002%
of the traded volumes, so in most of the cases, no adjustments to our estimations are
needed, besides standard seasonality controls.
Table F.1: Seasonal Products
Product Category Quarters First Season Second Season
620311 Men’s or Boys’ Suits, of Wool
or Fine Animal Hair
2 April-June October-December
620323 Men’s or Boys’ Ensembles, of
Synthetic Fibres
2 April-June October-December
620329 Men’s or Boys’ Ensembles, of
Other Textile Materials
2 January-March April-June
620411 Women’s or Girls’ Suits, of
Wool or Fine Animal Hair
3 January-March April-June
620421 Women’s or Girls’ Ensembles,
of Wool or Fine Animal Hair
3 January-March April-June
620423 Women’s or Girls’ Ensembles,
of Synthetic Fibres
3 January-March October-December
620431 Women’s or Girls’ Jackets, of
Wool or Fine Animal Hair
3 April-June July-September
620441 Women’s or Girls’ Dresses, of
Wool or Fine Animal Hair
1 April-June -
620444 Women’s or Girls’ Dresses, of
Artificial Fibres
1 April-June -
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Appendix G
Code
G.1 Matlab Code
What follows just includes the source file for the Monte Carlo exercise presented in
Chapter 4. This file, itself calls about 25 child functions nested in one another and
these are not included here in the interest of space. All the code and supporting files
are available upon request. Consider that the actual Monte Carlo (Chapter 4) was ran
accessing a cluster with 1800 Westmere cores (150 nodes) with 24GB of RAM, plus 11
nodes with 48 cores and 512 GB of RAM. For this reason, the code below was fragmented
to use 100 cores simultaneously and it is included here for illustrative purposes only.
Running this on a single computer as it is written here is virtually impossible.
1
2 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
3 % MPE Computation and Monte Carlo Exercise of Network Formation Game with
4 % Endogenous Bargaining.
5 %
6 % by Julia Cajal Grossi
7 %
8 % (Please do not circulate)
9 % (Last Updated: July 2014)
10 % (See draft paper)
11 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
12
13 % ======================================================================= %
14 % INDEX OF THIS FILE
15 %
16 % I) FORMAT OF THE DATA
17 % II) PRESENTATION OF THE MONTE CARLO EXERCISES
18 % III) CONSTANTS AND SEEDS
19 % IV) COMPUTING AN MPE OF THE GAME
20 % V) SIMULATION OF DATA COMING FROM THAT MPE
21 % VI) CALLING ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
22 % VI-A) CCPs
195
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23 % - Frequency with random assignments for unobserved;
24 % - Kernel (discrete / continuous);
25 % - Frequency with unconditional CPs imputed to unobserved;
26 % - Frequency with same probability imputed to unobserved;
27 % VI-B) FORWARDS SIMULATION
28 % VI-C) PARAMETERS (STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION L&F)
29 % VII) MONTE CARLO
30 % VIII) SAVING RESULTS AND STATISTICS
31 %
32 % ======================================================================= %
33
34 % ======================================================================= %
35 % I. FORMAT OF THE DATA:
36 % ======================================================================= %
37
38 % Matrix of size T x (1+(2xB)) where:
39 % T: to the total number of realisations of the network;
40 % (:,1): first column has the time indices;
41 % (:,2:B+1): following B columns , one for each buyer , with the index of
42 % the seller , j, buyer i is linked to;
43 % (:, B+2:2B+2): prices paid by each buyer , to its partner;
44
45 % Matrix of size 3 x B where:
46 % (1,:): Q(i), quantities for each buyer;
47 % (2,:): R(i), revenues (price in local market) for each buyer;
48 % (3,:): M(i), cost of material inputs for buyer;
49
50 % Matrix of size T x (B+S) where:
51 % each entry ==1 if the player is active (trading) in that period , zero
52 % otherwise.
53
54 % ======================================================================= %
55 % II. PRESENTATION OF THE MONTE CARLO:
56 % ======================================================================= %
57
58 % Constants remain as above. The implementation is for one market only.
59
60 % Specifics of the equilibrium in next section.
61
62 % Number of Monte Carlo simulations for every experiment:
63 MCS = 1000;
64
65 % Time periods (T):
66 % T = 50; % size(Data ,1);
67
68 % Parameter vector: (for 2 buyers , 2 sellers)
69
70 % --> (:,1): Cost of linking with old seller;
71 % --> (:,2): Cost of linking with new seller;
72 % --> (:,3): Bargaining parameter for buyer 1;
73 % --> (:,4): Bargaining parameter for buyer 2;
74 % --> (:,5): Heterogeneity of seller 1;
75 % --> (:,6): Heterogeneity of seller 2;
76
77 % Setting 2: Costs of linking; no heterogeneity; symmetric.
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78 theta_2 = [1 12 0.5 0.5 2 0.2 0.2 1]; %% OK
79
80
81 % ======================================================================= %
82 % III. CONSTANTS AND SEEDS:
83 % ======================================================================= %
84
85 % 0) Choice of experiment:
86 theta = theta_2;
87 % Rename parameters:
88 B_ij = zeros (1,2); % --> Two buyers
89 B_ij (:,1)= theta (:,3);
90 B_ij (:,2)= theta (:,4);
91 c_low = theta (:,1);
92 c_high = theta (:,2);
93 Rho_j = zeros (2,3); % --> Two sellers
94 Rho_j (1,1)=theta (:,5);
95 Rho_j (1,2)=theta (:,6);
96 Rho_j (2,1)=theta (:,7);
97 Rho_j (2,2)=theta (:,8);
98 %Rho_j (1,3)=theta (:,9);
99 %Rho_j (2,3)=theta (:,10);
100
101 % 1) PLAYERS:
102 B = 2; % Total Number of Buyers --> Load from data
103 S = 2; % Total Number of Sellers --> Load from data --> back to 3
104
105 % 2) STATES AND ACTIONS:
106 % Given the Players in the game , generate the states of the world and
107 % relevant matrices:
108 [Proposals , B_Actions , A_b , states , Move , G, Cou
109 nterfactuals , Gamma] = states_generator(B, S);
110 % --> This functions calls procedu
111 % re npermutek.m, which is NOT written by me.
112 % Available in Mathworks.
113 % If you cannot call npermutek , generate states as follows:
114 % Proposals=zeros(states ,B);
115 % for i=1:B
116 % Proposals(:,i)=kron(kron(ones(( B_Actions ^(i-1)) ,1),
117 % cumsum(ones(1,B_Actions))’), ones(B_Actions ^(B-i) ,1));
118 % end
119
120 % 3) PARAMETERS IN THE PROFIT FUNCTIONS AND BARGAINING GAME
121
122 beta =0.9; % Discount factor
123
124 % Quantities and Inputs --> Load from data
125 Q = [2 2]; % load(); % 2*(B,1); % Quatinties for each buyer.
126 M = 2*ones(B,1); % load(); % 2*ones(B,1); % Cost of material inputs per unit.
127 R = 100* ones(B,1); % load(); % 100* ones(B,1); % Per -unit revenue for the
buyer.
128 mkt_price = 90; % Per unit price of the garment as outside option for the
buyer.
129
130 % Costs of Linking
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131 Costs_of_linking = c_high*ones(B_Actions ,B_Actions); % --> rows are actions.
132 Costs_of_linking = Costs_of_linking + (-c_high+c_low)*eye(B_Actions ,B_Actions
);
133 Costs_of_linking(B_Actions ,:)= zeros(1,B_Actions);
134 % If the buyers chooses not to link , no cost; If he chooses to link with an
135 % existing supplier , c_low; if he chooses to link with a new supplier ,
136 % c_high. Same for all buyers.
137
138 % 4) MPE ITERATION CONTROLS
139 rho_cutoff =0.000625; % convergence cutoff criterion in
140 %the iteration over probabilities in MPE computation;
141 max_iter = 1000; % maximum number of iterations that
142 %will be allowed in the MPE "Outer" Loop
143
144 % 5) UNOBSERVABLES AND SHOCKS
145 sigmaeps =1;
146
147 % 6) VARIOUS SEEDS AND INITIALISATIONS
148 V_i=zeros(states ,B); % Value function for the buyers
149 Vs_i=zeros(states ,S); % Value function for the sellers
150 T_nash =(5* ones(B,S,states)).*G(:,1:S,:); % Prices for all players
151 P_i_a_g =1/ B_Actions*ones(B,B_Actions ,states); % Initialising CCPs
152 % stable_links=G; % Stability initial condition (all links are stable)
153 %seed=rng; %
154 %rng=seed;
155
156 % 7) FORWARD SIMULATION ITERATION CONTROLS
157 MAXITER = 500; % Maximum number of iteration in the fixed point problem (prices
to values)
158 paths = 500; % Paths is the number of different paths ,
159 % starting from a network , that the forward simulation
160 % will follow to average over and get the value functions.
161 T = 80; % the length of each path;
162 rho_cutoff_fs = 0.009; % cutoff for the fixed point problem (prices to value
functions).
163
164 % 8) SECOND STAGE CONTROLS
165 prob_diff_cutoff = 0.0001; % cutoff for the policy iteration in the second stage.
166 %Careful: Increasing this slows down the second stage consideraby.
167
168 % ======================================================================= %
169 % IV. COMPUTING AN MPE OF THIS GAME:
170 % ======================================================================= %
171
172 % Idenitfy the Setting to work with
173 name = num2str(theta);
174 char(’Computation of MPE - Experiment Setting: ’,
175 ’Costs of Linking , Bargaining Parameters , Match quality ’, name)
176 % Given constants and parameters above , compute an MPE of the game:
177 [Converge , Convergence_Path , Lim_Cycle_period , iter_MPE , Psteady_MPE ,
178 Prices_MPE , CCPs_MPE , Gamma_MPE , Trans_MPE , V_i_MPE , Vs_i_MPE] = Generate_MPE(
rho_cutoff ,
179 max_iter , B, S, B_Actions , states , Proposals , G, Counterfactuals , Move , P_i_a_g ,
180 sigmaeps , V_i , Vs_i , T_nash , M, Q, R, beta , mkt_price , Costs_of_linking , B_ij ,
Rho_j , Gamma);
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181
182 % ---------------------------- Outputs: ------------------------------- %
183 % --> Converge: Scalar = 0 if cnvergence not achieved.
184 % = 1 if convergence achieved.
185 % --> iter_MPE: Number of iterations until convergence.
186 % (max_iter if Convergence =0)
187 % --> Convergence_Path: max_iter x 1 vector storing
188 % the deviation in each loop until hitting the cutoff for
convergence.
189 % (zeros for the iterations never visited)
190 % --> Lim_Cycle_Period: scalar; contains the number of points
191 % the loop visits if it has not cobverged to a solution but to a
cycle.
192 % (if convergence , this is zero)
193 % --> Psteady_MPE: states x 1; contains the ergodic distribution of states.
194 % (if no convergence , zeros everywhere)
195 % --> Prices_MPE: matrix of size states x B containing the
196 % price paid by buyer (column) for the garment under each state (
row).
197 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
198 % --> CCPs_MPE: matrix of size states x (B*B_Actions) containing the CCPs
199 % for each player and action (columns) under each state (rows).
200 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
201 % --> Gamma_MPE: vector of size states x 1 containing the stable
202 % network in the Gamma stability mapping.
203 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
204 % --> Trans_MPE: matrix of size states x states with the equilibrium
205 % transitions over states.
206 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
207 % --> V_i_MPE: matrix of size states x B with the value functions for
208 % each buyer under each state.
209 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
210 % --> Vs_i_MPE: matrix of size states x S with the value functions
211 % for each seller under each state.
212 % (if no convergence , just shows last iteration)
213
214 % -------------------- Embedded Procedures: --------------------------- %
215 % The Generate_MPE function calls the following procedures:
216 % --> probability_objects: Given CCPs generates transitions
217 % over states and choice -conditional transitions;
218 % --> sellers_choice: Selects the link of max profit
219 % when seller is linked to more than one buyer and gives the
220 % stability rules;
221 % --> stage_profits_buyer: Computes stage profits of the buyers
222 % given the stability rules;
223 % --> value_function_updating: Generates value functions for all
224 % players via value function iteration;
225 % --> pricing_problem: Solves the Nash Bargaining problem for
226 % all linked pairs , in turn calling:
227 % --> outside_options: Computes outside options for all
228 % players given the negotiation network.
229
230 % ======================================================================= %
231 % V. SIMULATING DATA FROM THAT MPE:
232 % ======================================================================= %
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233
234 % ARGUMENTS FOR THE SIMULATION FUNCTION:
235 nobs = 2000; % Number of "observations"
236 psteady = Psteady_MPE; % vector states x
237 % 1 with the steady state probabilities
238 CCPs_MPE; % array of size B x Actions x
239 % states with the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities
240 B; % As described above
241 states; % As decribed above
242 B_Actions; % As described above
243 seed; % Generated above
244
245 [~, Net_Choices_sim] = simulation_MPE(nobs , CCPs_MPE ,
246 psteady , B, B_Actions ,states , seed , G);
247
248 Net_Stream_sim=zeros(nobs ,1);
249 for n=1:nobs ,
250 for s=1:states ,
251 if Proposals(s,:)== Net_Choices_sim(n,:),
252 Net_Stream_sim(n,1)=s;
253 end
254 end
255 end
256
257 % ======================================================================= %
258 % VI. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES:
259 % ======================================================================= %
260
261 % ============================ VI -A) CCPs ============================ %
262
263 [P_i_a_g_A , P_i_a_g_B , P_i_a_g_C , P_i_a_g_D , P_i_a_g_E ,
264 P_i_a_g_F] = CCPs(B, B_Actions , S, states , Net_Choices_sim , R, Net_Stream_sim);
265
266 % - Frequency with random assignments for unobserved (with and without cutoff);
267 % - Kernel (discrete / continuous);
268 % Kernel estimator for continuous state variable;
269 % Kernel estimator for discrete state variable;
270 % - Frequency with unconditional CPs imputed to unobserved;
271 % - Frequency with same probability imputed to unobserved;
272
273 % ====================== VI -B) FORWARDS SIMULATION ===================== %
274
275 P_i_a_g = zeros(B, B_Actions , states);
276 for n=1:states ,
277 for i=1:B,
278 for a=1: B_Actions ,
279 P_i_a_g(i,a,n) = CCPs_MPE(n,(a+( B_Actions*abs(B-i-1))));
280 end
281 end
282 end
283
284 % Initial arbitrary stability rule
285 Gamma_tau = Gamma_MPE;
286
287 stable_links = G;
Appendix G. Code 201
288 for n=1:states ,
289 stable_links (:,:,n) = G(:,:,Gamma(n));
290 end
291
292 T_tau =(5* ones(B,S,states)).*G(:,1:S,:);
293 for n=1:states ,
294 for i=1:B,
295 for j=1:S,
296 T_tau(i,j,n)=Prices_MPE(n,i)*stable_links(i,j,n);
297 end
298 end
299 end
300
301 V_i=V_i_MPE;
302 Vs_i=Vs_i_MPE;
303
304 [conv_vec_fs , Vs_i_star , V_i_star , T_nash_star , Gamma_star] = ForwardsSimulation(
V_i ,
305 Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , paths , T, B, S, B_Actions , states
,
306 Proposals , G, R, Rho_j , M, Q, mkt_price , Costs_of_linking , beta ,
307 Counterfactuals , B_ij , Move , P_i_a_g);
308
309 % Alternative 1: Solve for prices computing an MPE of the game and do not
310 % update prices in the forwards simulation (so no convergence), just the
311 % simulation.
312
313 % Alternative 2: leave the fixed point in prices and run the full
314 % convergence exercise.
315
316
317 % ========================== VI -C) PARAMETERS ========================== %
318
319 P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_E; % Or choose alternative
320
321 % TRUE PARAMETER VECTOR: [1 12 0.6 0.5 2 0.2 0.2 1]
322
323 % ALTERNATIVE 1: SCAN A GRID
324
325 CANDIDATES_VEC;
326
327 % ALTERNATIVE 2: MINIMIZATION:
328
329 [LF_estimates ,fval ,flag]= fminsearch(@(theta) minimize(theta , P_i_a_g ,
330 prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER ,
331 B, S, B_Actions , states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q,
332 mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move), [0.2 15 0.5 0.6 0 0.2 0.2 0]);
333
334 % ======================================================================= %
335 % VII. MONTE CARLO:
336 % ======================================================================= %
337
338 % Runs with variations in first and second stage:
339
340 % Frist stage:
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341 % A) P_i_a_g_A: simple frequency estimator (1 to 4)
342 % B) P_i_a_g_D: frequency estimator with kernel (5 to 8)
343 % C) P_i_a_g_E: frequencies with unconditional assumption (9 to
344 % 12)
345 % D) P_i_a_g_F: frequencies with all actions same proba (13 to
346 % 16)
347 % E) P_i_a_g_G: True probabilities (16 to 20)
348
349 % Second stage:
350 % A) Use all states and treat prices as unknown
351 % B) Use all states and exploit observed prices
352 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as unknown
353 % D) Use observed states and exploit observed prices
354
355 nexper = 5*4; % 20 EXPERIMENTS
356 RESULTS_MATRIX = zeros (100,8, nexper);
357
358 % Grid of candidate parameters to scan:
359 CANDIDATES_VEC;
360 for repli =1:1000 % 1000 runs for each estimator
361
362 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% GENERATE SAMPLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
363
364 nobs = 2000; % Number of "observations"
365 psteady = Psteady_MPE; % vector states x 1 with
366 % the steady state probabilities
367 CCPs_MPE; % array of size B x Actions x states with
368 % the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities
369 B; % As described above
370 states; % As decribed above
371 B_Actions; % As described above
372 %seed; % Generated above
373
374 [~, Net_Choices_sim] = simulation_MPE(nobs , CCPs_MPE
375 , psteady , B, B_Actions ,states , G);
376 % Note that in actual data I don ’t observe the
377 %action , but I infer it from the evolution of states
378
379 Net_Stream_sim=zeros(nobs ,1);
380 for n=1:nobs ,
381 for s=1:states ,
382 if Proposals(s,:)== Net_Choices_sim(n,:),
383 Net_Stream_sim(n,1)=s;
384 end
385 end
386 end
387
388 Observed_states=zeros(states ,1);
389 for s=1: states
390 for n=1: nobs
391 if Net_Stream_sim(n,1)==s
392 Observed_states(s,1) = Observed_states(s,1)+1;
393 end
394 end
395 end
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396
397 Observed_states (:,1) = (Observed_states (:,1) >0);
398 Prices_MPE;
399
400 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% RUN ALTERNATIVE FIRST STAGES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
401
402 [P_i_a_g_A , ~, ~, P_i_a_g_D , P_i_a_g_E , P_i_a_g_F] = CCPs(B,
403 B_Actions , S, states , Net_Choices_sim , R, Net_Stream_sim);
404
405 P_i_a_g_G = zeros(B, B_Actions , states);
406 for n=1:states ,
407 for i=1:B,
408 for a=1: B_Actions ,
409 P_i_a_g_G(i,a,n) = CCPs_MPE(n,(a+( B_Actions*abs(B-i-1))));
410 end
411 end
412 end
413
414
415 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% RUN ALTERNATIVE SECOND STAGES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
416
417 for exper = 1: nexper
418 %
419 % if exper <=4
420 % base = 1;
421 % P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_A;
422 % % A) P_i_a_g_A: simple frequency estimator
423 %
424 % if exper == base % A) Use all states and treat prices as
unknown
425 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF(CANDIDATES_VEC ,
426 % P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
427 % rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths , T,
428 % Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move);
429 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
430 % end
431 %
432 % if exper == base+1 % B) Use all states and exploit observed
prices
433 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs(
Observed_states ,
434 % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i ,
435 % Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
436 % states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
437 % Counterfactuals , Move);
438 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
439 % end
440 %
441 % if exper == base+2 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as
unknown
442 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_res(
Observed_states ,
443 % CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i ,
Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
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444 % rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths , T,
Proposals ,
445 % G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move);
446 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
447 % end
448 %
449 % % if exper == base+3 % D) Use observed states and exploit
observed prices
450 % % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs_res(
Observed_states ,
451 % % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i
, Vs_i , Gamma_tau ,
452 % % T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states ,
paths , T,
453 % % Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals ,
Move);
454 % % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
455 % % end
456 %
457 % end
458
459 if exper >4 && exper <=8
460 base = 5;
461 P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_D;
462 % B) P_i_a_g_D: frequency estimator with kernel
463
464 if exper == base % A) Use all states and treat prices as unknown
465 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF(CANDIDATES_VEC ,
466 P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
467 rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
468 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move
);
469 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
470 end
471
472 if exper == base+1 % B) Use all states and exploit observed
prices
473 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs(Observed_states ,
474 Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i
,
475 Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
476 states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
477 Counterfactuals , Move);
478 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
479 end
480
481 if exper == base+2 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as
unknown
482 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_res(Observed_states ,
483 CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau ,
484 T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
485 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals ,
486 Move);
487 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
488 end
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489
490 % if exper == base+3 % D) Use observed states and exploit
observed prices
491 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs_res(
Observed_states ,
492 % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i
,
493 % Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
494 % states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price ,
495 % beta , Counterfactuals , Move);
496 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
497 % end
498
499 end
500
501 if exper >8 && exper <=12
502 base = 9;
503 P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_E;
504 % C) P_i_a_g_E: frequencies with unconditional assumption
505
506 if exper == base % A) Use all states and treat prices as unknown
507 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF(CANDIDATES_VEC ,
508 P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
509 rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
510 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
511 Counterfactuals , Move);
512 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
513 end
514
515 if exper == base+1 % B) Use all states and exploit observed
prices
516 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs(Observed_states ,
517 Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff ,
518 V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER ,
519 B, S, B_Actions , states , paths , T, Proposals , G,
520 R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move);
521 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
522 end
523
524 if exper == base+2 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as
unknown
525 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_res(Observed_states ,
526 CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau ,
527 T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
528 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move
);
529 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
530 end
531
532 % if exper == base+3 % D) Use observed states and exploit
observed prices
533 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs_res(
Observed_states ,
534 % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i
,
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535 % Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states
,
536 % paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
Counterfactuals , Move);
537 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
538 % end
539
540 end
541
542 if exper >12 && exper <=16
543 base = 13;
544 P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_F;
545 % D) P_i_a_g_F: frequencies with all actions same proba
546
547 if exper == base % A) Use all states and treat prices as unknown
548 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF(CANDIDATES_VEC ,
549 P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
550 rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
551 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals ,
Move);
552 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
553 end
554
555 if exper == base+1 % B) Use all states and exploit observed
prices
556 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs(Observed_states ,
557 Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i ,
558 Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
559 states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
560 Counterfactuals , Move);
561 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
562 end
563
564 if exper == base+2 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as
unknown
565 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_res(Observed_states ,
566 CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau ,
567 T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
568 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move
);
569 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
570 end
571
572 % if exper == base+3 % D) Use observed states and exploit
observed prices
573 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs_res(
Observed_states ,
574 % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i
,
575 % Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
states ,
576 % paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
Counterfactuals , Move);
577 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
578 % end
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579
580 end
581
582 if exper >16 && exper <=20
583 base = 17;
584 P_i_a_g = P_i_a_g_G;
585 % E) P_i_a_g_G: True probabilities
586
587 if exper == base % A) Use all states and treat prices as unknown
588 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF(CANDIDATES_VEC ,
589 P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau ,
590 rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
591 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
592 Counterfactuals , Move);
593 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
594 end
595
596 if exper == base+1 % B) Use all states and exploit observed
prices
597 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs(Observed_states ,
598 Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i
,
599 Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions ,
600 states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
601 Counterfactuals , Move);
602 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
603 end
604
605 if exper == base+2 % C) Use observed states and treat prices as
unknown
606 [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_res(Observed_states ,
607 CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff , V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau ,
608 T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER , B, S, B_Actions , states , paths ,
609 T, Proposals , G, R, M, Q, mkt_price , beta ,
610 Counterfactuals , Move);
611 RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
612 end
613
614 % if exper == base+3 % D) Use observed states and exploit
observed prices
615 % [MinObjFun , Beta] = Structural_Estimation_LF_obs_res(
Observed_states ,
616 % Prices_MPE , CANDIDATES_VEC , P_i_a_g , prob_diff_cutoff ,
617 % V_i , Vs_i , Gamma_tau , T_tau , rho_cutoff_fs , MAXITER ,
618 % B, S, B_Actions , states , paths , T, Proposals , G, R,
619 % M, Q, mkt_price , beta , Counterfactuals , Move);
620 % RESULTS_MATRIX(repli ,:,exper)= Beta;
621 % end
622
623 end
624
625
626 end
627
628 end
Appendix H
An Example Illustrating
Endogenous Outside Options
H.1 Varying Marginal Costs
This section offers a very simple exposition of a small static 2 × 1 game, with a fixed
network under different specifications of the outside options 1.
Consider a setting with 2 buyers, b1 and b2, with a value for the good equal to R, a unit
demand and an outside option of value zero. Assume there is a unique seller, s, who can
supply one unit of the good with an overall production cost of c1 and two units with
the cost c2, where c1 < c2. For simplicity, fix all bargaining parameters to be equal to
0.5 so surplus is distributed equally across bargaining parties. Consider an exogenously
determined negotiation network, g that looks as follows:
S1
B1
B2
1This section, as well as important modifications in the specification of the general bargaining model
presented in this paper, were motivated by very fruitful discussions with Ariel Rubinstein, whose com-
ments are gratefully acknowledged. All mistakes are mine.
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Focus on the bargaining outcome for the pair b1−s. The surplus for b1 in this relation is
given by R− tb1s. The surplus for the seller in this setting is (tb1s+ tb2s−c2)−( ˆtb2s−c1),
where ˆtb2s is the counterfactual price s would obtain from b2 if b1 and s were not trading.
Different specifications on ˆtb2s are possible.
H.1.1 The no-renegotiation assumption
One possible specification assumes no renegotiations are possible after disagreement
takes place, so ˆtb2s = tb2s and the counterfactual price with b2 in the bargaining problem
between b1 and s is equivalent to the equilibrium price with b2 under agreement. Under
the parametrisation above, t∗b1s =
R+c2−c1
2 . Note that in this case, the price agreed on
with b2 plays no role in the determination of tb1s.
H.1.2 Allowing for a network effect
Alternatively, it could be the case that if the link b1− s was to break, the price s would
obtain from b2 would be different from tb2s, as the network on which b2 and s would be
barging would be:
S1
B1
B2
In this context, tb2s =
R+c1
2 . If this is taken into account as the counterfactual scenario
for the seller in the negotiation with b1 when the links with both buyers are active, then
t∗′b1s =
1
2(R+
2c2−c1
3 ).
It can be seen that whenever c2 > 2c1, t
∗
b1s
> t∗′b1s. Under this specification, with constant
marginal costs (so c2 = 2c1), both specifications for the outside option of the seller would
render the same result. Departures from that case then, would have an implication on
the equilibrium prices and gains from trade.
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H.2 Capacity Constraints
Now, assume that the seller can only produce one unit a cost c. A network with two
edges like the one above cannot arise and the bargaining process ends breaking one or
other link. Now, the surplus from the relationship b1− s for the buyer is given again by
R− tb1s. The surplus for the seller is now (tb1s− c)− (max{ ˆtb2s− c; 0}), where ˆtb2s is the
counterfactual price s would obtain from b2 if b1 and s were to break their link. Note
that if ˆtb2s − c < 0, t∗b1s = R−c2 . Whenever that inequality condition is reverted, it can
be easily seen that t∗b1s = R and the seller extracts all the surplus of the relationship.
However, if, as before, ˆtb2s was to be specified in the counterfactual network arising from
deleting the link with b1 and bargaining only with b2, then ˆtb2s =
R+c
2 and t
∗′
b1s
= 3R+c4 .
It can be easily seen that whenever c > R, trade between b1 and s will not occur. But
whenever c < R, the equilibrium price will be strictly smaller than R, so s will not be
able to capture the whole of the gains from trade.
Generalising this result to a case in which the seller is linked to B buyers, t∗bs =
2BR+c
2B
,
which approaches t∗bs = R as B grows large. Extensions allowing for heterogeneity in
players’ outside options, reservations and costs are straightforward.
Appendix I
Measuring Unobserved
Heterogeneity: Data Restrictions
and Estimation
I.1 Input Costs
The first restriction we face when using fixed effects to recover the types of the manufac-
turers is the lack of information on labour inputs. We know from our visits to Bangladesh
that for the set of products we are considering, the technology is fairly similar across
firms. We have no information, however, on whether there are differences across firms
on the quality or skills of their workers or the wages they offer. Below I present a very
crude approximation to the share of labour in the cost of production of garments.
Table I.1: Share of (line) labour costs in costs of garment - Lower bound approxima-
tion
Mins Per Kilo Cost of Labour Cost of Fabric Share of Labour
Product Median USD USD %
Jacket 60.78 0.27 11.04 2.40
Shirt 19.34 0.09 7.50 1.14
Trouser 30.36 0.14 9.80 1.36
Minutes per kilo: Median of minutes (SMVs) in the production line by product
taken over all the orders that 20+ firms received over a year; both estimated
and actual times were used. Cost of Labour estimated using a monthly wage
of USD61. Cost of Fabric: Estimated using a fabric-to-output weight ratio of 1
and prices of fabric for the 25th percentile of prices in Bangladesh Local.
The table above shows that the share of labours cost in the line over material + labour
costs is between 1 and 2.4%. Although this is very limited exercise (in various ways, for
example, it includes only minutes in the line and excludes the times of managers, etc.)
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and needs to read with utmost caution, it offers a rough idea on orders of magnitude of
fabric and labour.
Consistent with the picture we present here, in 2006 an ILO/UNDP project (BGD/85/153)
estimated the overall average minutes-person required for the production of a piece of
garment (including all the labour in basic worker equivalence) to be 25 in Bangladesh
(for comparison, 19.7 in Hong Kong, 20 in Korea). If in a kilo of garment there were 6
items (which would be, for example, the case for very light shirts), the resulting estima-
tion of labour requirement would be more than twice the minutes I have estimated in
the table above and still the overall cost of labour would have a share over the cost of
material inputs + labour below 7% 1.
A more systematic study was carried out by Kee (2006), who using a World Bank
survey on 1,000+ firms estimated productivity in the sector finding coefficients of 0.01
for capital, 0.23 for labour and 0.76 for material inputs.
Turning to material inputs, the nature of our data is such that we only observe imported
fabric, but not the fabric that is domestically procured. The selection of products we
are working with eases off the challenges that this might impose, as we know there is
nearly no local production of woven fabrics for the categories we consider. However, we
have no information on whether third parties import fabric and re-sell domestically.
Out of the 7,800 manufacturers operating before 2012 in the whole of the panel (all
products), about 2,900 import fabric at some point in the panel. There manufactur-
ers cover 91% of all the export transactions in garment and 94% of the value of all
exports. Moreover, more than 902% of the export transactions of the woven garment
manufacturers in this subgroup are matched with at least one import transaction.
The weight of the exported garment consists mainly of the fabric needed to produce
them, so the theoretical input-to-output ratio of weights is around one. Out of the
2,700, the median seller has a ratio of 0.5. However, if we restrict the sample to those
producers that are more specialized in woven (i.e. that at least half of the value of their
exports corresponds to woven products – a total of almost 1,400 sellers) that median
is above 0.8 (and 1% is 0.61) 2. These specialized sellers cover more than 75% of the
1The wages used in the ILO study correspond to 0.22 dollars per hour in Bangladesh, compared to
0.55 in China, 0.51 in India. Also, the wage of a chief quality controller (top of the scale) is 3.2 times
the wage of an unskilled worker.
2The exact input-to-output weight ratio can be a characteristic of the exported product. For example,
coats and jackets with zips, buttons, etc. have added weight in the final product that does not come
from fabric. Controlling for the exported product should, among other things, take care of the ”average”
technical relation between the fabric weights and the output weight. Having controlled for that, low
ratios can also represent firms that have a higher proportion of domestically sourced inputs. Verhoogen
and Kugler (2009) show that a) prices of inputs are a good proxi for the quality of the inputs (i.e. do not
reflect differences in transportation costs) and b) that plants purchasing high quality imported inputs
also purchase high quality domestic inputs. They observe a high and robust correlation between the
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exports of woven products.
To assess whether there is a domestic re-sell market of imported fabric, I considered
all the imports of fabric (of any kind) coming into Bangladesh (without restrictions
on the importing firm. The table below shows three facts: (i) of all the imports of
fabric in Bangladesh, 96% are done by exporters (not only RMG, but firms that export
in any category); (ii) 95% of all the imported fabrics is imported directly by RMG
manufacturers; (iii) from the remaining imports of fabrics, only 1.8% corresponds to
firms that could potentially supply fabric locally for RMG manufacturers 3.
Table I.2: Importers of Relevant Inputs
Fabric
Percentages over all Exports
Imported by Non-Exporters 0.038
Imported by Exporters 0.962
Percentages over all exports imported by Exporters
Woven Garments 0.817
Knitted Garments 0.133
Textile Articles (linen, blankets, etc.) 0.018
Cotton, yarn and woven fabrics* 0.012
Minerals and oils 0.003
Special fabrics* 0.003
Textiles for Industrial Use 0.003
Knitted Fabrics* 0.002
Yarns and man-made fibres* 0.000
I.2 Estimation
Consider that prices can be decomposed as in the equation above and that we now
change the notation slightly so matrix X collects the time and product fixed effects, we
drop the k subindex and stack observations over time and i:
y˜ = X˜β + D˜θ + F˜ψ + ˜ (I.1)
where D is N ∗×N and is the design matrix for sellers effects, F is N ∗×J and collects the
buyer effects and X contains M columns, one for each regressor. With Ti observations
per individual (assuming away the different k’s for ease of notation), N∗ = ∑i Ti. The
statistical error is assumed to have a zero mean, a finite variance and to be orthogonal
to all other effects in the model. Dummy variables are included for all the buyers and
the seller effect are swept out via within transformation, so D˜ becomes the null matrix.
prices of domestic inputs and imported inputs. Therefore, using the price of the imported input and
controlling for the input-to-output ratio seems to be sufficient for accounting for unit input costs.
3Categorisation of importers in sub-sector is done using the main product exported by the firm.
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The notation above corresponds to one-to-one matching, because it gets cumbersome to
represent the matrices otherwise. But Abowd and Stinson (2003) present a complete
exposition that allows for many-to-many matching during the same period and with a
third level in the panel section (the product).
y = Fψ +Xβ +  (I.2)
It is shown in Abowd et al. (2002) that this is algebraically equivalent to introducing
dummy variables for both sets of players. Estimation of the full model by fixed effects
methods requires a special algorithm to deal with the high dimensionality of the problem.
So the matrix system will be solved by re-arranging the rows and columns in the matrices
to have the players ordered according to their ”component” of the network. So groups
are defined to contain the maximally connected subgraphs of the graph and the groups
block-diagonalise the matrix (with X ′X,X ′F, F ′X,F ′F ) and with each group, all but
one fixed effect can be estimated. Then, the sellers that don’t change firms have zeros
in their entries of the F matrix, so the computation will use the information on all the
players for X ′X and only on those groups that have ”movers” for the rest of it.
For concreteness, the estimation starts by performing the within transformation over i,
and then the system to be solved is:
[
X ′X X ′F
F ′X F ′F
][
β
ψ
]
=
[
X ′y
F ′y
]
(I.3)
which is:
[ [X ′X 0
0 0
]
+
∑
i∈Movers
[
0 X ′F
F ′X F ′F
] ][β
ψ
]
=
[
X ′y
0
]
+
∑
i∈Movers
[
0
F ′y
]
(I.4)
Then, the submatrices X ′X and X ′y are computed on the whole of the sample. Then
the de-meaned matrix F is generated only over the movers. Effectively, to run the
estimation only the non-zero columns are included (of dimension Ti × s for seller i with
s buyers. So F ′sX and its transpose and F ′sy are computed and the system is solved for
β and ψ.
To obtain the seller effects (I have labeled the outcome variable, i.e. the prices, as y to
keep it consistent with the notation in the literature):
θˆi = yi − ψˆi − xiβˆ (I.5)
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where ψˆi averages ψˆji over t and all the relevant j’s.
The fixed effect for the seller contains both effects of time invariant observable char-
acteristics of the seller and its unobserved heterogeneity. Assume this is decomposed
in:
θi = αi + uiν (I.6)
where αi is the unobservable component and ui is a vector of time invariant firm char-
acteristics. In Abowd et al. (1999) it is shown that regressing θˆi on ui one can obtain
consistent estimates of ν. Then αi can be recovered as the difference between θˆi and the
linear fit from that auxiliary regression.
Appendix J
Qualitative Characterisation of
Large Buyers: Factsheets
Table J.1: H&M
Name of the Firm Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M)
Description (A) Swedish multinational retail-clothing company; (B) Known for
fast-fashion clothing for men, women, teenagers and children
Parent Company H&M
Description of Parent
Company
Not applicable
Year of Creation 1947
Country of Origin Sweden
Founder Erling Persson
Relevant M&A (A) Erling Persson opened Hennes in 1947; (B) Acquired Mauritz
Widforrs, a hunting apparel retailer, in 1968, hence the name Hennes
& Mauritz (H&M).
Main Products (A) Women; (B) Men; (C) Kids; (D) Divided; (E) Denim; (F) Under-
wear; (G) Sportswear
Main Brand (A) H&M; (B) COS; (C) Monki; (D) Weekday; (E) Cheap Monday;
(F) & Other Stories
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 23.03 billion (incl. VAT) in 2013; (B) USD 19.74 billion
(excl. VAT) in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and cosmetics to con-
sumers
Markets (A) Asia Pacific; (B) Middle East and North Africa; (C) North and
South America; (D) Europe
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) Germany (20%); (B) U.S.A. (10%); (C) France (7%); (D) UK
(7%); (E) Sweden (5%) of sales
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh in 2013; (B)
Skills training centers for helpers and fresh people in 1999
Source H&M History; H&M Regions; H&M Report; H&M Products; Oanda
Exchange Rate
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Table J.2: Asda
Name of the Firm Asda Stores Ltd. (Asda)
Description (A) British supermarket chain which retails food, clothing, gen-
eral merchandise, toys and financial services; (B) Uses the slogan
”Britain’s Lowest Priced Supermarket” to promote itself
Parent Company Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Description of Parent
Company
(A) Known as Walmart, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is an American multi-
national retail corporation; (B) Founded by Sam Walton on 1962 in
U.S; (C) Owned and controlled by the Walton Family
Year of Creation 1949
Country of Origin United Kingdom
Founder Yorkshire Farmers
Relevant M&A (A) Associated Dairies and Asquiths dealed and created Asda Stores
Ltd., where two names of party, Asquith and Dairies, were combined;
(B) George Davies Partnership (George Clothing) was introduced into
Asda stores in 1989; (C) Waltermart acquired Asda in 1999; (D) Asda
George Clothing was named after George Davies, founder of Next
Main Products (A) Blazers Coats and Jackets; (B) Dresses and Jeans; (C) Jumpers
and Cardigans; (D) Jumpsuits and Playsuits (E) Lingerie; (F) Ma-
ternity; (G) Nightwear; (H) Onesies; (I) Polo Shirt; (J) Shirts and
Blouses; (K) Skirts; (L) Socks and Tights; (M) Swimwear; (N) Tops;
(O)Trousers and Shorts; (P) Sweatshirts and Hoodies; (Q) Ties and
Underwear
Main Brand George Clothing
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 26.8 billion in 2006; (B) USD 26 billion in 2005; (C) USD
21.7 billion in 2004
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
USD 3.19 billion in 2005
Markets United Kingdom
Rank in UK Mintel Group Ltd., a London-based market research firm, estimates
George clothing as the fourth largest retailer of clothing in UK after
Marks and Spencer, Arcadia Group, and Next
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) George Clothing came up and comitted to a project called Lean
Manufacturing to in increase factory productivity, improve worker
skills and quality; (B) Works with Bangladeshi NGO’s such as Phulki
that promotes the rights of women and children and HERproject that
promotes the health and empowerment of 20000 female workers; (C)
George Clothing opened office in Bangladesh on 2010 to further de-
velop their relationship with factory owners and workers and NGO’s
Source Asda History; Walmart History; Asda Report; Walmart Report; Wal-
mart Report; Relationship with Bangladesh
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Table J.3: Walmart
Name of the Firm Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart)
Description (A) American multinational retail corporation; (B) Owned and con-
trolled by Walton Family; (C) Operates in 27 countires under a total
of 55 different names; (D) Officially incorporated as Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.
Parent Company Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1962
Country of Origin U.S.A
Founder Sam Walton
Relevant M&A (A) Sam Walton purchased a branch of Ben Franklin Stores from the
Butler Brothers in 1945; (B) Publicly listed in 1970; (C) Acquired
Asda, a british supermarket chain, in 1999; (D) Sam Walton opened
the first Sam’s Club in 1983; (E) Acquired a majority of interest in
Seiyu, one of the largest supermarket chains in Japan, which became a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Walmart in 2008; (F) Walmart in Mexico
acquired a majority position in Cifra in 1997 and changed the name
to Walmart de Mexico (Walmex) 3 years after
Main Products (A) Baby and Toddler; (B) Boys; (C) Girls; (D) Intimates and
Loungewares; (E) Juniors and Juniors Plus; (F) Maternity; (G) Men’s;
(H) Big and Tall; (I) Women’s and Wonen’s Plus; (J) Young Men’s
Main Brand (A) Asda; (B) Sam’s Club; (C) Seiyu Group; (D) Walmex
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 466.11 billion net sales in 2013; (B) USD 443.85 billion net
sales in 2012
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
USD 31.07 billion or 7 % of net sales in 2012
Markets (A) Africa; (B) Agentina; (C) Brazil; (D) Canada; (E) Central Amer-
ica; (F) Chile; (G) China; (H) India; (I) Japan; (J) Mexico; (K)
United Kingdom
Market Share in US
and International
(A) Walmart U.S. (58%) in 2013; (B) Walmart International (29%)
in 2013; (C) Sam’s Club (12%) of sales in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Encourages Bangladesh government to review the minimum wages
for wokers in garment industry by joining other leading brands and
retailers; (B) Organises supply chain meeting focused on fire safety,
conducting fire drills, and fire safety training; (C) Launched The Al-
liance for Bangladesh Worker Safety in coalition with North American
retailers
Source Walmart History; Walmart Countries of Operation; Walmart Gar-
ment Products; Walmart Report; Relationship with Bangladesh; ABC
News
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Table J.4: Gap
Name of the Firm The Gap, Inc. (Gap)
Description (A) American multinational clothing and accessories retailer; (B) Op-
erates six primary divisions, namely Gap, Banana Republic, Old Navy,
Piperlime, Intermix, and Athleta
Parent Company The Gap, Inc.
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1969
Country of Origin U.S.A.
Founder Donald Fisher and Doris F. Fisher
Relevant M&A (A) San Francisco-based Gap Inc. brought Banana Republic into
the Gap Inc. Family in 1983; (B) Athleta was founded in 1998 and
acquired by Gap Inc. on 2008; (C) Intermix was founded in 1993 and
was acquired by Gap Inc. on 2012
Main Products (A) Men; (B) Women and Women Plus; (C) Maternity; (D) Girls;
(E) Boys; (F) Toddler Girls and Boys; (G) Baby Girls and Boys; (H)
Petites; (I) Athletes
Main Brand (A) Gap; (B) Banana Republic; (C) Old Navy; (D) Piperlime; (E)
Intermix; (F) Athleta
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 16.15 billion in 2013; (B) USD 15.65 billion in 2012; (C)
USD 14.55 billion in 2011
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) Asia; (B) America; (C) Europe; (D) Africa; (E) Middle East
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) U.S.A. (78%); (B) Canada (7%); (C) Europe (5%); (D) Asia (9%);
(E) Others (1%) of sales in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
Provided help to Bangladesh garment workers in keeping the factories
protected through fire and safety plan called the The Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety
Source Gap History; Gap Inc. Report; Relationship with Bangladesh; Oanda
Exchange Rate
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Table J.5: Levis
Name of the Firm Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi’s)
Description (A) Privately held American clothing company known worldwide for
its Levi’s brand of denim jeans; (B) Founded in 1853 when Levi
Strauss came from Buttenheim, Bavaria to San Francisco, Califor-
nia to open a west coast branch of his brothers’ New York dry goods
business; (C) Corporate headquarters located at Levi’s Plaza in San
Francisco; (B) Made the first pair of Levis 501 jeans in 1890s
Parent Company Levi Strauss & Co.
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1853
Country of Origin U.S.A
Founder Levi Strauss
Relevant M&A (A) Expanded by adding new fashions and models, including stoned
washed jeans, through the acquisition of a Canadian clothing manu-
facturere, the Great Western Garment Co. (GWG) in 1972; (B) Ex-
panded from 16 plants to more than 63 plants in the United States and
23 overseas in just over the decade from 1964 to 1974; (C) Launched
the Dockers brand in 1986, largely sold through department store
chains in the United States; (D) Introduced Dockers into Europe in
1996; (E) Partnered with Filson, an outdoor goods manufacturer in
Seattle, in 2010 to produce a high-end line of jackets and workwear
Main Products (A) Jeans; (B) Pants; (C) Shorts; (D) Shirt Top; (E) Outerwear; (F)
Jackets and Vests; (G) Dresses and Skirts
Main Brand (A) Levi’s; (B) Dockers; (C) Signature; (D) Denizen
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 4.68 billion in 2013; (B) USD 4.61 billion in 2012; (C) USD
4.76 billion in 2011
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) America; (B) Europe; (C) Asia; (D) Middle East; (E) Africa
Market Share by Re-
gion
(A) Americas (61%); (B) Europe (24%); (C) Asia Pacific (2%) of sales
in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
Maintains relationship with 13 factory suppliers of garment from
Bangladesh as of 2014
Source Levis; Levis History; Levis Products; Levis Report; List of Suppliers
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Table J.6: Next
Name of the Firm Next Plc (Next)
Description (A) British multinational clothing, footwear and home products re-
tailer; (B) Headquarts located in Enderby, Leicestershire; (C) Op-
erates around 700 stores, 597 in the UK and Ireland and around
200 are in continental Europe, Asia and the Middle East; (D) The
largest clothing retailer by sales in the UK, having overtaken Marks
& Spencer in early 2012 and 2014
Parent Company Next Plc
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1864
Country of Origin United Kingdom
Founder Joseph Hepworth
Relevant M&A (A) Hepworth & Son acquired Kendall & Sons Ltd, a Leicester-based
rainwear and ladies fashion company from Combined English Stores
in 1982 in order to redevelop the Kendall’s stores as a womenswear
chain of shops. Terence Conran, the designer, was Chairman of Hep-
worth’s at this time and he recruited George Davies, who went on
to become Chief Executive of Next; (B) Acquired Combined English
Stores and the Grattan catalogue company in 1987; (C) Introduced
Next childrenswear and the Next Directory in 1987 and 1988 respec-
tively; (D) Sold 433 jewellery stores in the United Kingdom, which
principally traded under the Salisburys and Zales brands, to the Rat-
ners Group for USD232 million in October 1988; (E) Bought the youth
brand Lipsy in 2008; (F) Launched an online catalogue for the United
States in 2009 offering clothing, shoes, and accessories for women,
men and children
Main Products (A) Coats and Jackets; (B) Dresses; (C) Jeans; (D) Knitwear; (E)
Lingerie; (F) Skirts; (G) Sportswear; (H) Swim and Beachwear; (I)
Tops, Tshirts, Polos and Blouses; (J) Trousers and Leggings; (K)
Underwear; (L) Sweat Tops and Hoodies
Main Brand (A) Next Retail; (B) Next Directory; (C) Next International
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 3.13 billion (Next Retail); (B) USD 1.56 billion (Next Di-
rectory); (C) USD 4.69 billion (Next Brand) in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) United Kingdom; (B) Continental Europe; (C) Asia; (D) Middle
East
Sales by Brand (A) Next Retail (21%, representing 500 retail branches in UK and
Ireland); (B) Next Directory (11%); (C) Next Brand (32%) of sales
in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Provides training for factory management and personnel; (B) As-
sists in strategic improvement of workers safety by re-aligning existing
expertise; (C) Supports the development of industry, building and fire
safety action plan
Source Next Brands and Products; Next Report; Relationship with
Bangladesh; Oanda Exchange Rate
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Table J.7: Primark
Name of the Firm Primark
Description (A) An Irish clothing retailer, first opened by Arthur Ryan in June
1969 in Dublin under the name Penneys, operating in Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom; (B) Main headquarters located in Dublin;
(C) A subsidiary of international food, ingredients and retail group
Associated British Foods; (D) Employs 48000 people
Parent Company Associated British Foods
Description of Parent
Company
(A) ABF a diversified group of businesses grouped into five business
segments, namely sugar, agriculture, retail, grocery, and ingredients;
(B) A diversified international food, ingredients and retail group with
sales of £13.3bn and over 113,000 employees in 47 countries
Year of Creation 1969
Country of Origin Ireland
Founder Arthur Ryan
Relevant M&A (A) Opened first store in Dublin, Ireland in 1969; (B) Purchased the
Littlewoods chain in 2005; (C) Opened first concession model in 2011
to include stocks in Selfridges department stores
Main Products (A) Coats and Jackets; (B) Dresses; (C) Jeans; (D) Knitwear; (E)
Lingerie; (F) Skirts; (G) Sportswear; (H) Swim and Beachwear; (I)
Tops, Tshirts, Polos and Blouses; (J) Trousers and Leggings; (K)
Underwear; (L) Sweat Tops and Hoodies
Main Brand (A) Early Days; (B) Rebel; (C) YD; (D) Atmosphere; (E) Ocean
Club; (F) Love to Lounge; (G) Opia; (H) No Secret; (I) Denim Co.;
(J) Secret Possessions; (K) Cedar Wood State
Yearly Sales (Overall) USD 6.26 billion revenue in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) United Kingdom; (B) Spain; (C) Ireland; (D) Germany; (E) Por-
tugal; (F) Netherlands; (G) France; (H) Austria; (I) Belgium
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) UK (63%); (B) Iberia (16%); (C) Ireland (15%); (D) Northern
Continental Europe (7%) of total stores in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Provides financial support to the workers and families who were
working in the factory that produced garments for Primark; (B) Ac-
cord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh in 2013
Source Primark History, Products and Brands; Associated British Foods;
ABF Report; Relationship with Bangladesh; Oanda Exchange Rate
Appendix J. Large Buyers’ Factsheets 223
Table J.8: Tesco
Name of the Firm Tesco
Description (A) A multinational grocery and general merchandise retailer; (B)
Headquart located in Cheshunt, Hertfordshire, England, United King-
dom; (C) The second-largest retailer in the world after Walmart, as
measured by profits and revenues; (D) Operates stores in 12 coun-
tries across Asia, Europe, and North America; (E) The grocery mar-
ket leader in the UK, Ireland, Malaysia, and Thailand; (F) Clothing
brands include Cherokee, Stone Bay, True, and F+F (formerly Flo-
rence for women and Fred for men)
Parent Company Teso PLC
Description of Parent
Company
Not Apllicable
Year of Creation 1919
Country of Origin England
Founder Jack Cohen
Relevant M&A (A) Founded in 1919 by Jack Cohen as a group of market stalls; (B)
Purchased 70 Williamson’s stores in 1957, 200 Harrow Stores outlets
in 1959, 212 Irwins stores in 1960, winning the deal against Express
Dairies’ Premier Supermarkets, 97 Charles Phillips stores in 1964, and
the Victor Value chain in 1968 which was sold to Bejam in 1986; (C)
Completed the takeover of the Hillards chain of 40 supermarkets in
the North of England in May 1987 for £220 million; (D) Took over
the supermarket chain William Low in 1994, beating Sainsbury’s for
control of the Dundee-based firm, which operated 57 stores; (E) Pur-
chased the retail arm of Associated British Foods in 1997, consisting
of the Quinnsworth, Stewarts and Crazy Prices chains in the Ireland
and Northern Ireland, and its associated businesses, for £640 million;
(F) Formed a business alliance with Esso, a part of Exxonmobil, in-
cluding several petrol filling stations on lease from Esso in 1997; (G)
Signed a franchise agreement with Trent Ltd, part of the Tata group,
to supply Star Bazaar with exclusive access to our retail expertise in
2008
Main Products (A) Coats and Jackets; (B) Dresses; (C) Jeans; (D) Knitwear; (E) Lin-
gerie; (F) Shorts and Skirts; (G) Sportswear; (H) Swim and Beach-
wear; (I) Tops, Tshirts, Polos and Blouses; (J) Trousers and Leg-
gings; (K) Underwear and Nightwear; (L) Playsuits and Jumpsuits;
(M) Socks and Tights; (N) Hoodies; (O) Komonos and Chinos; (P)
Kids and Uniforms
Main Brand (A) Cherokee; (B) F&F
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 113.20 billion (sales inc. VAT) in 2013; (B) USD 100.23
billion (revenue exc. VAT) in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
USD 29.43 billion (26% of sales are general merchandise, clothing, and
electricals) in 2013
Markets (A) United Kingdom; (B) Mainland China; (C) Czech Republic; (D)
Hungary; (E) Republic of Ireland; (F) Japan; (G) Malaysia; (H)
Poland; (I) Slovakia; (J) South Korea; (K) Thailand; (L) Turkey;
(M) United States (N) India; (O) Kipa
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) United Kingdom (67%); (B) Asia (17%); (C) Europe (15%) of
sales in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
”(A) Provided support to factories to improve their people manage-
ment, ethical leadership and new production techniques through the
development by Tesco and the UK Government’s Department for In-
ternational Development (DfID) Responsible and Accountable Gar-
ment Sector (RAGS) of the Apparel Skills Foundation’s Programme;
(B) The pilot programme in May 2012 showed the following results:
19% increase in work per hour pay; 16% decrease in monthly working
hours; 45% decrease in labour turnover; 25% decrease in absenteeism;
20% increase in the efficiency on the pilot line; (C) Participated in
the pilot project for cleaner production of textiles in Bangladesh, to-
gether with other brands and retialers, resulting in the saving in 18
fabric mills of an annual equivalent of 300 million litres of water, 19000
tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions and GBP 520000”
Source Tesco History; Tesco Products and Brands; Relationship with
Bangladesh; Tesco Report; Oanda Exchange Rate
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Table J.9: Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH Corp.)
Name of the Firm Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH Corp.)
Description (A) American leading dress shirt brand and top dress shirt brand syn-
onymous with men’s style; (B) Introduced the patented soft-folding
collar in 1921, and has been associated with stylish, affordable shirts
since then
Parent Company Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH Corp.)
Description of Parent
Company
(A) PVH Corp. an American clothing company owning brands such
as Tommy Hilfiger, Calvin Klein, Van Heusen, IZOD, Arrow; (B)
Owns licenses brands such as Geoffrey Beene, BCBG Max Azria,
Chaps, Sean John, Kenneth Cole New York, JOE Joseph Abboud
and MICHAEL Michael Kors
Year of Creation 1881
Country of Origin Pennsylvania
Founder Moses and Isaac Phillips
Relevant M&A ”(A) Incorporated in 1976 as a successor to the business begun in
1881; (B) D. Jones & Sons merged with Phillips in 1903; (C) Isaac
Phillips met John Van Heusen, created their most popular line of
shirts (Van Heusen) and renamed the corporation to Phillips-Van
Heusen in the 1950s; (D) Received a patent for a self-folding collar
in 1919 and released the product to the public in 1921; (E) Intro-
duced the first collar-attached shirt in 1929 and the Bass Weejun in
1936; (F) Launched Geoffrey Beene shirts in 1982; (G) Acquired G.H.
Bass in 1987, Izod brand in 1995, Arrow brand in 2000, Calvin Klein
company in 2002, Superba, Inc. in 2007 (owning necktie licenses for
brands such as Arrow, DKNY, Tommy Hilfiger, Nautica, Perry El-
lis, Ted Baker, Michael Kors, Joseph Abboud, Original Penguin and
Jones New York), and Tommy Hilfiger in 2010 (for 3 billion US dol-
lars); (H) Began making men’s clothing under the Timberland name
in 2008, with women’s clothing the following year; (I) Pulled Van
Heusen brand out of European trading market due to losses in the
third quarter of 2010
In November 2013 PVH sold the G.H. Bass brand and all of its assets,
images and licenses to AM Retail Group”
Main Products (A) Casual Shirts; (B) Dress Shirts; (C) Loungewear; (D) Neckwear;
(E) Pants; (F) Sweaters; (G) Womens; (H) Big and Tall
Main Brand (A) Calvin Klein; (B) Tommy Hilfiger; (C) Heritage Brands (Van
Heusen, IZOD, Arrow, Speedo, Warner’s, Olga); (D) Licensed Brands
under Heritage Brands (Chaps, DKNY, Donald J. Trump, Geoffrey
Beene, Kenneth Cole NY, Kenneth Cole Reaction, Michael Kors,
SEANJOHN, Ted Baker London, Valentino Garavani)
Yearly Sales (Overall) USD 8.22 billion in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) United States; (B) United Kingdom; (C) Australia; (D) Canda;
(E) India
Market Share in North
America and Interna-
tional
(A) North America (65%); (B) International (45% of which 20% Asia
and Latin America)
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, broadly in-
specting factory and providing safety and training program in the
garment industry, in 2013; (B) Participated in the Steering Commit-
tee of the Accord
Source Van Heusen History; Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH Corp.) History; Van
Heusen Products; Relationship with Bangladesh-Workers Rights Con-
sortium; Relationship with Bangladesh; PVH Report;
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Table J.10: VF Corporation
Name of the Firm VF Corporation
Description American clothing corporation selling jeanswear, underwear, day-
packs, and workwear
Parent Company VF Corporation
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1899
Country of Origin Pennsylvania
Founder John Barbey
Relevant M&A (A) First established as Reading Glove and Mitten Manufacturing
Company in Pennsylvania in October 1899 by John Barbey and oth-
ers; (B) Started with a 320-square-foot factory leased for 60 US dollars
per month and was incorporated in Pennsylvania in the same year;
(C) Changed the name Vanity Fair Mills and manufactured under-
garments in 1919; (D) Began selling shares to the public in 1951; (E)
Acquired H.D. Lee Company (Lee Jeans) in 1969 and changed the
corporate name to VF Corporation reflecting a more diverse product
line; (F) Acquired Blue Bell Inc., owner of Wrangler and JanSport,
in 1986, doubling the size of VF and making it the largest publicly
held clothing company; (G) Sold the Lee brand jeans, in 2005 after
parting ways with Fallon Worldwide in Minneapolis, part of the Pub-
licis Groupe; (H) Sold the underwear business to Fruit of the Loom
in 2007; (I) Acquired Majestic Athletic in 2007; (J) Purchased Seven
for all Mankind and Lucy Activewear in 2007
Main Products (A) Athletic and Sports Wear; (B) Jeans and Denims; (C) Women,
Girls and Toddlers; (D) Pants and Shorts; (E) T-shirts
Main Brand (A) Wrangler; (B) Lee Jeans; (C) Rustlers; (D) 7 For all Mankind; (E)
20X; (F) Chic; (G) Rock and Republic; (H) Ella Moss; (I) Bulwark;
(J) Majestic; (K) Nautica; (L) The North Face; (M) Smartwool; (N)
Red Kap; (O) Horace Small; (P) Splendid; (Q) Timberland; (R) Lucy
Let’s Go; (S) Nautica
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 11.3 billion in 2013; (B) USD 10.77 billion in 2012
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) U.S.A.; (B) International (Western Europe, Japan, Eastern Eu-
rope, China, and South America)
Market Share in U.S.A.
and International
(A) U.S.A. (62%); (B) International (38%) in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Bangladesh Fire and Safety and Building Structure Plan in 2013;
(B) Health and safety; (C) Training and capacity building; (D) Edu-
cation and community development
Source Van Heusen History; VF Corp Brands; Relationship with Bangladesh;
VF Report; Oanda Exchange Rate
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Table J.11: C&A
Name of the Firm C&A Europe (C&A)
Description (A) Dutch international chain of fashion retail clothing stores with
branches in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey; (B) European head of-
fices in Vilvoorde, Belgium and Du¨sseldorf, Germany; (C) Part of the
cityscape in many parts of Europe; (D) Named after the initials of
names of its founders Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer
Parent Company Cofra Holding AG
Description of Parent
Company
(A) Cofra Group founded when the first C&A store was opened by
brothers Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer in Sneek, Netherlands
in 1841; (B) Established in 1911 in Zug, Switzerland specialising in
retail, real estate, financial services, private equity and renewable en-
ergy; (C) Owns the international chain of clothing stores C&A; (D)
Manages network of stores and online-shops in Europe, Brazil, Mex-
ico, and China aiming to provide high quality and affordable fashion
for the whole family
Year of Creation 1841
Country of Origin Germany
Founder Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer
Relevant M&A (A) Managed to have an expansive network of stores and online-shops
in Europe, Brazil, Mexico, and China; (B) Opened textile warehouse
in Nethrelands in 1841; (C) Introduced standard sizes as well as the
customer-friendly option to exchange goods; (D) Ventured in retail
banking with its product C&A Money; (E) Closed last store in UK in
2001; (F) Withdrawn market in Argentina in 2009
Main Products (A) Ladies; (B) Men; (C) Young Fashion; (D) Boys; (E) Girls; (F)
Babies
Main Brand (A) Yessica; (B) Yessica Pure; (C) Your Sixth Sense; (D) Angelo
Litrico; (E) Westbury; (F) Canda; (G) Clockhouse; (H) Baby Club;
(I) Palomino; (J) Here & There; (K) Rodeo Sport
Yearly Sales (Overall) USD 9.47 billion total gross sales in 2011
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Income mainly generated from sale of clothing and accessories
Markets (A) Europe; (B) Brazil; (C) Mexico; (D) China
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) Germany (45%); France (9%); (C) Iberian (8%); (D) Belgium
and Luxemberg (8%); (E) Netherlands (7%); (F) Switzerland (7%);
(G) Eastern Europe (7%); (H) Austria (6%); (I) New Markets, i.e.,
Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Italy, and Turkey (2%) of sales in 2011
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Opened vocational training centre by Dutch ambassador in
Dhaka; (B) Accord on Fire and Building Safety in 2013
Source C&A History; C&A Products; Relationship with Bangladesh; Cofra
Holding AG History; C&A Report; C&A Social Responsibility; Oanda
Exchange Rate
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Table J.12: Carrefour
Name of the Firm Carrefour S.A. (Carrefour)
Description (A) French multinational retailer headquartered in Boulogne Billan-
court, France; (B) One of the largest hypermarket chains in the world
with 1452 hypermarkets at the end of 2011, the fourth largest retail
group in the world in terms of revenue after Wal-Mart, Tesco and
Costco, and the third in profit after Wal-Mart and Tesco; (C) Oper-
ates mainly in Europe, Argentina, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia; (D) Word carrefour
means ”crossroads” and ”public square” in French
Parent Company Carrefour S.A.
Description of Parent
Company
Not Applicable
Year of Creation 1959
Country of Origin France
Founder Marcel Fournier, Denis Defforey and Jacques Defforey
Relevant M&A Merged with Promodes, known as Continent, one of its major com-
petitors in the French market in 1999
Main Products (A) Women’s; (B) Men’s; (C) Children’s
Main Brand TEX
Yearly Sales (Overall) USD 99.45 billion net sales in 2013
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
Difficult to find information on sales of Tex, Carrefour’s textile brand,
but a range of the brand were introduced in French and Romanian
stores in 2013.
Markets (A) Asia; (B) Europe; (C) Middle East; (D) Africa; (E) Latin Amer-
ica;
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) France (47%); (B) Other Europe (26%); (C) Latin America (18%);
(D) Asia (11%) of sales in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Human Rights; (B) Fire and Building Safety Alliance
Source Carrefour History; Carrefour Brands and Products; Relationship
with Bangladesh-Human Rights; Relationship with Bangladesh-Fire
and Building Safety Alliance; Relationship with Bangladesh-Fire and
Building Safety Alliance; Carrefour Annual Report; Oanda Exchange
Rate
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Table J.13: Kmart
Name of the Firm Kmart Corporation (Kmart)
Description (A) American chain of discount department stores known for its Blue
Light Specials, a promotion of discounted products in a specfic part of
the store; (B) Headquarter in Illinois, United States; (C) Purchased
Sears in 2005, forming a new corporation under the name Sears Hold-
ings Corporation
Parent Company Sears Holdings Corporation
Description of Parent
Company
(A) Sears Holdings Corporation a leading integrated retailer focused
on delivering digital and physical shopping experiences to its mem-
bers; (B) Host of a social shopping platform Shop Your Way offering
rewards for shopping at Sears and Kmart; (C) Operates through its
subsidiaries Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart Corporation with
more than 2350 full-line and specialty retail stores in the United States
and Canada.
Year of Creation (A) 1899 founded S.S. Kresge; (B) 1977 renamed to Kmart Corpora-
tion
Country of Origin U.S.A.
Founder Sebastian S. Kresge
Relevant M&A (A) Founded in 1899 and was incorporated in 1902 in Delaware; (B)
Reincorporated in Michigan in 1916; (C) Founded Canadian sub-
sidiary S.S. Kresge Ltd. in 1929; (D) Organized Kmart Australia
Limited by S.S. Kresge and G.J. Coles and Coy Limited in 1968; (E)
Moved headquarters from Detroit to Michigan; (F) Exchanged 51%
interest in Kmart Australia Limited for 20% interest in G.J. Coles
and Coy Limited in 1978 which increased to 21% in 1985, and was
divested in 1994; (G) Acquired Walden Book Company and Home
Centers of America in 1984; (H) Sold most U.S. Kresge and Jupiter
stores to McCrory Corporation; (I) Purchased The Sports Author-
ity in 1990; (J) Acquired 22% interest in OfficeMax in 1990, which
increased to 90% a year after; (K) Acquired Borders, Inc. in 1992;
(L) Purchased stores in Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 which
was later sold in 1996; (M) Sold the operations of Builders Square
and Kmart Canada; (N) Forged a long-term merchandising agreement
with Martha Stewart Omnimedia, Inc. and with Fleming in 2001; (O)
Acquired BlueLight.com, company’s e-commerce subsidiary, in 2001;
(P) Kmart Holding Corporation merged with Sears, Roeback and Co.
in 2004
Main Products (A) Women’s; (B) Men’s; (C) Children’s
Main Brand (A) Alphaline; (B) Bongo; (C) Canyon River Blues; (D) Covington;
(E) Craftsman; (F) Dream Out Loud; (G) Jaclyn Smith; (H) Joe
Baxer; (I) Land’s End; (J) Latina Life; (K) Parallel; (L) Personal In-
dentity; (M) Route 66; (N) Sesame Street; (O) Structure; (P) Tough-
skins; (Q) Two Hearts; (R) Winnie the Pooh
Yearly Sales (Overall) (A) USD 36.19 billion revenues in 2013 (Sears Holdings Corporation);
(B) USD 13.19 billion revenues in 2013 (Kmart); (C) USD 19.20 billion
revenues in 2013 (Saers Domestic); (D) USD 3.80 billion revenues in
2013 (Sears Canada)
Yearly Sales (Gar-
ment)
(A) USD 11.24 billion revenues (Sears Holdings Corporation); (B)
USD 4.30 billion revenues in 2013 (Kmart); (C) USD 5.20 billion rev-
enues in 2013; (D) USD 1.74 billion revenues in 2013 (Sears Canada)
Markets (A) U.S.A.; (B) Purto Rico; (C) U.S. Virgin Islands; (D) Guam
Market Share by Coun-
try/Region
(A) U.S.A. (97%); (B) Puerto Rico (2%); (C) U.S. Virgin Islands
(0.30%); (D) Guam (0.09%) of total stores in 2013
Relationship with
Bangladesh Suppliers
(A) Safety and worker’s rights; (B) Regular audits with regular sup-
pliers
Source Kmart History; Kmart Brands and Products; Sears Holdings Corp.
History; Relationship with Bangladesh; Sears Holding Corp. Annual
Report
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